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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
MAKING AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY WORK: ASSESSING CONDITIONS FOR
DEMOCORATIC STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN RWANDA
by
Fiacre Bienvenu
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor John F. Clark, Major Professor
This dissertation offers a single case in-depth analysis of factors precluding civil
society from democratizing African polities. Synthesizing existing literature on Rwanda,
I first undertake an historical search to trace the origins and qualities of civil society in the
colonial era. This effort shows, however, that the central authority—commencing before
the inception of the Republic in 1962—consistently organized civil society to buttress its
activities, not to challenge them.

Next, using ethnographic research, I challenge

conventional economic and institutional accounts of civil society’s role in democratization.
I show that institutional change and the economic clout of organized groups are marginal
and transient in effect, and hence possess considerable limitations to democratize state and
non-state-groups relations. I argue that the Genocide and its historical materials, social and
economic precariousness, and neo-patrimonial power configurations have erected a
prevailing political culture that still conditions how Rwanda’s state-society relations are
imagined, realized, and challenged.

Conversely, just as that political culture has

lengthened the reach of the state into society, limiting the potential autonomy of civil

x

society, it has also been the basis for rebuilding the society, restoring the state’s authority,
and enacting major state-building oriented reforms. Consequently, for CSOs to induce a
liberal democratic order in domestic politics, subsequent activism will require long-term
strategic and organic investment of actors into the dispersed, parochial strands of
democracy first, not into ongoing confrontational, yet fruitless, political warfare that
hinders social capital formation and that civil society is not yet equipped to win.
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CHAPTER I

TOWARDS THE STUDY OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Background
This research began with a basic paradox: the “no democracy without a vibrant
civil society” dictum common in the West confronted a reality of “a large civil society
without democracy” in Africa. Since the late 1980s, the hope was high that a magic bullet
to the problem of authoritarian rule in African states had at last been found. That is,
enabling the rise of organized social forces represented the most peaceful and enduring
antidote to the old, undemocratic governance typical of African states at that time. Western
social science was convinced that popular democratic rule would not come about unless
there was a civil society to spur and support it. The Cold War had just ended, East
European states were becoming democracies and reigning democratic powers were not
going to continue to support these states unless they opened up politically. The conditions
for democratization seemed ripe. The wide view within academia and world policy
institutes was that Africa, too, could democratize.

Indeed, more than a whiff of a

democratic revolution was detectable within many African states.

New African

democracies soon began to model themselves after their Western counterparts. African
leaders, scholars, and opposition elites, all believed it. As Omar Bongo, the former
president of Gabon, memorably put it: “the wind from the East [was] shaking the coconut
trees.”1 But three decades later, civil society has not transformed the overall democratic
outlook of the continent, where “electoral autocracy” is now the norm. The preached and

1

Cited in Thompson, Alex. 2016. An Introduction to African Politics. Routledge, p. 246; and also in
Wiseman, John A. 1996. The New Struggle for Democracy in Africa. Aldershot: Avebury, p.70.
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mentored democracy has not yet come into being, despite the hard work that civil society
has continued to do. Major institutions that rate democratic performance around the world
agree on one thing: Africa remains the least democratic region of the world, despite the
continuing expansion of civil society across the continent.

Research Problem Statement and the Significance
Using a single case (Rwanda) analysis, this research examines the origins of the
inability of civil society to undergird democratization in African states. The central
question is, why has the impressive development of civil society in Rwanda not produced
the democratic outcome that the political science convention had predicted in the 1990s?
This is an important question because the philosophy guiding the effort to democratize
African states by the West, through development of a robust civil society, still presents a
puzzle. And this puzzle exists on three levels. The first one is theoretical; and that is, while
civil society is not a singular variable in the ways in which democratic culture takes root
across societies, its universalized incidence on democratic outcome is either overestimated
or misunderstood. Rwanda’s case, for example, negates that logic. Rwanda’s political
reality does not align with the established philosophy that “the more vibrant civil society,
the more democratic the state”. The second implication is empirical. If the consequences
of civil society on democratization have so far been marginal or almost nil, then this
suggests that we do not yet have a full understanding of the true nature of the civil society
forces that we have often connected to democratization. There is a need to begin to take
interest in the constitutive forces of that civil society, beyond the numerical and prima facie
characteristics it presents in that region of the world, so as to understand the kind of forces
from it that give impetus to democracy. There is an urge to investigate civil society not
2

just as a plethora of organized groups—with an assumed harmony and shared aims that
seek to challenge the state—but also as a vast spectrum of groups whose goals may not
primarily be about addressing the state at all. It also means that we need to disaggregate
civil society groups in their infinite horizontal variety, and examine which categories of
them that have a natural vocation to democratize the structures of the state. The third
implication is policy oriented. Namely, if Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have always
been developed by the aid community with the ultimate aim in mind that they will
challenge the state, but only opposite the outcome is happening, then a fresh look at their
actual practices can inform policy-makers on how they might practically support
liberalization or development.

Problem in Current Debate
As I embarked on this research project and began to read what non-Rwandan
students of Rwanda (Reyntjens 2009; 2011; 3013; Strauss 2011; Strauss 2013; Newbury
1992a; 1992b) had written about the conflict, political violence, the Genocide, the history,
governance, civil society, different regimes, and much more, I was surprised by many
things, but one thing stuck out.

I struggled to understand how all of the thematic

components in Rwanda’s political system came together. Scholarship had addressed those
issues as if they came from different and unrelated countries. I knew that all these events
were inextricably tied to each other and that one overarching force crosscut all major events
that have happened in Rwanda’s political trajectory. And as the aim for my research
became even clearer—explaining how the re-vitalization of civil society failed to provoke
real democratization—I became even more puzzled. There was no theoretical framework
to guide my understanding of the various analyses of Rwanda’s events and its non3

democratic trajectory. Meanwhile, I became aware of the history of civil society and of
where it had been successfully a source of democratic performance (Putnam 1993; de
Tocqueville 2003; Fukuyama 1995; 2001; 2004). I was trying to see if there existed some
common thread in making civil society work in those other places. I was looking for a
single undercurrent that could underpin the discussion on Rwanda’s political events in pre, during, and the post-multi-party eras.
As a Rwandan, I naturally gravitated towards the inward explanations about
Rwanda’s “pseudo-democracy”. Some scholars of Rwanda had written exhaustively about
these issues, while others had inaccurately linked facts and explanations, but an extended
inward phenomenological analysis of democratization, aimed at general readers, was
nowhere to be found. In the literature, it seemed as though political events in Rwanda had
always occurred outside the comparative realm of history, culture, geography, and time.
The ontology of Rwanda’s civil society was ignored in the broad comparative political
discourse. Most writings exuded the commonly made mistake in writing about Africa that
Reid (2011, 136, 155; see also Clark 2003) alludes to as “presentism,” or the reductionist
and foreshortening compressing of events to what is relevant only now. There seemed to
be a missing link in the literature on Rwanda about what apparently made civil society
irrelevant to the possibilities for democratic political reform. Reflections on civil society
in Rwanda treated it as a static category rather than a process. Yet, there appeared to be in
Rwanda a powerful but unknown force that had allowed the occurrence of some very
momentous events (e.g., the Genocide) and altered their course, but had been unable to
change the public’s political behavior. I suspected that nameless and unvoiced forces were
the missing link in our understanding of the workings of Rwanda’s democratic experiment.
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I eventually concluded that the force behind the unchanging democratic outcome lay
somewhere in cultural explanations.

A New Approach to the Problem of Civil Society and Democratization
My task was made all the more complicated when I decided to explore Rwanda’s
political culture as the central explanatory variable to my central question. I lacked a strong
theoretical base from which to begin my new research. The theorizing available with a
discussion on political culture in Africa—such as the work of Harrison and Huntington and
their colleagues (2000, 2-13, 14-28, 29-43, 44-54, 65-77, 80-97, 98-111, 126-140, 178188, 268-281, 282-296)—was helpful but offered only limited framing power. Harrison
and Huntington treat culture as the root of authoritarianism and underdevelopment in
African states. This, however, is a Euro-American centric view. Actually, Harrison (2000)
elsewhere claims that underdevelopment (even though he was talking about Latin America)
is a state of mind, reinforcing the view that culture is split into a dual category of good and
bad. I therefore ran into another conceptual difficulty. Positing that culture was the
missing link in dysfunctional relationship between civil society and the state, this view
would imply that Rwanda’s culture was inimical to liberal democratic practices. But I
wanted to test a different reading of it. That is, I suspected that a reading of Rwanda’s
culture from the inside would reveal a more complex role for it in conditioning state-society
relations.
Accordingly, I turned to the alternative framework of state in society as proffered
by Migdal (2001). That is, a framework that examines the state not as just a domination,
but as both and integrated and dispersed domination. It is a framework that explores the
state beyond the Weberian construction as an invulnerable organization whose behavioral
5

choices are disconnected from societal influence. This framework allows us to see that
leaders behave oddly not because they are naturally meant to be so, but because the state
is a realm that functions in the broad constraints stemming from the same state power
structures but also from the societal realities. This framework treats both the state and the
society as two organized entities engaged in implicit alliances that transform each other
and their behavior continuously. From there, I looked at the organic composition of
Rwanda’s civil society by analyzing its horizontal diversity first. I wanted to look closely
to have an inward understanding of how Rwanda’s civil society is actually composed,
without reference to dominant Western concepts of it. I disaggregate it to examine the
components that made it up, in order to determine whether such elements aligned well with
the mission of democratization. Then, I came up with a three-type category to describe
Rwanda’s civil society: Balloon, Mushroom, and Minion groups. I observed that civil
society was not and has never been a group of interests whose goals somehow converged
around addressing the state. Rather, it is a pluralistic realm in which many CSOs have no
explicit intention to challenge the state. Following Migdal, I describe the state’s and civil
society leaders as culturally integrated actors.

I use the terms CSOs, NGOs,

Balloons/Minions interchangeably. In each of such instances, I meant the organizations
that are not grassroots or rural (that I otherwise refer to as Mushrooms).

Methods and Structure of the Inquiry
This research work developed from a set of eclectic methodological techniques,
essentially combining theory analysis and a “thick description,” a technique used in
political anthropology to describe origins and the workings of phenomena. Between Spring
2012 and Summer 2015, I conducted approximately sixty semi-structured interviews with
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several professionals and key informants working in various civil society organizations. In
Summer 2015, I spent twelve weeks in Rwanda and conducted eight Focus Group
Discussions (FGDs) with members of a wide array of grassroots associations across all the
four provinces of Rwanda and the City of Kigali. I also interviewed members of the
government including the Ministry of Local Governance (MINALOC), the National Unity
and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), Rwanda Governance Board (RGB), and the
Rwanda Development Board (RDB). I interviewed three members of the parliament and
attended three parliamentary hearing sessions open to the public. Members of the Rwanda
civil society platform, the private sector, media, and other local parastatal agencies offered
invaluable discussions to this inquiry. I gathered copious archival materials from head
offices of the organizations I visited in Kigali, and also available on their websites, and on
the Internet. I interviewed acquaintances, friends, and former college professors and
professional colleagues in Kigali who referred me to others most of the time. Over Skype
and several email exchanges that went on over some years, I continuously received
assistance remotely from a network of a people from Rwanda. I was thus able to complete
missing information, update my previous reporting, and receive additional publication
reports.
On the grassroots level, my interviews consisted in knowing the origins and the
philosophy undergirding Mushrooms. I asked members and leaders what factors had led
to their creation, what kind of activities they conducted, the benefits members gained from
joining the organizations, the regime that administratively governed them, their
involvement in the communities, the influence they were subjected to, and their vision for
members and their communities. On the second upper level (Balloons and Minions), I
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wanted to decipher whether there existed a state-oriented democratization mission and the
modus operandi and also the daily philosophy within their CSO bureaucracy. I looked at
their mission statement, vision, and periodic activity reports. Through interviews with
leaders of such CSOs and also key informants in the realm of civil society, I sought to
determine the degree to which organizations were drawn into the mission of channeling
popular demands and hence addressing the state in any way and whether there existed some
concrete achievements from such experience. But most crucially, the unstructured set of
interviews with this group of informants were geared towards helping me gauge the links
and disconnects between individual constraints in Rwanda (social, political, and economic)
and the principles of democratization in the realm of civil society activism.
By interviewing members of the international community too, including the
European Union mission representation in Kigali, the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA),
USAID and the U.S. Embassy, the Swiss Cooperation, and the Germany Technical
Cooperation (GTZ), I sought to understand whether the ways in which their enforcement
of policies and programs aimed to develop civil society and hence democratization were
actually helping or hampering the prospects of liberalizing Rwanda’s political system.
Therefore, I asked stakeholders in this category of informants what their philosophy for
supporting civil society was, since when had such been happening, the results and examples
of change thus far realized, how they selected objectives, how they selected CSO partners,
how they mitigated constraints stemming from the history of Rwanda, their strategies
(ground or top-down), how they worked with the government and what kind of relationship
they two have had, etc.

All that added to the wealth of my methods and of this

phenomenological study of the Rwandan civil society.

8

I collected only a limited amount of quantitative data. These came from my field
gathered evidence that I organized in an empirical format (see chapters four and six). More
quantitative data came from government statistics such as the National Institute of Statistics
of Rwanda (NISR) published between 2005 and 2016, the Demographic Health Survey of
2015, the National Unity and Reconciliation Barometer, the Ministry of Education
(MINEDUC) of 2016, the Civil Society Platform Mapping Report (2011), publications
from civil society organizations, as well as other quantitative information on Rwanda
available in the United States. This select set of data provided hard evidence on the
Rwanda’s civil society – democratization phenomenon; they shed light on the problematic
disconnect that exists between the democratization project (that started in the 1990s) and
the actual domestic realities of civil society organizations. They were invaluable to prove
the limitations of programs that are still underway in creating a new democratic course in
Rwanda. The method used in this inquiry is therefore both deductive and inductive at the
same time. It is deductive in the sense that it sought to test existing theories about civil
society and democratization in Africa. But it is also inductive to the extent that it aimed to
acquire information for new theories by asking my respondents to describe their social
relations in their own terms, rather than in the terms proffered by a dominant social science
paradigm.
This dissertation is divided into five main chapters in addition to the introductory
chapter and the conclusions. Its structure is dictated by the contexts for state-society
relations that I believe to be most relevant. Chapter two reviews the literature on the
concept of civil society, democratization, and state building. It focuses on the missing
theoretical connections between the processes of democratization and civil society. It also
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presents conceptual gaps, by pointing especially to the problematic approach of describing
civil society as a static category, instead of, a process. That is, I argue that one cannot
evaluate the role of civil society in Africa outside domestic forces that have created it and
continue to shape it. This chapter provides a new framework for assessing the association
between civil society and the state; it insists that we must understand the horizontal
composition of civil society, and its cultural origins, as well as its vertical relationship with
the state.
Chapter three offers a historical review of civil society in Rwanda. It traces the
first civil society movement in Rwanda back to its origins in colonial times. It then shows
not just the various historical challenges that this civil society has always encountered, but
also its origins and the historical forces that shaped its rise. I divide events into three major
historical epochs: a) the indigenous and pre-modern civil society era, which begins
sometime back in time before the first day of Rwanda as an independent Republic; b) the
period of 1990-1994, or the democratization era, i.e., corresponding to the period of
political liberalization, as well as the crescendo in rise of civil society groups, political
parties, and media in Rwanda. It was during this period that the democratic experiment
took place and failed. And finally, c) the renaissance of civil society era (1994-2017), or
the post-democratization and post-Genocide period, corresponding to the Third Republic.
That is the period when we see a resurgence of civil society after the failure of the effort to
establish state-society relations on a democratic basis. In this last period, civil society was
again re-invented, though there were elements of historical continuity rooted in the
persistence of key elements of Rwandan political culture.
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Chapter four examines economic accounts of the relationship that exists between
civil society and the state.

It tests the extent to which civil society’s activism for

democratization is predicated on its own economic power (financial self-reliance), and also
that of the larger economic environment of Rwanda. It addresses the economic factors
(and their connection to civil society’s battle to democratize the state) at three levels:
individual, group, and national. The first level directs our attention to the question of
whether members of civil society are joining groups primarily because they seek to
challenge the state, or because they essentially see a group as a channel through which to
better their material lives. At the second level, I examine CSOs and their democratic
engagement (and the results that has produced) in relation to their “economic capacity,” a
metric I created to assess the financial autonomy and sustainability of a group. Lastly, I
examine civil society in the wider context of the national economic environment, i.e., the
environment in which the state is the major economic operator, making both policies and
unstoppable interventions in the economy. I examine the extent to which such conditions
are hampering or helping civil society to be autonomous and to challenge the state.
Chapter five examines an institutional explanation of why civil society in Rwanda
evolved as it did through the three periods. I explore institutions from a mainly legalistic
perspective, because dealing with institutions is to deal with the law. My examination
reveals that the law has always reflected extended forces of Rwanda’s political culture
throughout Rwanda’s post-independence history. It hence demonstrates the institutional
challenges that civil society faces in the societal question for democratization when legal
and institutional instruments are congenially designed in its disfavor.
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Chapter six, core to the central argument in this research, analyzes Rwanda’s
political culture. It tackles the phenomenon from three analytical windows. First, it
examines Rwandans’ “deference to the state,” and how the general characteristics of
Rwandans’ political behavior have always characterized how civil society behaves as a
collective. Second, I examine trust, seeking to determine the degree to which both
interpersonal trust and institutional trust affect the ability of members of civil society to act
together or share goals in their overall struggles to address the state. Last, I examine
political culture through the sub-category of “risk aversion.” I describe ways in which the
behavior of civil society is significantly influenced by memories of the experiences of the
past, when civil society was free but the outcome became violence. Risk aversion is a
rational and calculated response to a perceived threat, which undermines the outcome that
would otherwise result from challenging the state officials without existence of such risks.
The last chapter provides general conclusions and nuanced reflections on the major
findings of this dissertation. I particularly problematize the traditional ways Western social
science has conceptualized and developed the concept of civil society for Africa. I review
the limitations of such an approach when the cultural environment continues to resist it,
and also offer recommendations on the future study of democratization in such domestic
conditions.

Limitations of the Inquiry
While my arguments are certainly a critique of the previous work on Rwanda’s
political development, in no way do I pretend that this work is a definitive or final account
of Rwandan civil society. The impetus for this research project stems from my previous
work in the NGO world in Rwanda for over ten years, where I was personally implicated
12

in the work of developing civil society. That experience heightened the intellectual intrigue
I experienced as I reviewed the main literature on the subject throughout my years of postgraduate study. There seemed to be a profound disconnect between the lessons about civil
society that I had learned through experience, and the academic side of studying the
concept on the other. My primary aim for this research was to provoke a new conversation
about the role we believe that civil society plays in democratic transition-consolidation
process, and also about the hard work that goes into building democratization forces. My
central argument challenges the dominant normative approach that tends to overlook—and
often look down on—the local forces that participate in the processes of state building.
The role of these local forces must be more fully integrated into our analyses.
Although I have done my best to be objective, I acknowledge the possible
limitations of my study. First, my own Rwanda-centric views may have clouded neutrality
in its ideal form. Yet, throughout my study, I did as much as I could to build arguments
that reconcile both domestic and the international considerations. I strove to recognize the
multiple contexts in which Rwandan state-society relations have evolved. The reason for
doing that comes from the question I have always struggled to answer: how do theoretical
models and real life inform one another? I have always been leery of ideas whose processes
appear as too self-important than the desire to imagine routes for bringing about good social
change. Intellectuals like Joseph Nau (2017, 1-29) say that everything we posit about the
social world is primarily anchored in some kind of individual perspective. He argues that
we all begin with a distinctive social perspective, but we use the laws of social inquiry
called methods to make ourselves falsifiable or otherwise, but that objectivity as a matter
of absolutism is impossible to attain. Rather, what objectivity is about lies in being honest
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and transparent about your facts and claims and then in being open about it by inviting
others to criticize it. Based on my experience and reading, I thought that political culture
was probably at the root of the dysfunctional relationship between civil society and
democratization in Rwanda from the beginning. Nonetheless, I have tried to examine
alternative points of view as honestly as I could. My study shows that both the institutional
and economic contexts are important for understanding state-society relations. Yet both
are subordinate to, and subsumed by, the more over-riding politico-cultural context.
I concede that my methods are more those of a political anthropologist than of a
conventional comparativist political scientist. I relied on purposefully selected set of
interviews, and the groups I chose to interview do not reflect a sophisticated
methodological sampling. The reason I chose to do so is because I sought to organize such
interviews in a manner that was suitable to garner not just optimal, but also a new brand of
information. That is the way I thought was possible to give me pertinent data on the hidden
logic and workings of civil society and its role in Rwanda’s democratic trajectory. Even
though existing datasets as well as other statistics-oriented techniques (such as structured
interviews and surveys) are useful, they have considerable limitations in this type of
phenomenological study. In Rwanda for example, just as in many other societies in Africa,
one can be flawless on methods and yet fall short on the quality (and hence validity) of
their findings. Asking a question systematically does not necessarily make the inquiry
truly rigorous or even invulnerable considering the subtlety and imperceptible social
political realities that still govern life in Rwanda. It is one thing to analyze what people
express in Rwanda, but fathoming what they mean or think is another. On the challenges
stemming from studying democracy in other cultures, see for example the work of Schaffer
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(2000).

Therefore, ethnographic research, which is a technique used in ‘political

anthropology’ but of course limited as all others, provided the advantage of using a
different type of data as well as that of dispensing with contextual complexities and
sensibilities. As an African (and a Rwandan) Africanist, in addition to my domestic
linguistic, cultural, and other social aptitudes, I enjoy certain advantages as a sort of
political anthropologist compared to my non-Rwandan researchers.
In addition, with one single case analysis and its limited scope of data, I do not
pretend to reach conclusions applicable to the totality of the African continent, as the title
of this work might suggest. However, the problem that I discuss is largely viewed in the
literature as an African syndrome. Since we cannot study every country to understand how
its civil society functions, this findings stemming from this single-case research suggests
that we must re-examine the role of civil society in Africa’s democratic trajectories. They
also suggest the need to re-conceptualize the workings of the democratic paradigm in
African states as well as the processes and policies thus far believed to lead to
democratization. This research has therefore focused on Rwanda with the hope that its
significance will be relevant to other cases in Africa.
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CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Scholarship has connected the rise of associational movements to political
liberalization. However, the causal mechanisms that link the two are underspecified,
meaning that the current literature cannot explain why this relationship does not hold in
Africa. This chapter offers a critical review and assesses the gaps in the common Western
assumptions about the impact that civil society development has on democratization. As I
critique the existing conceptualization of the workings of civil society and democracy, I
show the limits of the mainstream framework in both studying and developing civil society
in Africa.

Problem Statement and Research Question
Why has the development of civil society not led to political liberalization in
Rwanda as conventional Political Science wisdom expected? Differently put, when talking
about the failures of democracy in Rwanda—just as elsewhere in Africa—what accounts
for the discrepancies between the theoretical civil society, on the one hand, and the actual
civil society, on the other? Why have we not yet seen change in state’s behavior as a result
of civil society growth and activism in Rwanda? And what is it that continues to preclude
civil society from democratizing the Rwandan polity? That is the question central to this
research. It seeks to explore, understand and explain the failures of civil society to
liberalize political life in Rwanda. While that question has been (differently) asked in the
past (Longman 1999; Monga 1996; Ndegwa 1996; Bratton 1989), it remains very relevant,
primarily because the debate it pertains to has become a dead end. There are still many
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unknowns and unanswered question on what truly enables civil society to democratize the
state and its behavior. In the context of Rwanda, in the study of African politics at large,
as well as in the wider field of Political Science, this is a relevant line of inquiry since we
do not know why “the third wave” of democratization of the 1990s has been a failure in
many parts of Africa, including Rwanda.
It all began in the late 1980s. Both scholars and world policy practitioners had a
much more confident view of civil society organizations than it turned out to be justified.
There was an almost universal optimism that the rise of many independent voluntary
organizations would help end the phenomenon of political Afro-pessimism.

The

anticipation was that an increase of associational life would save Africa from her
embarrassing label of ‘the except for continent.’2 Scholars of democratization linked the
vibrancy of an organized civil society to deepening of democracy, expecting to see the
same relationship in Africa that had emerged in Southern Europe in the 1970s and Eastern
Europe in late 1990s (Bernhard 1993; Keane 1988), in East Asia in the 1990s (Pye 1999;
Kim 1997; Kim 2000), and in South America in the 1980s (Przeworski 1991; Linz and
Stepan 1996).
Students of Africa likewise expected that civil society would create some type of
revolutionary state of affairs for political reforms in Africa (Harbeson, et al. 1994; Bratton

2

Africa is all too often referred to as “the pessimists’ paradise,” other times as “the except-for continent”
(see Weisner, Thomas S., Candice Bradley, and Philip Leroy Kilbride. 1997. African families and the crisis
of social change. Westport, Conn: Bergin & Garvey. Pp. xix-xxxi; see also Collier’s The Bottom Billion,
2008: 64-75). For a detailed and critic review on ‘afro-pessimism,’ see Part one and Part two in Enwezor et
al. (2006). In addition to family and ethnic crises (in connection with the fact that it has some 2,000 different
ethnic identities, and that there are some 750 different languages spoken throughout the continent), Africa is
also confronted with a series of economic plights. It is estimated that real income in all sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) is less than a third of that in South Asia (see chapter 9 on sub-Sahara’s economic and development
environment in Joseph Nau’s Perspectives of International Relations, 2014: 413-424). The total SSA’s
income is slightly more than that of Belgium alone. The median income is equal to the output of a town of
6,000 people in West, while 48% of people in SSA live below the poverty line ($1.25 per day).
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and van de Walle 1992: 27-55; Baker 2002; Osaghae 1994; Osaghae 2005). They
portrayed the unleashing of civil society groups as a catalyst of a “global democratic
revolution of the 21st century” (Huntington 1991: 33) and as a political renaissance in
Africa (Harbeson, et al. 1994; Bratton 1989) that would bring authoritarianism under siege
forever. They expected newly-flourishing civil societies to establish an organic democratic
link between populations and ruling elites (Rothchild and Lawson 1994; Holm and Molutsi
1992: 75-95; Tripp 1997). Exponents of this perspective expected these “intermediary
institutions” to help end the syndrome of a one-party rule culture and other traditions
inimical to inclusive governance, including neopatrimonialism, military rule, personal
autocracy, oligarchy, and repression of civil and political rights (Bratton 1994; 1997;
Osaghae 1994). The prevailing theory had it that an increase in the plurality and autonomy
of social forces would redefine the rules of the political game in Africa (Rothchild and
Lawson 1994; Monga 1996; Tripp 1997).

This view suggested that an expansive

associational life was a vehicle to political transitions (Fatton 1991; Woods 1992; Bratton
1994; 1997), and also to ‘economic change’ (Callaghy and Ravenhill 1994; Diamond and
Plattner 1995) in the continent. In a sense, developing civil society was the most credible
way to bring Africa to democratic standards existing in the West.3
In ordinary conditions, we would have observed a different out of civil society and
political outcomes in Africa throughout the years. The newly-robust civil society groups
would by now have deepened democratization in Rwanda and elsewhere in Africa. They
would have connected the society more closely to the state, channeling people’s demands

3

Michael Bratton justified the crucial role of civil society in transforming African politics in the sense that
“it embodies a core of universal beliefs and practices about the legitimation of, and limits to, state power.’
See “Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa,” Harbeson, Rochild, and Chazan, 1994, p. 52.
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to the authorities. Throughout the continent, they would have filled the vacuum where the
state had failed or was weak. More vibrant civil society organizations would have led more
transitional democracies to have become consolidated democracies. They would also have
been a key development player in domestic economies. In the greater perspective of things,
a revitalized civil society would have tilted the balance of power in state-society relations,
by legitimizing it as a credible and insurmountable voice in the governing processes.
Yet, that has not occurred yet. Despite the increasing number and sophistication of
such civic groups, an organized civil society is still far off those goals. Despite the fact
that millions of Africans have continued to join new associations (Chazan 1999: 75-102;
Uvin 1998), there is no association to be made between civil society and the current status
of democracy in Africa. Throughout the post-1989 era of liberalization, support to
associational movements in Africa by Western groups has not ceased to increase with an
uninterrupted flow of funding and technical backstops (Ottaway & Carothers 2000; Bonnel
et al., 2013; McNeil and Melena 2010). but too little can be assessed with respect to its
association to democratization. Civil society has not channeled people’s demands to the
state, and has often served as a vehicle of state interests (Devarajan et al., 2014; Monga
1999, 48-62; Wiredu 1998). It has not filled the vacuum where the state failed or was weak
(Devarajan et al., 2014; Herbst 2000; Herbst, et al., 2003; Young 1999). Most of the
continent’s democratic model is not palatable to that of the West (Levitsky et al., 2010;
Joseph 1999; Herbst 2000; Herbst et al., 2003). African states, including Rwanda, still
rank behind those of other continents in several areas where a robust civil society was
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expected to have an impact.4 Most of the new civil society groups have remained
deferential to the state, which goes against their most elemental characteristics of civil
society, i.e., autonomy (Ottaway 1997).
Furthermore, the wars and other ethnic conflicts did not decrease as a result of civil
society activism either, e.g., in Rwanda (Longman 2010). Even where transition occurred,
such structures did not lead to democratic consolidation (Bauer 1999: 429-448). Civil
society as a collective has failed to self-impose as one credible, rich, robust, complex,
imaginative, and legitimate force who addresses and can confront the state in the process
of ordering the society including on sensitive issues such as encroachments on civil rights.
Many other groups have instead been co-opted by the state (Saine 2009). There is thus a
legitimate case to be made that contrary to expectations, civil society has not aided the
democratization project in many African states.5 Such has been the case not just in
Rwanda, but also throughout the continent. In the nutshell, civil society has not reinforced
democratic transitions and has not delivered as the world had hoped.

4

See the Freedom House Index: while their assessment of democracy focuses on select indicators of
democratic freedom such as election, press liberties, and only partial components of civil society, Rwanda
has consistently ranked between ‘not free’ and ‘partial free’ sinr
Ce 2011. For additional similar assessments, see also Global Integrity Index since 2009. See also Straus and
Waldorf, Remaking Rwanda (2011), concluding that Rwanda’s post-atrocities model of democracy is a
‘transformative authoritarianism.’
5

To be fair, we should also mention that there is no consensus on the failure of civil society to drive political
change in Africa among Africanists. Some political scientists do believe that certain African countries (e.g.,
Kenya and Zambia) liberalized or democratized as a function of the ‘nature’ of their civil society (VonDoepp
1996; Barkan, et al. 1991; Fatton 1991; Harbeson, et al. 1994). But even those advocates of civil society as
a democratizing force in certain African states have yet to determine what it is exactly about civil society
movement that has led to political reforms. That a civil society is strong in a certain political context does
not necessarily credit such groups the merit of political change. We do not yet know what particular dynamics
and contextual attributes of civil society has led to political reforms in Zambia or Kenya, as VonDoepp
claims, for example. In addition, the role of civil society has always been a contested terrain since the
beginning. While some were critical of the very project of ‘democratizing Africa’ (Ake 1991), others were
simply defiant on even the deployment of the concept and saw it as an ideological conspiracy being
transplanted in Africa (Abrahamsen 2000).
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This observation then brings us back to the initial question. What went wrong, not
just with the failures of civil society to influence the democratic trajectory, but also with
how Political Science scholarship could not settle the debate? Is there anything about civil
society that research has overlooked, avoided, underrated or overrated in Africa? And if
so, in what ways? In addition, does the way the question of civil society and its failure to
liberalize politics in Rwanda and Africa has been treated enable us to have a greater
understanding of factors at work? We do not yet know why an organized civil society has
not prompted the state (and the political class) to liberalize politics in Africa. Nor do we
yet know the nature of forces impeding civil society to create a permanent dynamic for an
inclusive and open governance system. More specific to this research, we have yet to
understand why civil society groups have failed at creating effective strategies for
interacting with the state in instituting liberal democratic mores in the Rwandan political
life. Scholarship has yet to provide us with a practical framework for understanding the
factors and patterns precluding civil society from being a democratically transformative
entity in Rwanda. It remains to be explained why civil society has failed to address the
state and put it on a trajectory of progressive political liberalization. There is no convincing
argument to the question of “what is it that has consistently precluded civil society from
altering political behavior in Rwanda, and by extension in Africa?”

A Conceptual Gap in the Study of Civil Society and Democracy in African States
To answer the research question, we need to extend the inquiry beyond civil society
itself. It is equally important to look at how scholarship has addressed this question in the
past. There are multiple shortcomings with the ways in which we in the scholarly
community have looked at this question. Conceptually, academia has treated civil society
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predominantly from its normative characteristics. Scholarship has consistently employed
the concept of civil society in Africa in the manner that unequivocally leads us to think of
it as a fixed structure without a beginning, rather than a result of a process. The forces
shaping and rounding civil society are more assumed than understood. The ways in which
the problem of failures of civil society is approached dismiss the phenomenological
dimension to the workings of civil society. The ontology of civil society as a phenomenon
is ignored or avoided. The evolutionary and cultural ingredients of the Western prototype
of civil society do almost not matter in Africa. To the extent that there is a deficit between
the theoretical civil society (conditions) and the actual civil society (outcome) in Rwanda,
it behooves us to draw that contrast first so as to answer the right question.
There is a need to clarify how previous conceptualizations have approached the
problem of failure of civil society and democratization in Rwanda, and Africa by extension,
or we risk running into three major problems. First, it prevents us from knowing whether
scholarship has been asking the right question. In a way, it is as though we have been
explaining the failures of civil society based on an assumption of a phenomenon which
may not have been hardwired to survive in that environment. That is, we may have been
ignoring the organic conditions which create civil society, as a theoretical phenomenon,
and not just the norms that enable a transplanted model of civil society to work.6 We must
ask whether the conditions that organically create a liberal democratic civil society existed
or were enabled in Rwanda before the revitalization of civil society became a norm in the
6

In ideal circumstances, conditions for an organic civil society are preferable and ought to be in place first
in order for a democratically transformative civil society to do its job, just as the history of the most successful
civil society tells us. That is what de Tocqueville alluded to as “a culture congenial to democracy” having
driven the success of the American political system; or Putnam’s observation that democracy worked well
only in those North Italian areas where civil society ideals had first been made a tradition (1993). Yet, in
Rwanda, just as most of the rest of Africa, an organized civil society of the 1990s rose out of that
developmental logic of it.
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first place. We then need to consider what effects that had on the evolution of civil society
there.

Tracing genetic conditions or the ecology for civil society in the Rwandan

democratic trajectory is crucial to understanding its failures to be a politically liberalizing
force.
Second, a flawed conception of the phenomenon we seek to understand keeps us
from answering adequate questions. That is, understanding the failures of civil society and
democracy depends on whether the type of civil society we find in Rwanda had a natural
propensity to drive political liberalization first, or whether it was meant to generate
something else.

It is after understanding the logics and forces having created and

dominated the life of civil society in Rwanda that we can begin to assess why it has
produced the unexpected political outcomes. Understanding the logics out of which the
current Rwandan civil society emerged—an ontological conception—is the only objective
way to understand its contemporary character. Otherwise, just like previous scholarship,
the analysis of it is based on an incomplete assessment and is at best partially satisfying.
This research describes the problems of civil society in Rwanda from the logics of
deep-seated cultural realities first, not essentially as a failure of structural norms. It
explores the roots—not the fruits—from which the failures of civil society to effect
democracy came. It analyzes the problem of civil society in Rwanda first as a phenomenon,
not as a norm; as a process, not a conclusive outcome; and finally, as society-centered, not
essentially state-centered. It is a phenomenological analysis of the dynamics of civil
society’s failure to liberalize politics in Rwanda.

More specifically, this research

conceptualizes the failures of civil society in Rwanda primarily as a deep-seated
phenomenon originating from endogenous logics, not merely from the forces exterior to
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the socio-cultural, political and economic environment in which it exists. The major
premise here is that civil society’s failures do not exclusively originate from the logics
embedded in the state or international forces. As an ontological paradigm at the center of
this inquiry, it makes the most sense to see whether the mechanisms that would have
allowed civil society to make way for democracy and to serve as a permissive condition of
democracy in the West were present in Rwanda first.
A third major conceptual mistake that this research seeks to avoid is that scholarship
has predominantly led us to visualize civil society as if it were a unified body. Scholarship
has consistently given us an assumed view of a congruous and congenial civil society with
respect to its theoretically assumed incidence on democracy.

The discourse on the

utilitarian value of civil society in democratization carries in it a general tendency to portray
it as if it were a harmonious set of groups seeking to challenge the state’s moral order to
impose one of their own that is democratic. Such a portrayal of civil society leaves students
of politics to think of it as though the groups and members it represents (economic,
political, social, religion) all have shared values and aims. Western analysts often take the
plurality and diversity of civil society for granted. Yet, just like society, civil society is an
amalgamation of a myriad of entities with different identities and purposes, sometimes who
are even in competition with one another. Civil society is an umbrella of diverse ideas and
forces, each with some unique identity characteristics individually and permanently vying
for some form of social control (Migdal 2001, 44-56). In it is a conglomerate of broad and
dispersed entities of mores, aims, and interests. That then raises a subsequent question of
whether all civil society groups in Rwanda share values and aims, or whether they—as a
collective—are hardwired to address the state on the fundamental question of democracy.
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This research addresses the question of multiplicity of civil society groups in the way they
can be usefully categorized in order to make proper association to the failures of
democracy. All the groups that civil society represents cannot be lumped into one single
basket, as though democratic liberalization equated with uniformization of group
capacities. To better assess any possible linkage between them and the processes of
democratization, we need to catalog civil society groups based on their political values,
aims, and strength. Characterizing such groups based on their genetic fabric lays a
meaningful ground for us to establish their link to the liberal democratic culture. It will
also enable us to understand why they operate in a certain way whenever they are in
interaction with the state on the wider range of democratic issues. Scholarship has all too
often employed a broadly constructed concept of civil society without making proper
distinction on this level. And without delineating civil society groups by their political
identity logics, then any deduction we may make in relation to democratization becomes
parsimonious. This conception makes it difficult to determine whether the conditions for
a transformative civil society exist or can be fairly assessed in a society like Rwanda.

Analytical Gaps in the Study of Civil Society and Democracy in African States
Academia has taken a predominantly state-centered approach to the failures of civil
society to lead to democratization. The discourse has looked at the problem essentially as
a vertical dynamic in which the state’s omnipotence inevitably subverts civil society’s
posture and survival.7 While the state’s superlative power and its ubiquitous penetrative

7

As example, when Monga diagnoses that there are eight problems precluding civil society in Africa to do
its (theoretically) democratizing job (weak opposition parties, rulers’ manipulation of elections, a narrow
political field, lack of political ideas and vision, constrained press freedom, and international support for
dictators), it is clear that he is blaming it all on the state. He does not seem to problematize civil society
groups themselves. Similarly, Longman (1992: 246-251), posits that the civil society failed democratization
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abilities in Rwanda are plausibly undeniable—just as in several other states—such an
argument is often misapplied or even overrated when explaining the failures of civil
society.8 This research explains the failures of civil society from the constraints that social
forces impose not just upon civil society but also on the state altogether.
Another problem with analyzing democratic failures by capitalizing on the state’s
eminent role is that such a view obscures the importance of looking at the phenomenon not
exclusively from the mechanical (activities) but also the organic (constitutive elements)
workings of civil society in the process of democratization. Most states like Rwanda are
less coherent than the theoretical account suggests. Migdal suggests that states are actually
fragmented and to the extent that they all face and depend on a myriad of other social
organizations such as families, clans, multinational corporates, domestic businesses, tribes,
political parties, and a wide range of other patron-client dyads (2001: 41-71). Accordingly,
it is useful to trace the failures of civil society to democratize within the state’s apparatus.

in Rwanda because of five (state caused) factors: a) disconnect between civil society and political parties, b)
parties joined the 1992 coalition government, c) the expansion of the state coercive capabilities, d) state
orchestrated chaos, and e) ethnicity and cooptation by the state. More scholarship on civil society go on to
take a similar position and rarely do they take a hard look at civil society itself, i.e., its historical grounding
and constitutive forces. It is almost as if the strength of civil society groups were a given and that no failure
could be rooted in the horizontal workings of civil society to begin with. Even Ndegwa’s (1996) assessment
that four factors are missing in order for NGOs to advance democratization in Africa (organization, resources,
alliances, and political opportunities) feeds into the same assumption that there is no other way for civil
society groups than (superficially) balancing the state’s power in order to democratize.
8

That view (generally) feeds off the Weberian conception of state as a legitimately hyper muscular structure
that can bend everything in the society to its will. But other views actually finger to the contradictions and
limitations of such sort of ultra-deterministic power that states are believed to have (Migdal 2001: 41-47;
Lawson 2000; Woods 2001; O’ Murchú 2000). They point to the inability of states to use such power to
translate states’ policies (including in some advanced societies) into real social change. Migdal (2001), for
example, sees a dilemma in the assumed state’s mighty power. On the one hand, there is the state’s
‘indispensability’ and ‘vulnerability’ on the other. He sees the vulnerability of the state as deriving from that
it is an entity with limitations just like any other among the myriad other ones in the society who is always
vying for social control—with the exception that the state has the most dominant instruments at its helm to
achieve its aims. But the fact that the state has to regularly depend on alliances from both domestic (clans,
families, and other forms of patron-client dyads) and international (part of the world social system of
organizations, international major powers, corporates, NGOs, and other states) groups shields it from being
absolutely invulnerable.
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This new way to look at the state has an implication for the ways we assess the failures of
civil society. That is, if both the state and civil society constantly adapt in response to a
culture imposed by other organizations, then that suggests there is a factor transcending the
theoretical mighty of the state that we need to turn the focus on. We need to examine the
horizontal patterns that give way to the constancy of political behavior not just among civil
society groups but also among the stewards of the state at its various levels. Seldom has
the analysis of civil society’s failures been contemplated also as reflective of a horizontal
paradigm that permeates all structures of the society. The bulk of scholarship (Haberson,
et al. 1994; Makumbe 1998; Fatton 1992; Bratton 1994; Gready 2010; Orvis 2001) has
analyzed civils society by focusing on the direct relationship of groups with the state (a
functionalist view), overlooking the role of the groups’ organic developmental fabric
(ontological approach). In a way, most scholarship has evaluated the vitality of civil
society in African state-society relations from the traditional Shils’ dichotomy emphasizing
the “prominence of the governmental center” (1975, 74). But the problem with analyzing
civil society’s failures in that dichotomous structure, i.e., casting the logics driving civil
society as detached from those driving the state, is that it accomplishes nothing in our quest
to understand the nature of civil society – democracy relations. In fact, this dualizing mode
of studying the state and society relations is, for Midgal (2001) “divisive” (49). It is
disruptive an approach to pit groups against one another when their logic of persisting and
changing is meant to keep them as a mélange in that cluster of social organizations, which
suggests that an examination of them together and not one as foreign to the other.9

9

The Schils’ tradition that prominent African scholarship (Ndegwa 1996; 2001; Monga 1996) on the failures
of civil society have followed presents the state as the center (with omnipotent power) and civil society is a
periphery (whose abilities are irresistibly repressed), supporting that the question of survival of civil society
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In addition, the simple dichotomous categorization of a complex dynamic of state
civil society relations as in—state versus civil society, or center versus periphery, or elites
versus the mass—advances too little our comprehension of the phenomenon. Such analysis
is dismissive of the very heterogeneous nature of the struggles led by multiple
organizations in a society. As Midgal (2001) argues, “civil society and society are not
synonymous” (132). The two are not tantamount to the same thing because there are
multiple arenas of domination and opposition in the society, some groups simply not
hardwired to pull in the direction that addresses the state yet still affecting the way the state
operates. But we often treat civil society as though it were a coherently organized entity
theoretically meant to oppose or balance the state. Yet, as Naomi Chazan (1994) points it
out, “civil society encompasses only one portion of what has become a complex and diverse
associational scene” (278). Midgal reinforces it by pointing out that “some social forces
have not lent their support to the state’s universal pretensions or, for that matter, the
pretensions of a civil society pitted against the state” (2001, 132). This research strains the
bewildering views of the constitutive forces of civil society in Rwanda in order to better
ascribe any democratizing role to it.
Another gap that prior analyses have not filled is that between the various
components of grassroots civil society. The rural and popular associational life is an
integral part of civil society often dismissed in the way we seek to understand the workings
of civil society and how it affects democratization in states such as Rwanda. Scholarship
has taken a generally narrow view of civil society by limiting it to the groups with a national
or regional profile, as if democratization starts and ends at the apex of the state’s pyramid.

is at the sole will of the state system. While the state’s power to repress civil society groups is not a novel
discovery, it even tells a limited story on the true nature civil society failures to democratize in Rwanda.
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The majority of civil society groups exist in rural arenas in most African states, including
Rwanda, where more than 80% of the population still lives. And we know that civil
society, as a set of autonomous institutions meant to mediate between state and society in
democratic governance (Putnam 1993, 130), is enhanced by successful attitudes and
participatory behaviors of citizens (Brehm and Rahn 1997). Civil society exists and
functions as a composite unit with multiple segments, drawing its support primordially
from below (Putnam 1999; Kwak, et al. 2004; Uslainer 2004; Irwin and Berigan 2013;
Simpson and Eriksson 2009; Ndegwa 1996).10 It is therefore important to focus on the
organic resources that civil society draws on to interact with the state first.

Rural civil

society, commonly cast as ‘peripheral groups,’ are thus one of the key elements in
successful democratization (Gibson 2001). In Eastern Europe, for example, eclectic civil
society organizations were instrumental to the democratic revolutions of the late 1990s
(Bernhard 1996; Kubik 1994; Ost 1990; Stokes 1993; Tismaneanu 1995; Weigle and
Butterfield 1992).

But many Africanist analyses often excluded these grassroots

organizations from the pool of analytical ingredients that grow a democracy up despite
their recognition to be generally a “precondition for effective self-government” (Putnam
1993: 90). In a way, these grassroots networks are connected to and hence cannot be treated
in isolation from the national democratic fate.

This research provides a horizontal

framework for understanding the workings, or the “ecology” driving civil society in
Rwanda, as well as the recipes of its identity at different strands of democracy. I provide
a new analytical dimension for understanding the logics that have given impulse to this

10

That is the case in principle. We also know that there are many cases were civic associations have been
“created” at the top, too (Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Gary 1996; Tripp 2001; Fjelde 2009). But such are the not
the kind of organizations that would drive the change we are talking about here.
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civil society such that we can understand the sources of its behavior in the process of
engaging politically with the state in Rwanda.
Among other major factor that the analysis also has considered but with only
partially satisfying answer over is institutions. The general assumption is that institutions,
in the sense that they reduce uncertainties (North 1989; 1991) will protect civil society
from repressive responses to their activism. North and other institutionalists believe that
civil society will not achieve any democratic goal without an institutional framework
favoring it (idem). But aside from reinforcing the prominence the role of the state in
democratization, this view of institutions tells us too little about the values profoundly
affecting the behavior of such institutions themselves. The dominant scholarship in
Political Science often emphasizes the institutional character as an organization or a set of
organizations that make rules or simply with recourse to coercion, but it does not tell us
what may cause institutions to follow one set of behavioral pattern in a specific cultural
context. If both state and civil society have an unchanging behavioral pattern in the way
they relate one to another democratically, then there must be an element of commonality
with institutions, too.

Therefore, to understand the behavior of civil society in

democratizing the state needs to extend beyond the simple institutional function of ‘rules
making,’ and instead focus on the origins of variations in institutional behavior. That
means, analysis needs to pay attention to the effects of culture in the outer structures of
institutions in terms of democratic behavior.
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Civil Society and Democracy—A New Analytical Framework
As we have seen, while the linkage of civil society and the failure of political
liberalization in African states is not a new theme in African politics research, there are
several issues with how the analysis and theorizing have treated the question. Conceptually
and analytically, inquiries on civil society and democracy in Africa have suffered from
enough insufficiencies to preclude us from reaching a proper apprehension of this problem.
One of them is the inattention to the evolution and historical patterns of civil society in
relation to domestic politics and liberalization. Both historical materials and cultural
artifacts to the formation and evolution of civil society in Rwanda are essential, but missing
from previous inquiries connecting civil society and democratization. In this research, I
treat civil society not in a dichotomous and divisive way that excludes it from the forces
that drive both the state and its institutional practices. Rather, I treat it along with the state,
as an integral part of the wider society. My analysis builds from Migdal’s (2001) approach
to state society relations; that is, an approach that sees the state as evolutionarily part of,
rather than separate from, society.
By this logic, wherever civil society has succeeded at transforming political life,
there has been a historically cultural rationale that favored it.11 De Tocqueville was right
to ascribe the success of the American political system to “a culture congenial to

11

For instance, we know that a wide community-grounded associational life created a culture of civic
engagement that became a building block in the success of the American political system (Tocqueville, et al.
2000; Huntington 1991; Huntington 2000; Putnam 2000; Putnam 2003). The British consensus model arose
from a collective effort from liberals, social democrats, nationalists, and the aristocracy to altogether
transcend parochialism and created a new culture of “civic virtue” and active citizenship in which protection
of group interests and pluralism would be guaranteed (Biagini 1996; Dunleavy, et al. 2000; Almond and
Verba 1963; Almond and Verba 1989). In France, the historical role of representational structures, such as
unions, in policy bargaining processes has become so crucial and inescapable that those are characterized as
corps intermédiaires, or intermediary institutions, in French state-society relations (Legay and Baury 2009;
Druelle-Korn 2011).
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democracy” (in Lipset 1959, 82). Putnam (1993) was equally right to redevelop de
Tocqueville and to note that culture had been at the root of differences in democratic
performance between the Northern and the Southern regions of Italy. Additional works on
the intersection of political institutions, institutional change, and human progress have also
pointed to the unequivocal role of culture in political and economic outcomes (North 1990;
Harrison 1985; Banfield 1958; Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset 1990; Harrison &
Huntington 2001).

Some have bluntly posited that “culture makes almost all the

difference” (Landes 1998; see also Inglehart and Welzel 1997: 210-230).

Others

inductively asserted that “culture is the mother, institutions are the children” (EtoungaManguelle 1991, xxviii). Yet, both academia and international NGOs have consistently
treated civil society in Rwanda as though the history of that cultural dimension were
irrelevant.
Many Western civil societies succeeded in supporting democracy primarily
because they started off as a true expression of culturally cultivated intrinsic values. When
such values emerged, and when they were practiced over and over, they unconsciously
devolved into routine and habit, carrying into institutional arrangements before translating
into rules of governance. Values personifying individual rights became central in political
imaginations and served the anchor of all movements that defined political life in such
societies. And as people practiced it over and over, a routine bred habit and eventually a
liberal political culture. Civic engagement was a result of an organic culture that began at
the grassroots level. It was a function of an inward and internal development first.
Community “civicness” was not produced from exterior forces. Nor was it a result of the
state’s sole initiative. Instead, the statehood too was a byproduct of that same culture.
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Grassroots and parochial dynamics were responsible for the emergence of a vibrant civil
society.

Then the state appropriated and integrated those values in its institutional

mechanisms (e.g., rules, processes, and civil society) of interaction with the society. That
is the not logic that institutional construction followed in Africa. And that has profoundly
affected the character of institutions, the state, and civil society.
Yet, when civil society is studied in Rwanda and other African states, this interior
dimension of civic engagement, as well as the logical progression of its development, is
more assumed than traced or understood. The wave of democratic transition in many
African states did not begin in the manner that easily promised civil liberties, core to
conventional civil society. Instead, it coincided and collided with other influential forces
such as traditional authority in governance, political culture, ethno-national/regional
politics, civil war/conflicts, economic opportunities, and under-development (Clark 2008;
Buur and Kyed 2007; Diamond and Plattner 1993). In a way, and contrary to the Western
experience, civil society in Africa—as formal institutions for interactive and participatory
governance—morphed out of strictly coincidental and sometimes opportunistic conditions.
Civil society organizations did not organically carry a political feature before the 1990s.
In Rwanda, for example and prior to 1990, the existence of such groups was never primarily
meant to challenge the political practice (Uvin 1999; Longman 2010). This dynamic has
continuously handicapped the trajectory of a liberal civic tradition they vied to promote.
Therefore, continuing to evaluate civil society-democracy relations from a purely
normative—extra local—standards does not advance our ability to understand it. This
study describes the evolution of civil society democracy relations also from that historical
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construction, and uses that description to explain why the expansion of civil society did not
lead to democratization in Rwanda.

Contextualizing the Analysis of Civil Society in Rwanda
When one looks deeper, it becomes clear that civil society in Rwanda operates
around a contextual logic that is still vaguely understood in academia and the West. The
debate has yet to provide us with a practical framework for understanding the culture that
would have created a democratically transformative civil society in the first place. There
is a general tendency in scholarship to always gauge civil society against a set of rules,
standards, and expectations that the dominant world community and academia intended it
to follow. That is, scholarship treats civil society as a linear progression of the Western
liberal democratic constitutionalism, or that because civil society worked well in one place,
then it should work in the same way if applied wholesale. But that is erroneous insofar as
increase of associational groups ignores that such groups must have a culture around them
that supports them. Pushing for creation of numerous groups is treating the problem only
half-way the process. It is true that civil society in Africa still has a lot to learn from the
evolution of civil society in the West, and thus adapt, grow, and root organically. But this
hasty way of analyzing it raises the question of whether we can truly understand its
workings without understanding whether the recipes that grew it up in the West exist in
Rwanda or elsewhere in the first place. Therefore, we need to gauge civil society as
something with an ontological substance in the domestic environment, not merely as a
normative model ordained to succeed anywhere no matter what.
From culture to history through social, political and economic realities that connect
and define politics every day in Rwanda and Africa, there are still several unexplored
34

contours in the workings of civil society to be understood. Much of academic inquiry has
focused on the outer forms of civil society’s connection to democratization, ignoring and
dismissing the inward processes of its development and growth. There is therefore a need
to trace local cultural beliefs, practices, democratic commitments, and behavior that
produce a civil society unproductive of democracy. That effort is worthwhile insofar as
continuing to test the marriage between civil society and democracy in the manner that
links the mere existence of local NGOs to political outcomes—while eschewing the
domestic cultural dimension—overlooks a recipe that was crucial in the evolution and
success of civil society in the West. That approach is partial. It only renders the debate
even a more contested terrain and limits our ability to understand variation of democracies
in other regions of the world.
That is why a new analytical framework is needed, insofar as much of the enduring
contestation surrounding civil society, as both a concept and an ordering principle, cannot
be understood from a purely normative vantage point. This research has taken an organic
approach and offered a different inquiry method. That is, the research takes a neoTocquevillian way of understanding the problems of civil society from culturally rooted
factors and patterns. It is from a process embedded in structures of the society (horizontal
analysis) that this research unpacks and explains the logics of the failure of civil society
expansion to lead to democratization in Rwanda. The following section illustrates the
systematic format in which the research was conducted.
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Hypotheses
This research tests three potential explanatory causes for the unimproved
relationship between state and civil society. The independent variables that I test are poor
economic conditions and shallow institutions, and political culture). The first two are
commonplace in mainstream inquiries seeking to explain a series of political, security, or
even economic outcomes in Africa. This research tests them not as a static outcome, but
as a process and an expression of other major static factors. I started with the premise that
both economic conditions and institutional arrangements do not constitute inhibiting
factors to the failures of civil society to affect the democratic trajectory in Rwanda. Rather,
the research started off with an assumption that the economic component and institutions
in Rwanda are both a medium and an expression of a more salient factor to the problem
than absolutely independent explanatory variables to it. The third and major hypothesis
the research has tested is political culture. It is the major explanatory variable to the focus
of this inquiry: what accounts for the failures of civil society to shape the democratic
trajectory in Rwanda?
These three variables have exposed the unexplored and hidden logics out of which
the Rwandan civil society emerged and to which it has been responding. They are poor
economic conditions, lack of favorable political institutions, and an unfavorable political
culture. Investigating these three variables will lead, first, to understanding why civil
society has failed at its work to enable democracy in Rwanda; then, to identifying the real
social forces to which Rwanda’s large and apparently vibrant civil society organizations
are responding.
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Hypothesis 1: Lack of financial self-reliance undermines the strength and forestalls
the ability of civil society groups to address the state in autonomous and wide-ranging
ways. From Machiavelli to Inglehart and Welzel, economic conditions have been tied to
democratic transition and consolidation, insofar as democracy and poverty are
unharmonious. Machiavelli would say that it is difficult to be both poor and a good civic
subject at the same time. In other words, economic capacity transforms social and political
structures by bestowing the necessary power upon the middle class, which then demands a
democratic polity (Moore 1993). The idea behind this reasoning is that democracy and
poverty are unharmonious, and that economic development, by transforming the social
structure, sets a stage for making democracy possible (Lipset 1959; Limongi and
Pzreworski 1997). Central to the economic theory to democratization is the significance
of an economically viable middle class in arbitrating the democratic polity. The belief is
that economic development transforms the polity by guaranteeing most electoral power to
the middle-class. In other words, an economically strong middle class is important to those
people who are not poor are the ones likely to participate intelligently in politics. This
literature draws on what came to be known as ‘modernization theory’ or ‘modernization
and cultural change’ (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). There is also a consensus (idem) over
the belief that poorer countries tend to move into nepotism and a political system that
supports friends and kin while a society divided between a large impoverished mass and a
small favored elite would result either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper
stratum) or in tyranny (popularly based dictatorship). Although The argument does not
connect development to democracy per se, it draws a consequential association between
the two. That is to say, a concatenation of systemic events (industrialization, education,
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reforms, etc.) will all make democracy possible by transforming the social and political
structures that make democracy possible.
Applying this theory to Rwanda, the deduced testable proposition is that the
inability of civil society in Rwandan democratic life was primarily a function of its lack of
economic autonomy and vitality, but also a result of civil society operating in a poorly
resourced economic environment. However, while this proposition is evidently plausible,
there was no anticipation that it would reveal a response fully connecting civil society to a
failed democratization process. Instead, the economic condition is one medium via which
civil society manifests cultural attributes in the process of democratization.
Hypothesis 2: The absence of an institutional framework openly favoring antigovernmental activism has impinged on strong engagement of civil society into national
democratic life without fear or restraints. By virtue of rules and by stewarding legal
protection of individual rights, institutions allow predictable outcomes of actors in all
democratic arenas (Przeworski 1997; Lipset 1959 & 1990; North 1989; North 1991). In
that sense, institutions are the safeguard of the rules of the political game. Therefore,
activists, usually backed by civil society groups, obtain the freedom to engage in political
activism and call out the state within their freedom in the manner that guarantees them no
harm or any form of repression but rather predictable outcomes. Therefore, from this, I
hypothesize that the failure of civil society to lead to political liberalization in Rwanda is a
direct result of lack of institutionally protected rules allowing for a cadre of politically
active associations. Testing this hypothesis has provided an extended view over the extent
to which institutional arrangements have historically restrained an active incorporation of
civil society groups into the political life in Rwanda.
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Hypothesis 3: The political culture framing the aspirations of civil society
engenders strong resistance to liberal democratic practices, which keeps change in political
behavior from unfolding. Only a few scholars—amongst whom de Tocqueville (2000),
Inglehart (1988); Inglehart and Welzel (2005); Huntington and Harrison (2000); and
Putnam (1993)—see the basis for democratic political development as rooted in a set of
democracy-prone cultural logics. Understanding the influence of politico-cultural norms
on civil society behavior in Rwanda is central to this hypothesis. This research has utilized
cultural determinants to analyze the complex realities connecting civil society to
democracy in Rwanda. Understanding civil society’s failures in democratizing the state
were explained through examination of the effects of culture on state and civil society
relations in Rwanda. I examined the enduring effects that culture has had in inhibiting the
transformation of Rwandan politics via civil society. More particularly, I sought to
determine the degree to which the shallow behavior of civil society in promoting
democratization was a function of the Rwandan cultural values and the overall cultural
belief system on the matter of state.
To know what truly accounts for the discrepancies between expectations and
achievements of civil society, an approach different from previous inquiries calls for
consideration. To address the need for a different approach, I take interest in the history of
civil society. I seek to trace behavioral patterns justifying any democratizing disconnect
in the evolution of civil society in Rwanda. Digging into the histories provides us with the
evidence for explaining how the actual civil society arose, as opposed to the one that some
scholars theoretically imagined would arise. I move the focus from mechanical to organic
constitution of civil society forces in Rwanda.
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This organic approach, which consists in exploring the workings of civil society from its
horizontal constitutive elements, provides us with more nuanced and richer explanations
than the traditional normative approach, which consists in gauging civil society against
standards exterior to the context. The history of civil society in Rwanda—its growth and
development—is germane to understanding its failures. That is why taking interest in the
processes that led to the production of this civil society, not the extemporaneous outcome
of it, gives us a frame of reference anytime we seek to explain it in relation to democracy.

Research Design
One unique feature of this inquiry is that it does not follow the traditional
“normative” approach to dealing with the problems of civil society whether in Rwanda or
anywhere else for that matter. Rather than approaching the question from the dominant
view—which rests on just the verticality of the state - civil society relations—this research
focuses on the horizontal processes and the constitutive forces of civil society to explain
the failures of civil society and democratization relationships. It explores the problem in a
novel way, namely, by breaking away from the recurring assumption that civil society is
an already established entity and that the state is a powerful entity constantly repressing
civil society. Instead, the research has examined the problems of civil society as a
phenomenon embedded in the structures of the society first. I take what I refer to as “an
organic approach” to understanding problems of civil society state relations and why those
have been democratically unfruitful. This research is a new attempt to present the patterns
having shaped the ineffective behavior of civil society in democratic processes as primarily
developmental rather than functional.
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This methodological (but also conceptual) shift is important considering that the
dominant view has created a pervasive assumption that civil society is a composite platform
of interests in which there is, as Migdal (2004) complains, a “harmonious consensus” (p.
132) every time it engages with the state. Such view, by dwelling on just the capacity of
the state in dealing with democratic processes, undermines the wide array of cultural,
structural, societal, and many other complex realities that give impulse to civil society
groups, that connect them to it, and hence define the behavioral patterns of their leaders.
My approach embraces and explores those ignored layers of civil society so as to determine
how those features intrinsic to civil society itself have crippled its ability to be an effective
source of democratization.
Moving to the more explicitly methodological front, this inquiry is distinct in that
it builds from out-of-routine type of data. Instead of relying chiefly on existing datasets
and orthodox modeling, I have relied on in-depth semi-structured (and at times informal)
interviews with a wide array of respondents representing and connected to all segments of
civil society in Rwanda. I, as a student of Rwanda and also a student of Rwandan origins,
organized such interviews in a manner that presented an advantage over a non-Rwandan
researcher. My familiarity with layers of the socio-cultural context, but also my (local)
linguistic and social aptitudes were suitable to garner a new brand of information that is
pertinent to the hidden workings of the democratic game and civil society in Rwanda.
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Table 1.1: Number of Organizations Selected by Category and Geographic Location

Mushrooms
Balloons
Minions
Total

North South East West Kigali City Total
2
2
2
2
0
8
0
0
0
0
6
6
0
0
0
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
8
16

My data selection preference was motived by the fact that although existing datasets
as well as other statistically-oriented techniques (such as structured interviews and surveys)
are useful, they have considerable limitations in this type of phenomenological study. In
Rwanda for example, just as in many other societies in Africa, it is very possible to be
orthodox and methodologically flawless in an inquiry and yet fall short on the validity and
thus quality of findings. Asking a good and structured question in a society (like Rwanda)
that is regulated by subtlety and imperceptible political realities, does not necessarily profit
to the rigor of inquiry or make it any less invulnerable. Rather, it is by immersing into the
daily realities of the local community, by targeting respondents with rich information at
the right time, by learning the second meaning of contextual messages, and by talking to
them in their language, that one can truly increase the chances of gathering information
most germane to the inquiry. It is one thing to analyze what people express in Rwanda,
but fathoming what they mean or think is another. Therefore, extended familiarity with
the contextual realities and sensibilities was of a crucial advantage in this research.
Considering that I could not study every country of Africa to understand how their
civil society functions, this single-case research has begun a new scholarly movement to
re-examine civil society in the continent. My research has thus focused on Rwanda, with
the intent that its significance will be relevant to other cases in Africa. It aimed to critically
and systematically analyze the shape and content of contemporary civil society in Rwanda
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to understand the logic of its behavior in light of democratization process. I particularly
intend to assess factors continuously precluding the Rwandan civil society from being a
democratizing factor.

Table 1.2: Interviews (FGDs and Semi-structured dialogues) between 2012-2015
North South East West Kigali City Total
Grassroots – FGDs
Mushrooms
16
14
12
14
0
56
Balloons
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Minions
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Key Informants
CSO personnel
Balloons
0
0
0
0
16
16
Minions
0
0
0
0
7
7
Other CS experts*
0
0
0
0
9
9
The State
MINALOC
0
0
0
0
1
1
Parliament (LC)
0
0
0
0
3
3
Parliament (UC)
0
0
0
0
1
1
NURC
0
0
0
0
2
2
RGB
0
0
0
0
3
3
RDB
0
0
0
0
1
1
RCA
0
0
0
0
1
1
International
USAID
0
0
0
0
2
2
EU
0
0
0
0
1
1
NPA
0
0
0
0
2
2
GTZ
0
0
0
0
1
1
Swiss Cooperation
0
0
0
0
2
2
Total
16
14
12
14
52
108
* Included members of academia, research institute, private consultants, and a member of
the Rwanda Private Sector Federation (PSF). LC means Lower Chamber of the parliament,
while UP stands for Upper Chamber of the Parliament, or the Senate. This table does not
encapsulate every single conversation I held in the margins of the events I attended, the
organizations I visited, and other planned activities throughout this research, nor does it
capture the frequency of interviews where those occurred with the same individual more
than once.
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Methods
This is a qualitative study. It consisted of process tracing to establish causal
mechanisms among culture, civil society, and democracy. I utilized the techniques of semistructured interviews conducted between Spring 2012 and Fall 2016, archival research
which included secondary resources and existing literature on the subject and Rwanda,
reflexivity, and secondary analysis of data from the National Institute of Statistics of
Rwanda (NISR) published between 2005 and 2016, the Demographic Health Survey of
2015, the National Unity and Reconciliation Barometer, the Ministry of Education
(MINEDUC) 2016, the Civil Society Platform Mapping Report (2011), publications from
civil society organizations, as well as other quantitative information on Rwanda available
in the United States. This select set of data provided hard evidence on the Rwanda’s civil
society – democratization phenomenon. They shed light on the problematic disconnect
that exists between the democratization project (that started in the 1990s) and the actual
domestic realities of civil society organizations. They were invaluable to prove the
limitations of programs that are still underway in creating a new democratic course in
Rwanda.
A part of my interviews was done and or completed over Skype from Miami.
Because there is no way to achieve a perfect sampling, my interviews relied on a purposive
selection of groups and individuals making sure to reflect all regions of the country, the
plurality of their activities, the dynamics of domestic politics, their various abilities and
strengths, and the international support they receive. The investigation included actors at
local, national, and international levels. This was a single case analysis and has covered
Rwanda between 1959, when Rwanda transitioned from monarchical a republic system, to
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2018, marking the latest episode in Rwanda’s political evolution which included
constitutional amendment that led to President Kagame’s third term in office. This
timeframe (1959 to 2018) spans three different regimes that I also refer to as three separate
republics, or three political systems.
The first hypothesis sought to examine whether the ineffective behavior of civil
society on the question of democratization was a result of lack of financial autonomy
allowing them to address the state in an independent and effusive way. To test that, I have
investigated the sources of their funding, whether they had sustainable mechanisms for
revenue generation in place such as recurrent contributions by constituencies. I also asked
leaders of the selected groups to name organizations or individuals funding them, by how
much, and under what conditions. I asked them to name actions they expended their
resources on. I asked them to name examples of any policies they have helped create or
influenced with their resources. I also asked them to describe what they envisioned their
organization to look like under times of funding. Some of this information was available
on their websites and in various reports and publications they gave me. Because groups do
not have equal financial power, I was particularly interested in assessing whether those
groups with greater financial wherewithal did more and better with respect to
democratization and their relationship with the state. I was interested in determining
whether the more financially advantaged groups had greater influence in the state’s policy
formation processes.
The second hypothesis sought to establish the association between civil society’s
failures and the history of Rwanda’s political institutions. To test that, I examined the laws,
rules, and regulations governing civil society. I looked at the laws that Rwanda has had
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between the 1960s and 2015 to determine how favored or restrained such groups became
with legal provisions and regulations in place. I also examined the state bodies overseeing
NGOs and the ways they operate. These included requirements (financial, organization,
membership, goals, mission, statements, and other bureaucratic conditions) for registration
of an NGOs, renewal processes (requirements and frequency), and banning, fining, and
censuring an organization. I also examined this process at the community, local, and
national levels. In particular, I examined the actions of civil society during the 1990-1994
period, when political space was relatively opened more than at any other time. Documents
on the government’s websites, archival materials, secondary research publications,
political speeches, and brochures were instrumental towards obtaining this information.
The third hypothesis tested the influence political culture has exerted on the ability
of civil society to influence the Rwandan polity. I explored political culture—as a set of
common beliefs, values, and habits—by examining three major behavioral features: first,
deference to the state or the anticipatory obedience the public has consistently given the
state in Rwanda; second, risk aversion, or the habit of people to operate a rational choice
when there is a perceived threat to individual or collective security in the face of political
actions; and third, social trust, in particular, the ability of non-state actors to work and
“bridge” other social differences during common political activism. I examined, compared
and contrasted this dynamic in three different time periods of Rwanda’s political history:
1962-1989, 1990-1994, and 1994-2015. That includes civil society’s major actions,
achievements, and behavior towards the state’s authority during and after the Genocide.
Furthermore, I also conducted participant observation at events such as Umuganda and
plenary sessions in the parliament to identify areas and cases of state-civil society mutual
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influence. I analyzed secondary resources and archival materials on how Rwandans respect
authority and elect officials. I analyzed political speeches related to civil society. Other
secondary research materials have provided me with valuable indications on social trust in
Rwanda and how it has shaped the relationship between citizens, groups, and the state.
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CHAPTER III

RWANDA’S CIVIL SOCIETY – STATE RELATIONS: AN HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS
To answer the question central to this research—why has the expansion and
deepening of civil society not led to political liberalization in Rwanda as mainstream
political science expected—requires us to look for a historical foundation of the
contemporary civil society. It demands us to examine the historical, social, and cultural
preconditions that bestowed some specific forms to the relationship and interactions that
the state and all organized societal forces have maintained in the governance Rwanda. In
other words, to what extent is contemporary civil society activism consistently rooted in
the evolution of such groups? And, in what ways is the current state – civil society
relationship a function of the political, socio-economic, and or cultural goals and trajectory
of civil society groups? Since we know that the history of civil society in Rwanda, as an
organized entity, predates 1990—a period corresponding with political liberalization in
continental Africa—it is important to examine key moments that forged civil society’s
relations with the state in the political history of Rwanda.
Revisiting the social environment and major political events that contextualized the
development of Rwandan civil society is crucial for gauging the democratic outcomes that
theorists and the world community await it to produce. It is useful to trace civil society’s
behavioral nature in the past if we truly want to understand the origins of its weak
connection to democratization. Then we will be able to formulate useful recommendations
for future democratic projects, not just in Rwanda but also in other comparable contexts
beyond it.
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In this chapter, I examine whether the failures of civil society to transform into a
vital force for democratic change in Rwanda’s governance are a result of some interruption
caused by events of the history, or whether they are organically tied to its evolutionary
basis. That is, if civil society was not democratically vivacious prior to 1990, then the
answer must lie in the historical basis that it took roots from. Similarly, if the enforced
democratization movement of 1990 did not improve the democratic prospects of civil
society to improve Rwanda’s polity, it then suggests that other internal logics explain better
the failure of Rwanda’s democratization before and after the 1990s. And such intrinsic
logics are worth investigating. That is why, the context and the history to the Rwandan
civil society provide a valuable framework for understanding the hidden logics that have
always driven its linkages to democratic governance. And it is by understanding such
logics that we can usefully gauge civil society’s future potential to produce
democratization.
Historical materials examining the evolution of the Rwandan civil society are
relevant to this research in the sense that elsewhere that civil society was successful, e.g.,
Northern Italy (Putnam 1993) or the United States (de Tocqueville 2000), patterns of statecivil society relations had evolved that were central to each success story. In every case of
American or European successful democratization was always a story of “path
dependency” that supported it. That is why a diachronic review of civil society as well as
of the environmental context that gave life to it is crucial to understanding its present
identity and, importantly, its association with democratization processes in Rwanda.
Tracing the logic of its democratic behavior in the history serves well our quest to
understanding what it has accomplished, and what it has failed to accomplish and why.
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And central to that effort is the question of whether the environment where it grew up
provided enabling or inhibiting conditions. This chapter discusses and describes the ways
in which cultural contexts, political and historical events, economic realities, as well as
other social and political forces have all worked in tandem, creating another culture that
systematically works against enforcement of the civil society project.
How have the social, cultural, and political environments facilitated or hampered
the Rwandan civil society to support or undermine the liberal and liberalizing values ethos?
Most inquiries have varyingly explored this question, but only to give partially satisfying
answers. We still do not yet know why civil society not only has failed to be a vibrant
democratizing force, but also continues to show no prospect for such success. Analyses
have treated civil society as a static outcome—as if democratization begins anytime activist
groups form—and not as a process indicator—as though there is no such thing as a history
of success. The ontology of success of civil society is taken for granted. The politicocultural environment in which civil society originates is often ignored and dismissed from
the analysis.
This chapter shows that civil society has failed to effectuate democratic goals in
Rwanda that the mainstream theory expected primarily because the cultural environment
it was introduced in was and is still strong enough to be replaced by it. It demonstrates
both cultural and historical difficulties that a liberal civil society has consistently and
powerlessly encountered throughout its emergence to grow democratic governance in
Rwanda. In this chapter, I also showcase the contextual complexities that clashed with,
resisted, and wound up dominating the advent of an organized civil society with the effects
that have persisted to this day. There is a domestic context that has morphed the logics
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around which both the state and civil society in Rwanda derive their relational patterns. In
addition, that context derives from a set of specific social truths, economic realities, and
political events that have transformed the Rwandan political fabric as a whole.
Furthermore, it is also a context most essentially framed by cultural saliences at the core of
the Rwandan political behavior. In that sense, this chapter shows that the advent and
success of democratization in Rwanda could not have been brought about by civil society,
insofar as it did not draw on organically cultivated democratic forces. In other words, the
democratic development project in Rwanda consistently faced cultural and systematic
impediments that were too strong to be overcome given.

Typifying the Rwandan Civil Society
Many scholars writing about civil society in Africa have maintained a broad view
of it, but too broad to explain its connection to various democratic strands in Africa (see
for example, Bratton 1989; 1994; Harbeson et al. 1994). While I use a broad definition of
civil society, there is a need to catalogue those groups and typify them based on and in
relation to their democratic goals. There is a plethora of groups who fall under the civil
society umbrella, but the challenge to the utilization of this aggregate understanding of it
is that not all groups share aims and values when we attempt to link them to democracy.
Exactly what types of civil society groups have socio-economic, cultural, and
political conditions produced in Rwanda? That is where understanding the problems of
Rwandan civil society groups begins. In other words, there is a need to explain the
difficulties of civil society to change the polity from its evolutionary context if we truly
seek to understand its behavioral rationale. The quality of its work is as much a result of
the forces that drove its beginning as in the nature of organizational identities they have
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morphed into throughout the years. Furthermore, specifying the categories of civil society
we find in Rwanda enables us to make useful connection between their identities and the
expectations we have of them with respect to democratization.
One could come up with numerous categorizations depending on the analytical
criteria in play.12 I have categorized the plurality of associational groups of Rwanda into
three types: Mushrooms, Balloons, and Minions. This catalogue provides a useful and
practical framework to link them to democratic expectations in Rwanda. To lump all civic
associations together is to treat them as if their values and aims were all hardwired to feed
into political objectives. But I also consider that speaking of civil society needs to embrace
the wide array of segments comprised in the associational umbrella. Such definitional
conception also echoes Timothy Longman’s (1999, 354) view that understanding the full
variety and orientation of civil society activity provides the best context to explain the
complex nature of political and economic structures in Africa. And not only does my
categorization show the economic limits of each type, it also delineates the political
characteristics and boundaries that separate them. It demonstrates the affordability, the
accessibility, and the nature of restrictions those groups face as far as the question of
political capital is concerned. The characteristics provided in the left most-column of Table

12

Some (activists in Rwanda) find the current civil society to be a four-dimension conglomerate of groups
worth categorizing by a series of metrics. Socially, there are church groups (and many segments of groups
within a church), anti-Genocide groups, survivors’ solidarity groups, women groups, youth organized
structures, etc. Economically, there are loans and saving schemes (tontines mutuelles), farmers, cooperatives,
business groups, etc. Humanitarianly, there are Twa minority representation structures, widows, orphans,
etc. Politically, there are human rights activists, anti-corruption, anti-Genocide negation leagues, political
transparency, etc. In the past, Peter Uvin (1999, 163-167) studied the groups that existed in Rwanda before
the Genocide and provided a more economic categorization framework: a) Cooperative, b) Farmers’
organizations, c) Tontines and informal associations, d) Foreign and local development NGOs, and e)
Churches. The problem with either of such catalogues is that neither of them permits us to determine their
connection to democratic goals both locally and nationally. It is difficult to know which group is concerned
when we aggregately refer to them as “civil society.” I have provided a politically practical catalogue which
enables us to draw a better link they each share with political liberalization processes.
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3.1 below represent a synthesis between the standards used by the World Bank on
governance and accountability and the actual type of work of civil society I observed in
Rwanda. I divided the work of CSOs into a three category index, reflecting CSOs with
political activism as their primary vocation, those that are purely service delivery oriented,
and those whose true objectives are difficult to tell given their flip-flopping nature.

Politically

Table 3.1: Cataloguing Rwanda’s civil society based on observed indicators of
democratization and participatory governance
Mushrooms

Balloons

Minions

Challenge the state and advocate human rights

N

N

N

Agenda set through international logics/principles

N

Y

Y

Influence national policies and election as watchdog

N

N

N

Routinely aware of and active in policy formations

N

N

Y

Y*—

N

N

Democratic internal regulations and procedures exist

Y

N

N

Does not depend on external funding to run activities

Y

N

N

Engage citizens one way or another in their action

Y

N

N

Vote and have regular budget to run activities

Y

Y

Y

Has extra financial needs to execute their goals

Y

Y

Y

Territorially projected and close to constituencies

Y

N

N

Concrete actions to develop members & society exist

Y

N

N

Essentially self-promote via economic goals

Y

Y

Y

Exert social influence in community of some kind

Y

Y

Y

Organically stem from and are connected to society

Y

N

N

Solidarity (social capital) is central in their action

Y

N

N

Service delivery

Neutrally principled

Actively participate in local public affairs

Note: where Y*— indicates that the activity is done to a marginal degree. The table mirrors the mix
nature of Rwanda’s environment of civil society. It shows the difficulties and chances of civil society
to converge efforts and win the state-oriented democratization struggles.

“Mushrooms” are civic groups emerging in rural areas, where more than 80% of
the population still lives. Members of these mushrooming organizations are people who
have consistently been part of some organized collective life of proximity. Politically, they
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are vulnerable because they are devoid of significant influence. Members of mushroom
groups are mundanely low economic status villagers, disconnected from the central power
apparatus and are circumscribed in the arenas of power at the village or Cell level.
Nonetheless, those members are driven by an organic commitment to solving local
problems. Their activities range from mutual visitations or taking a meal to a peer who is
ill, to building a bridge that connects villages or repairing a community water system in
defect. While the Genocide tore apart the groups and the dense associational fabric around
which members of the society converged, such movement has resurged after the Genocide.
Today, there is an estimate of 190,000 grassroots associations in Rwanda (Rwanda
Development Board 2011). They increase inexorably every day; they grow and expand,
like mushrooms. Mushrooms differ from other groups in the sense that they organically
sprout. They are a result of grassroots initiatives between neighbors in a village and are a
local problem solving driven. That explains why their economic capacity is limited and
hence their vulnerability to all forms of exploitations and cooptation. By all accounts, such
groups are not created by external initiatives. Instead, they carry purely parochial goals
and are locally focused without national ambitions.

They function on the basis of

members’ contributions and other small scale economic activities such as vegetables
farming, cattle raising, or talents based performance. Their governance reflects pure
democratic principles, with clear internal rules and laws on how leadership positions are
filled and transmitted.

They are a materialization of that concept of laboratory of

democracy that Putnam (1999) and de Toqueville (2003) developed. Mushrooms are
generally detached from the aid community by virtue of their marginal influence, which
too is a result of their inaudible rustic voice. Their involvement in national affairs is quasi
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inexistent. Conversely, their influence is palpable at the village level and it can stretch as
far as the local governing structures because they are consulted in various circumstances
by local officials.
“Balloons” swing and sway in their visions, missions, and actions depending on
political and economic opportunities and realties of the moment. They may be connected
to the lower levels of the society, but in an inauthentic and temporary fashion. Their leaders
have the potential to accept governmental or other political positions in the course of their
existence. Unlike mushroom groups, leaders of Balloon organizations bear an elevated
education profile, are duplicitously vocal, and have learned the tactics and strategies for
self-development. Such leaders have, in most instances, occupied visible positions in the
community or are simply a result of individual caliber that is most likely to raise them to
political positions or international NGO prominence. Balloons also play some roles in noncivil society institutions such as higher education or research and policy analysis but to a
marginal degree that is only suitable to the temporary goals of their donors. Their areas of
intervention range from service delivery to human rights advocacy, but they generally do
not engage in politically sensitive advocacy or in a serious way if they attempt to. They
are not financially independent and their survival is unlikely should their financial support
collapse. These groups sometimes start off as independent, before they are, mostly for
economic pressure, coopted.
“Minion” groups function to show to the state and the public that they run activities
demonstrating their direct involvement in solving the problems of the community. But, in
actuality, they are a detached from the depth of local realities and the daily lives of average
citizens. They are superficially connected to rustic communities. They do not implement
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their own agenda; instead, they are constantly reinforcing that of their ideological mentors.
Minion groups exist for both the government and foreign NGOs. Those operating in the
wing of the state are close to power (money and influence) but rarely translate those into
practical social change. Those operating under the wing of foreign groups are rarely in
good terms with the state.

By and large, Minions are trapped between the pressure to

please donors and the controlling strategies of the government. A dynamic stemming from
this form of cooptation has led to a divide that sets major NGOs as either pro- or antigovernment.

That tension arises from the very nature of Rwanda’s post-Genocide

dynamics, which subsumes the work of NGOs into a “with” or “against” the state
dichotomy (see Gready 2010; Middleton and O’Keeffe 1997, 115-7). A number of groups
characterized as non-state friendly and foreign influence driven have been suspended while
their international counterparts have in fact been expelled from Rwanda in the past (USAID
1996, 54).13 Minion groups activities are invisible or do little to solve democratic or major
societal problems. Their presence in the general political landscape has more to do with
the strategic goals of specific individuals or groups than a genuine quest to improve the
lives of constituencies in a significant manner.
Prior to the Genocide, most organizations that were nationally set fit the category
of Minions. Uvin (1999, 176) describes how most NGOs of the time were skilled at
exploiting the shallow space that the aid community left between disconnected goals of

13

In December 1995, the government of Rwanda expelled 38 foreign NGOs and activities of 18 more (mostly
locals) that were working with the former were suspended. The European Union made a public denouncing
announcement but that did not lead to any concrete action. See Official Journal of the European
Communities, C 17, Vol. 39, January 22, 1996, p. 0204. A report by USAID in 1996 also depicted the
tumultuous relations that existed between NGOs and the government of Rwanda during that crisis era in the
political life of Rwanda (USAID 1996, 54-57). The report particularly highlighted the complicated balance
that was absent between an expression of freedom that such (well off) NGOs enjoyed in Rwanda while the
state officials and personnel pained to even transport themselves to execute their duties.
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fostering them as shapers of democratic societies on the one hand and contingents meant
to vulgarize seeds of development. Hence, because those NGOs needed the aid to survive,
they did very well at the “talk the talk and walk the walk” of the development enterprise.
That is the same trend that we are still observing among the minions of today. It makes it
not just difficult but also ironic on the part the funders to continue the same strategy while
outcomes have not changed since the 1970s.

Delineating Rwanda’s Civil Society Over Time
Another key element to understanding civil society in Rwanda is its evolution over
time; that is its correspondence to different eras and epochs in which such groups have
existed and the ways in which different political times pushed it to mold, change, and adapt
its behavior. There are three distinctive epochs in Rwanda’s political life in understanding
how Rwanda’s civil society has evolved. First, there is the pre-initiation of civil society
period. That is the period between 1959 and 1990. That timeframe is characterized by a
continuation and perpetuation of lack of alternative opposition in the polity, a tradition of
one-party rule, complacency towards domestic politics on the part of world powers, a
period of civil society of one-party, and a period when there were virtually no alternative
voices to civil society in Rwanda (and in most Africa). I describe that epoch as ‘the era of
indigenous civil society in Rwanda.’ It is divided into two subsets, pre-Republic (before
independence) and a pre-democratization (before the third wave) categories of civil
society.
Next is the period between 1990 to 1994, corresponding to Rwanda’s encounter
with the Third Wave of Democratization in the continent that Huntington characterized as
the arrival of the “democratic revolution” (1991, 33). Civil society was enforced during
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that period. The political space opened more than at any other time in the previous history
of independent Rwanda. It was Rwanda’s democratic transition moment. During that time,
a series of democratic reforms took place. The Rwandan constitution was revised to
accommodate voices that an organized civil society represented, which led to a crescendo
of organized groups that were vocal. Political parties were now permitted and a favorable
legal framework was enacted. All those changes gave hope to actors who sought to instill
liberalization into Rwanda’s political system. In everyone’s eyes, Rwanda was on the
verge of a democratic revolution. However, that period also accounts for the collapsing of
the same democratic experiment that Rwanda went through. In less than four years, all the
vibrancy of civil society and of other political opposition that democratization had
unleashed evaporated. More particularly, mid-1994 marks the end (and the absence) of an
enforced civil society. The hope that recent civic associations had inspired inside and
outside the country quickly eroded. And Rwanda rapidly descended into the Genocide.
The existing civil society groups had ethnically fragmented, causing many of its
constituencies to collaborate with the extremist regime and to participate in the crimes.
That period is crucial to understanding the logics having, since years before, produced an
unchanging type of civil society in Rwanda. I call it “the ‘revolutionizing’ period for civil
society and democracy.”
The last critical moment in understanding the evolution of civil society and its
connection to democracy in Rwanda is that which began from the second half of 1994 to
2017, the year in which constitutional amendments occurred, allowing Kagame to re-run
for a third term in office. It is an epoch marking the resurgence of civil society, which
previously had gone dark and virtually dead, in the Rwandan political life. It is when
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Rwanda experiences what I refer to as a renaissance of civil society in its Mushroom,
Balloon, and Minion trilogy. It is a period with a unique comparative content to the extent
that we seek to understand the ways in which the new civil society would emerge and be
expected to function differently from that which has existed before. To the extent that the
post-Genocide civil society emerged out of a set of different logics and also lessons from
the past, there is a need to connect that context to the behavioral outcomes we see in
contemporary groups. It is important to understand the type of incentives that currently
exist in Rwanda to embark civil society onto another aggressive expedition for
democratization following the failures from the past. I describe this third epoch “a period
for realist civil society and democratization” in Rwanda’s polity.
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Figure 3.1: Rwanda Civil Society Evolution Chart
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Connecting ‘failures’ of civil society to the past
In this section, I seek to determine whether there were constituent parts of
democratic principles—such as defense of human rights, promotion of individual freedom
and civil liberties, or even engagement in other public affairs matters like fighting
corruption—embedded in Rwanda’s pre-1990 civil society. Is the disconnect between civil
society and democratization something that its evolution has consistently inherited or is it
rather an outgrowth of forces exterior to that civil society? Were there civic engagement
forces imbued in the formation of civil society groups and in the type of activism they led
since their inception? To what goals was the nature of the relationship such groups have
always kept with the state?14 In particular, was there a direct association between the
inabilities of civil society to successfully stand up for a liberal democracy and the type of
forces that influenced it and gave it the impetus to take off. In other words, comprehending
the dynamics that defined civil society at the hour of independence is elemental to
understanding why it has evolved its current relationship with democratic ideals. It will
enable us to understand the sources of its values in Rwanda’s political life over time.
Lastly, I seek to determine why the accomplishments of Rwanda’s civil society have not
measured up with the democratic ideals it was always expected to uphold.
As the evidence shows, the rise of the first civil society in Rwanda emerged out of
a whole set of logics that were different than those aiming to create alternatives to the
state’s unassailably dominant behavior. The kind of groups then representing civil society
were a response to demands dissimilar to those that democratic forces seek to inculcate in
Africa’s public life. Instead, the groups we find in pre-1990s Rwanda emerged because

14

Uvin (1998, 165) defines civic engagement is defined as an active participation of people in public affairs.
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the state wanted them as supportive instruments to the state system. The state, via its
mighty apparatus, helped create civil society. The first idea to lead to creation of civil
society in Rwanda came from the state early in the 1940s. The state was not benevolently
looking to create a force that would challenge it; it was a creative way that the state had
found to bolster itself. Such groups did not emerge to address or challenge the state in any
form. They were instrumental to the fulfillment of the state’s developmental agenda. They
were not meant to alter the vision that the state had of state-civil society relations. Civil
society groups, in a way, represented the state’s plan implemented through them.
Cooperatives are the oldest organized civil society groups in Rwanda. In fact, the
first group to ever have an organizational structure and a financial framework began in
1943. It was a cooperative that processed milk in Nyanza, south of Rwanda, in the
surroundings of the chief area of the monarchy and the colonial rule Uvin (1999, 164). The
first movement of organized groups was composed of workers but they were required to
produce goods that directly supported commercial and export interests of the colonial
system. The cooperative in Nyanza, like many others that followed, had a development
mandate that the colonial rule had fixed for them to implement its economic agenda (idem).
Musahara (2012, 3) believes that Georwanda, a mine extraction company created in 1953,
was the first group in the history of cooperatives in Rwanda and that it was a direct response
to a law on rural cooperatives that the colonial state of Ruanda-Urundi had just enacted.
Another law was passed in March 1956 granting cooperatives the license duration of 50
years (idem). In 1957 another prominent group appeared in the history of cooperatives in
Rwanda—TRAFIPRO, whose secretary—Gregore Kayibanda—would become the first
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president of the first Republic of Rwanda.15 Among other groups is the Union des Banques
Populaires du Rwanda (UBPR), a ubiquitous set of financial networks, supported by a
Swiss NGO which loaned money to private individuals and small-scale businesses, and
who has today turned into one of the largest bank institutions in Rwanda.
Even after independence, the density of civil society groups in Rwanda served the
new government as the reliable instrument to organize the population around the
implementation of its development agenda in. It is estimated that by the independence
time, 1962, already 8 cooperatives were working in Rwanda (Sentama 2009, 3; Uvin 1999;
Mugesera 1987; Nzisabira 1992).16

They all were focused on economic promotion

activities. As Peter Uvin (1999: 163-8) has argued, until the 1990s, the groups that formed
the civil society of that era were a direct result of an enforced national policy supported by
the complacent international aid community to produce development in Rwanda. Between
1962 and 1966, the number of cooperatives rose to 36. In 1966, the government passed
another law that encouraged the creation of more cooperative initiatives throughout the
country. As a result, the number of cooperatives grew to 423 between 1967 and 1973, and
to 1,203 between 1974 to 1980 Musahara (2012, 6). The movement on cooperatives grew
even more vigorous when the government integrated it into its institutional apparatus. That
is, the state launched the Office in charge of Cooperatives and Community Development,
resulting in the growing the number of cooperatives to 1,528 between 1981 and 1983.

15

TRAFIPRO was a micro-personification of what a mini-grocery store brand looks like and was present in
major towns of the then Rwanda. The exception was that TRAFIPRO was not accessible to all average
Rwandan citizen with limited purchase power.

16
Those are Georwanda, Somuki, Impala, Nkora, Abahizi, Trafipro, Thé-Ntendezi, and Codar. Sentama
(2009, 3) estimates that they, altogether, had a membership mounting to 22,475 adherents. Of them, 2 were
church created and closely affiliated, three focused on farming exports (coffee and tea), two were mining
companies, and only one (Thé-Ntendezi) was created by Europeans and run as typical business corporate,
unlike any of the other cooperatives.
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Perceived by national officials as a quick avenue through which to channel development,
cooperatives led to a law that even decreed the creation of the Ministry of Youth and
Cooperatives in 1988.
There are two major observations to make from this history of cooperatives in
Rwanda. First, membership in the cooperative movement between 1943 and 1962 was
accessible to only a select few elites who were educated and had a generally advanced
knowledge of the development that the government had envisioned for the society. It was
a movement conceived, implemented, and managed from above, not the grassroots. It was
also a movement whose initiatives aimed to empower, not to diminish the state’s eminent
role in the society. The forces encapsulating the elites and all the voices that could have
channeled people’s demands to the state were not grassroots issue driven: they were statelaunched and state-controlled. Their primary motive was not to challenge or scrutinize the
state in its developmental agenda or in ordering other policy matters beneficial to the wider
society. That set of organized groups was a product of the state’s enforced agenda. They
were an integral part of the state system. A patrimonial state system—in whose eyes no
one understood better the needs of the society and how to meet them—created them. The
state incited the rise and the action of cooperatives. Those groups were inextricably tied
into a patrimonial agenda driven by a patrimonial state. A patrimonial state—whose
understanding and power transcended everything else in the ordering principles in
Rwanda—created such groups and laid out a vision they followed and helped implement.
And to the extent that there was no resistance that such vision encountered, patrimonialism
was a crucial determinant in the birth of civil society of Rwanda dating as far back as the
colonial time. Major civil society groups in Rwanda were a byproduct of a patrimonial
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culture, not of a democratic one.

Patrimonialism was reinforced and, to a degree,

legitimized itself as an approach toward mitigating the developmental challenges the
Rwandan society experienced.
The second important observation to make out of the evolution of cooperatives in
Rwanda is the sheer disconnect that was between them and other organized structures
existing in the society.

While cooperatives represented an advanced level of self-

organizing in both power and activity in Rwanda, they did not articulate a vision driven by
other structures beneath them. Their vision (to empower the state first) took primacy over
that of rendering marginal structures strong and independent. There was no clear line of
coordination between cooperatives and the existing grassroots associational structures.
And lack of a ground-up synergy among associational groups has sustained throughout the
course of the civil society evolution in Rwanda. Rarely have groups with some relative
advantage sought more strength from the bottom. Rather, they each seek power from
above, i.e., the state and international organizational bodies. It is not because there were
no other organizational forces below the structures that cooperatives represented that such
a synergy still lacks in Rwanda. We know that Mushroom phenomenon in associational
life in Rwanda since the 1960s has incrementally flourished (Uvin 1998, 163; Brusten and
Bindariye 1997, 30). And yet, Mushroom groups have always operated in the margins of
the society, i.e., outside the interest of most power financial structures. Mushroom groups
were disconnected from both the vision and constitution of Balloon/Minion organizations
that cooperatives represented. Mushroom groups existing in rural Rwanda since the 1960s
included “tontines” and “farmers’ groups”, two of the categories that Peter Uvin (idem,
165) has extensively documented in his analysis linking associational movement and
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violence in Rwanda.17 Balloons, by virtue of the power and visibility they benefited from,
dominated all other categories of civil society forces—particularly grassroots based
mushrooms whom Uvin (idem) refers to as tontines and farmers’ groups—and that
deprived them of most forms of autonomy and the ability to act independently. Balloons
or cooperatives and all other associational sectors represented by the pre-1990 Rwanda’s
civil society were elite driven.

Members held, by comparison, far more advanced

knowledge of the problems of the society than most members of mushroom organizations
but did not use that knowledge advantage to shape civil society’s trajectory as a society
driven (not a state-dominated) force. The state-created elite established a vision and an
unchallenged line of activism for virtually all entities qualifying as civil society. It is within
that top-down, elite-engineered (not grassroots driven), state-emboldening (not populously
determined), always vertical (not horizontally integrated), and patrimonial (not
consultative) logic that the structures that civil society represented were born. Such
represents the mechanism out of which the cultural logic that grounded local NGOs was
born, and a state decreed ruling had to bless their entrance into activity.18
17

Uvin (1998, 165) defined the “farmers’ organizations” as small-scale versions of cooperatives other times
also called “pre-cooperatives.” He found that nearly all of them were both a creation of and in close
relationship with the state and the aid system. And according to the World Bank’s report in 1989, there were
3,240 registered cooperatives and farmers’ groups in Rwanda (p. 28). Nzisabira (1992, 215-258) estimated
that there were 9,243 tontines ‘mutualistes’ comprising around 200,000 members in Rwanda. He traces their
origins in Uganda and affixes a modernization label to them (for creating human progress) through what he
calls “contractualization.” He categorizes them into financial, mutual aid, and contingency fund groups.
As for the “tontines,” Corrèze, Gentil, and Barnaud (1982b, 107) have traced their origins in the traditional
and cultural mechanism of reciprocity and mutual support. Such groups, expectedly, did not receive external
funding. Unlike “cooperatives” and “farmers’ groups”, “tontines” are made up by the lowest financial
category of citizens. They are spontaneous, ubiquitous and grow in a geometrical progression, like
mushrooms. [Farmers’ groups are also populous but they “are not the poorest” (idem, 108-9)].
18

Among prominent local NGOs were Centre Iwacu (Center for Training and Research on Cooperatives). It
was created in 1984 to be the lead research institute on cooperatives and it was a direct result of the needs of
the newly created Ministry of Cooperatives and Youth. ACOR (Association for Coordination of NGOs in
Rwanda) was also created in similar conditions in 1983. CCOAIB (Council for Concertation of Local
Support Organizations), created in 1987, and Bureau Épiscopal du Dévelopment (BED), created in 1972,
followed the same trend and consistently aligned themselves around the laws decreed by the state. Centre
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Later in the 1980s, as local NGOs became neatly woven into the development
vision established by the state, many Balloons sought to own and subsume the work of
smaller organizations in the name of mentorship. They became the intermediary of more
local organizations with the state. But the relationship between local NGOs and grassroots
structures was not a two-way process. Far from being democratic, that relationship
translated paternalistic habits that always connected the state to the society. Most local
NGOs worked as umbrella organizations, coordinating a sizable number of small groups
below them whom were rarely consulted. In addition to being state enforced, many local
NGOs were also under a direct oversight of international organizations.19 Just as most of
their names suggested, the dominant local NGOs became known because their slogan
echoed that they were taking development to the people. Addressing and challenging the
state was not in the mandate they began with and continued to hold. It is out of a statedriven developmental philosophy that a formal civil society emerged. Development, not
democratic governance, was the central force civil society and the state established their
relationship upon from the beginning. In a way, formal civil society was pre-programmed
to follow, align with, and submit to the state’s vision; it was not born out of a benevolently
liberalizing logic.

Iwacu was promulgated by the Ministerial Decree n°096/05 of September 12, 1984; INADES by the
Ministerial Decree n° 119 of August 22, 1977, then amended by another n° 75/11 of April, 18 2006; and
CCOAIB was first promulgated by a similar decree in 1987 then amended by another one no 103/11 of July
9, 2004.
Godding in 1985 counted 268 NGOs in Rwanda and some of them were international, but most of them were
born as a result of the state’s enforced vision (even though many of them carried a religious identity to them
too). A report by INADES, another local NGO created in 1977 aiming to provide technical assistance to
local development initiatives, estimated that there were 143 registered NGOs in Rwanda in 1987 (42 nondenominational, 68 Catholics, 10 Protestants, and 1 Muslim).
19

According to Seruvumba (1992), ACORD, CCOAIB, IWACU, and BED altogether spent Rwf 1.7 billion,
managed 730 projects, and employed more than 4,000 staff members, 370 of whom were foreign technical
assistants.
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The state-civil society relationship has maintained its self at such standards
throughout Rwanda’s political epochs. Rarely have there been relationships connecting
civil society to the state beyond the patron-client relationship. After Rwanda became
independent in 1962, the ensuring mushroom groups along with Balloon cooperatives were
carefully and systematically absorbed by the state and incorporated into its developmental
agenda through legal powers of its institutions. A series of laws led to the creation of such
groups and defined constraining lines around which they functioned. In the 1980s, the
government optimally perpetuated those relational lines and made them arenas for a
structured popular regime support system. The state’s view of civil society thus comes
from the logic whereby such groups are an important channel for achieving grand
development plans. Despite multiple other vulnerabilities they present, formally organized
(civil society) groups have perhaps never been as much focused on anything else as on
serving the state’s goals.
The proliferation of both Balloons and Mushrooms was an idea well thought out by
the state and systematically pulled and incorporated into its system. In the real sense, they
have always been an integral part of the system whose vision for them has always been to
achieve goals different than liberalizing the state. Such associations represented a fledged
furniture best suited to furnish the development that a patrimonial state had architected for
every citizen. The state designed, owned, and set in motion a working framework and the
direction of their action. There was no wiggling around this construction of the relationship
that has gone on to connect civil society groups and the state. For example, the government
named 1989 “the year of self-organization of the rural world” (Uvin 1998, 165).
Subsequently, a special presidential fund was mobilized the same year to incentivize and
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promote such initiatives. Through provision of small loans and grants, the state controlled
the full action of civil society. In addition, the world community embraced the state-society
relations as such; rather than challenging it, it supported it. The World Bank report in 1987
hailed the government’s faith in the associational movement and argued that “the
widespread presence of cooperative, associative and risk-sharing groups…[was] largely
responsible for the vitality of local communities” (World Bank 1987, 28).
Development became the sole unifying factor among civil society, the population,
and the state. In a sense, the development machinery—that the state has always piloted—
was meant to leave no one and no organized structure off board. Development was the
convenient medium via which the state recruited civil society groups and the population to
line up with the power system. As the slogan on the national seal of pre-1990 period
indicated (liberté, coopération, Progrès), just as the acronym of the then one ruling party
Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour le Dévelopement (MRND) recapped, no one was
meant to remain outside the developmental agenda in every stratum of the Rwandan
society. Ntavyohanyuma (1987) has estimated that there was at least 1 farmer organization
per 35 households in Rwanda before 1990, 1 cooperative per 350 households, 1 NGO per
3,500 households, and more than 12% of Rwandans belonged to mushroom organizations.
As such, we can see that the same post-1994 civil society vibrancy existed in pre-1990
Rwanda.

Namely, a large swathe of the population participated in civil society

associations, but these did nothing to alter the state’s domination.
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Why Did the Political Opening of 1990 Not Help Civil Society in Rwanda?
With the advent of the Third Wave of democratization that swept through the
continent in the 1990s, one would have expected this development to launch reform of civil
society and the modes in which it had traditionally connected citizens and the state. One
would also think that the associational capital that Rwanda had registered by 1990 was
easily going to translate into change as far as governing relations were concerned.
Unfortunately, however, Rwanda’s political opening proved not to mark the start of
democratization, but rather the long slide to the Genocide of 1994. It did not take too long
to witness a nefarious fallout of the introduction of multi-party competition in Rwanda.
Relative political freedom reigned in Rwanda for some three years, but there truly came no
fundamental change out of it. One would even make a case that rather than enhancing the
role of civil society, the political opening degraded its capacity for supporting change.
In a surprising turn, the supposedly now autonomous civil society exposed its
extreme weakness and limitations during the moments leading up to and in the 1994
Genocide.

Despite several reforms that the state had implemented—including a

constitutional revision guaranteeing associational freedom and other civil liberties, the
results became a megalomania of violence, i.e., the Genocide.

The freedom that

independent media enjoyed, the multi-party competition freedom, the diversity of voices
expressed throughout the streets of Rwanda, numerous popular gatherings by opposition
parties’ constituencies, the negotiations between antagonistic forces that yielded the
Arusha peace accords, the newly created transitional multi-party government, multiple
other reforms and laws enforced in Rwanda’s political arena including preparation for the
first free and fair elections in Rwanda’s then history, all proved insufficient to lift Rwanda
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to democratic transition. All that democratic momentum did not produce the liberalization
culture that many had hoped for. Instead, political activism resulted in the collapse of both
the political system and civil society.
At the height of the Rwandan conflict in 1993, democratic forces were qualified,
by the state, as enemies. Political opposition parties became conveniently lumped together
with rebel forces of RPF. Then the conflict became not only regime versus opposition; it
also became Hutu (the regime elite) versus Tutsi (all opposition led by RPF). Every
organized group, be it a political party or civil society association, that opposed the state
was dealt a fatal hand by extremist components of the state. Leaders of such groups were
quickly labeled enemies of the state, tracked down, and arbitrarily assassinated (Longman
1999; Uvin 1999, 67-81). Surprisingly enough, many other groups sided with the state,
often participating in the propagation of pro-Genocide propaganda and in direct killing. A
dynamic along the Hutu versus Tutsi and State versus Enemy divide formed. Ethnicity
quickly became the site upon which the survival of the state and the future of democracy
were defined. At the apex of the Rwandan Genocide in July 1994, civil society had lost its
purpose and its mere existence. The democratizing relationship they had attempted to erect
between the state and the society had lost a sense of meaning. It is almost as if the
democratization movement of 1990 not only did nothing to channel the demands of the
people to the state, it actually unleashed forces in society that supported mass violence to
save the Habyarimana regime.
There is a case to be made here that democratization, in the various forms it was
implemented, helped activate violence and precipitated the downfall of the political capital
in Rwanda. But this quick turn of events in Rwanda also raises the question of whether the
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failure of civil society to use the opportunity of a political opening to be a strong force in
democratic governance was a function of inherent internal or external causes, structural or
cultural artifacts, and perhaps a direct result of the perturbed traditional state – society
relationship.

Both endogenous and exogenous factors were important but more

deterministic were the internal strands of power structures in Rwanda. Three major factors
explain the quick unraveling of state – civil society relations and the ensuing demise of the
democratic experiment in Rwanda: a) a politico-cultural environment inconsonant with the
liberal democratic logic, b) Rwanda’s ethnicity and the Genocide, c) a return to power
relational status quo in Rwanda’s polity.

An Environment Inherently Inelastic to The New Multiparty Logic
To the extent that the democratization wave was about to challenge the routine in
Rwanda’s political habitus, it remains unclear how Rwanda had prepared that about-tohappen radical change in its political system. There was no evidence that there existed any
cultural predilection for opposition—potentially stemming from non-state actors—to the
state’s imminent role in Rwanda’s political habits before 1990. No other events had thus
far successfully attempted to balance the state’s monopolistic and inviolable power.20
Democratization

was

about

normatively

altering

that

power

status

through

institutionalization of civil liberties and a widespread set of democratic principles. But one
needs to remember that there already existed some form of associational movement in
Rwanda even before 1990. The difference was that such movement had conceptually and

20

By the state I mean a non-personalist entity. There had been a coup d’état in 1973 and Habyarimana
replaced Kayibanda but the behavior of those two presidents as well as the unchallenged central role the state
remained a constancy across those two republics.
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practically existed in the sole logic to support, not to oppose, the state and channel its
agenda for the society. Up to that point in time, the Rwandan state had skillfully and
successfully tied virtually every civic association in the society (cooperatives, church,
business groups, media, education institutions) to its patrimonial power structures. It was
a state omnipresent in every sphere of the society (Straus 2013; Longman 2010).
Therefore, challenging that order inevitably sought to strip the state of its long-standing
strands of power. By the 1980s, President Habyarimana and his government had built a
state in which the population, his unique party MRND, every state agency, national
symbols, and every organized entity in the land harmoniously coalesced around his goal to
foster “unity” and “cooperation” for “development.” When he took power through a coup
in July 1973, President Habyarimana and the single legal party he subsequently created
and imposed on everyone in the land claimed to encourage a “démocratie responsable,”
meaning one allowing “free expression of ideas on the condition that they were developing
the mass” (Mfizi 1983, 61). In a sense, President Habyarimana meant that organized forces
had no purpose in Rwanda unless they served and represented the pro-government vision.
When he allowed political competition to infuse Rwanda’s political arena, there is no doubt
that he had believed that all political forces would remain within the same power logic, and
that he had been assured that such forces would never go out of his reach.
But having in place laws and public announcements or constitutional reforms
guaranteeing civil liberties and space for political power competition alone proved too little
to undercut the causes that had inhibited a liberal democracy in Rwanda prior to 1990.
Rwanda had a civil society, essentially, born to serve the state, not to oppose it or alter its
traditional power modus operandi.

The state had purposefully created a working
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framework for civil society primarily meant to bolster central power consolidation. The
political landscape was hardwired to accommodate a relationship in which it was virtually
inconceivable to raise a civil society with a potential to obliterate or balance the state’s
unchallengeable primacy. It is almost as if the attempt to alter the power structures could
not have happened without mass violence. In the political environment of Rwanda,
instituting an independent and strong civil society in Rwanda equated to reducing the
state’s absolute power. An abrupt activation of the buttons of democratization whereby
the organized groups were the locus for alternative political choices accomplished no other
goal than rendering the state vulnerable, and provoking a profoundly violent response.
That is why democratization took off in Rwanda—a democratically palatable constitutional
reform took place and a multiparty government was formed—but the distribution of power
changed very little (Longman 1999, 339). The state stayed strong and all attempts to
balance its power yielded results in the other direction of closing the political space. Rather
than democratizing the society, liberalizing attempts summoned every reactionary force
from the state, exacerbating the already poor governance, and magnifying violence in
which a considerable part of the same civil society took part. The pre-democratization civil
society was illiberal in conception in the first place. Nominal democratization did not
render the competing social forces any more liberal. The seminal political freedom and
opportunity that 1990 promised—to imbue liberal democratic values into the Rwandan
governance establishment—led to a backlash against such principles in the Rwanda.
Radical governance and extreme violence became the alternative to an approach that was
meant to be normatively liberalizing by balancing the state’s supreme power. Therefore,
the failure of civil society (along with other parallel forces of democratization) owes it

73

primarily to its obdurate move to challenge a political culture deeply engrained in the
Rwandan political society.

Identity and Genocide in the Era of Liberalization
The political freedom that came along with the normalization of a multiparty
system and a freed civil society in 1990 paralleled a civil war that broke out later that same
year.21 At its apex, the Rwandan armed conflict was not only instrumental to frame an
ethnic division and to serve as a pretext for Genocide by the state, it also served the same
state to redraw the rules of the political game. The conflict also provided a wide array of
tools to the state to assert new political directives but also to justify what had for long been
its behavioral tradition when responding to other political threats. But if anything, the
concomitance of conflict and democratization in Rwanda exposed the state’s gravest
vulnerability.
Because the liberalization of civil society coincided with the military rebellion of
1990, the state woke up with two powerful enemies in its face: democratic opposition
forces represented by calumnious political parties on the one hand, and bullets shot by RPF
forces on the other.

The former represented an attack to the one-party (and Hutu

dominated) ideology that Rwanda’s power structures had rested on since independence;
the latter (for the extremists) meant the arrival of a new ethnic order in which the majority
would be subjected to the rule of the minority once again as it was in the pre-colonial era.
To the extent that these two enemies (of the state) individually sought to disrupt the central

21

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a military branch of the Tutsi population living in exile since the
1950s, led an armed rebellion from Uganda on October 1, 1990 to overthrow the then government whose
leadership had been impervious to the peaceful return of the refugees.
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power, it gave the state the justification for maximal usage of force and violence against
the enemies. Ethnicity, hence, became the most potent mobilizing instrument for the state
to respond to that dual threats. In this double-front war, the state skillfully crafted a
venomous narrative conflating democratic competition and the civil war as a strategy for
self-preservation. But it did so as it allowed for some symbolic (yet carefully controlled)
reforms to occur at the same time as it engaged into a physical war. A multiparty
government was formed, but at the same time insecurity was raging, particularly in the
Northern region of Rwanda, causing significant internal displacement. Habyarimana and
his inner circle in the government blamed the chaos on the opposition, meaning the Tutsi
population directly. In that narrative, persuasively presented to the public, the Tutsi
population was unreflectively linked to the RPF rebels, the enemy of the majority
population, Hutu, and hence the enemy of the state. It then became virtually impossible to
separate the democratic warfare from the physical warfare. One leading preoccupation was
that the state and its majority Hutu population were under existential assault and that the
common enemy was the Tutsi population, present on the warfront and also dispersed within
the population.

The democratic debate conveniently disappeared into the now all-

attention-centered narrative about the civil war.
The internal dynamics of this conflict and democratization included a dimension of
regionalism to it, further decimating all hopes for independent democratic forces to
flourish. As new political parties formed between 1990 and 1993, some of them found
impetus in what they saw as a single region dominated political system and emerged
principally to countervail that regional dominance.22 An anti-Northern movement emerged

22

Habyarimana, a Hutu leader who took power through military coup in 1973, was from the Northern side
of Rwanda. Throughout his reign, his fellow Hutu Northerners dominated all major political and strategic
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seeking to challenge that regionalist culture in Rwanda’s politics but the irony was that it,
too, comprised of exclusively Southerners. For example, PSD, the major opposition party
at the time—arguably set to win had there been a competitive election in 1993—was
ethnically inclusive but was essentially known as a party of Southerners coalescing against
a Northern-dominated oppressive system. The South was home to the unique intellectual
institution of the time: the National University of Rwanda (UNR), the geographic symbol
of opposition to the single party system and also where the freedom of assembly dominated
throughout the country, is in the South. The PSD was the idea of Southerners, which
bequeathed it the nick-name of “the party of intellectuals” (Twagilimana 2007, 180). That
was a group of elites among whose members were the good guys who vehemently fought
the ethnic division sowed by the regime and later fell victim to their belief are the ones who
later inherited the name of ‘moderate Hutu.’ The leader of PSD, Félicien Gatabazi, a Hutu,
was shot killed on the evening of February 21, 1994 on his way home from a party meeting
in Kigali. PSD members accused the Habyarimana system of masterminding his death
since it was the only party the system had failed to split. On their side, members of the
Habyarimana party blamed the “opposition,” Tutsi’s RPF, apocryphally because Gatabazi
had discreetly revealed his intensions to break up with RPF rebels whom he first felt lenient
towards (Kiesel 1994, 9). In the most chaotic political turmoil, Abakombozi (redeemers),
a youth wing of PSD stopped the vehicle carrying Martin Bucyana, the leader CDR—a
satellite party of MRND—and brutally murdered him to avenge the killing of their leader
3 days previously.

spheres of governance, including military, finance, education, and foreign relations. He and his governing
circle later became ubiquitously and unapologetically known as Akazu, a little house which signified a onecentered micro political dynasty.
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The political turmoil of the 1990s not only perturbed the ways in which
democratization was set to unravel in Rwanda, it also rearranged its political traditions
quite profoundly. For example, when Agathe Uwilingiyimana became the first female to
ascend to a high governmental position as Prime Minister—as a result of a pressure on
Habyarimana to nominate her—it posed a serious threat to the one-party system; not
because she was a voluble democrat who sought to instigate radical change in Rwanda’s
unidirectional political practice, but primarily because she was perceived by the
Habyarimana regime as a woman like no other in their time who was capable of achieving
her objectives. Uwilingiyimana had set a precedent prior to her ascendance to power
prominence. She was peculiarly intelligent and competent with firm convictions and
principles (Taylor 2001, 179). She was respected for her commanding and persuasive
words. She had many degrees in science that she had obtained from European academic
institutions. She was well spoken and was not afraid to speak her mind including criticizing
the President in public. She was popular and had succeeded at galvanizing women and
many men in the country against a patriarchal system that the state represented, which
resulted in the birth of a first wave of organized groups in 1990.

In a way,

Uwilingiyimana’s own story was a rebuttal to a political culture that was male-dominated
and which she symbolically sought to displace. She belonged to the Hutu ethnic group but
her ideas and persuasive skills reflected unifying tendencies across the identity divide. She
did not seek to profit from the ethnic card that the regime had played. She believed in the
power of persuasive ideas as a cure for social injustices, just as many other civil society
organizations did.
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Most importantly, Uwilingiyimana saw and denounced the wrongdoings and
injustices numerous people were suffering from in Rwanda, including women. When she
became the Minister of Education, for example, she executed stern reforms and attacked
some of Habyarimana’s major policies head-on.23

Those included abolishing the

proportional rule which, up to that point, promoted children from elementary to secondary
school on the basis of national statistics and the 84% Bahutu-14% Batutsi- 1% Batwa
balance policy (see Freedman et al. 2006, 174-192). The Iringaniza-balance policy
purported to inject “social justice” into education and other areas (the army, diplomacy,
and other public services), but by giving a disproportionate educational advantage to Hutu
ethnic children and excluding many Tutsi children from education. For Uwilingiyimana,
performance, not ethnic or regional background, was the only criteria upon which children
were to be promoted to secondary education. She wanted to decouple education from all
forms of political interference. In 1993, she directed that two armed security officials be
stationed at every site where national examination took place to avoid theft of test copies
and other cheating maneuvers. Her independent positions on policies, her determination,
and her refusal to parallel education with favor proved to be a threat to a system that was
built outside democratic principles she wanted to subject it to. She represented an antithesis
to a regime system whose survival had been erected on a whole new logic for governing.
To them, Uwilingiyimana represented an iconoclastic force that was poised to displace the
state’s immovable power. But it would prove costly when, on May 5, 1992, a group of 25

23

In a joint communiqué released in Kinyamateka newspaper no. 1378 of September 1992, Minister
Uwilingiyimana and other opposition voices supporting her denounced the “ethnic and regional equilibrium”
policy or the “quota system” in education by casting its unjust nature. The minister argued that such policy
had excluded talented children from education and started to progressively change it in favor of neglected
regions (Freedman et al. 2006, 198).
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armed men stormed her residence, physically molested her in front of her children, and
pillaged her house. This violence attracted a national reaction of women who, for the first
time in the history of Rwanda, filled the streets throughout the country in solidarity with
the molested Minister (Kiesel 1994, 9).
Uwilingiyimana’s popularity among women prompted the state to take serious
consideration of women and to garner more support in an organized way. With a personal
involvement of the then first lady who was tied into the system, URAMA, a women
development movement, was created in 1991.24 It functioned as the female wing of the
MRND party and essentially aimed to counter the threatening civil society movement that
Uwilingiyimana had aroused. URAMA’s de jure purpose was to represent all women of
Rwanda and bring them into development in a practical way, but as Mageza-Barthel (2015,
58) notes, it was de facto “never consulted on policy matters or else rubber-stamped
governmental decisions”.25

URAMA was essentially made up of elite women and

represented primarily the views of regime elitist women in whose intentions some saw a
tactical move for prominent women to profit on the back of the ordinary women (de Lame
2005, 388). But more singular to URAMA was that it was introduced by MRND and the
regime in the name of a civil society movement which did not want to be outcompeted by
Uwilingiyimana in garnering support from women. More structures like URAMA were
created by MRND, but aiming primarily to annihilate rebellious actions perceived as
threatening and diminishing the state’s power just as the Uwilingiyimana phenomenon.26
24

URAMA stood for Urunana rw’Abanyarwandakazi mu Majyambere (female coalition in development).

25

Other organizations, including PROFEMMEs, were created to countervail URAMA.

26

One of them was Association des Femmes Parlementaires pour la Défense des Droits de la Mère de de
l’Enfant whose action is remembered for supporting the venomous extremist rhetoric and laying the
groundwork for the strategies which were used to execute the Genocide. The association is also known for

79

That is why, in the eyes of the regime, she represented a threat that had to be dealt with in
a singular way.
By focusing on Uwilingiyimana as traitor to the nationalist Hutu cause—and
dismissing her opposition competitive skills—the regime had tried to activate the most
effective weapon to tilt in the new multiparty context. Some have even argued that
Uwilingiyimana’s assassination at the onset of the Genocide owed as much to the fact that
she was a woman representing culturally revolutionary ideals, unlike others as to the simple
fact that she was in the political opposition (Taylor 2001, 164-169). In a traditionally
patriarchal society with salience of male dominance in political life, women had not yet
risen to prominence that would allow them to reverse the gender status quo. Her advent
into politics, in a highly ethnicized context, was perceived as a credible threat to the
survival of the existing state system. In the extremist Hutu imaginary, the threat that
Uwilingiyimana represented was perhaps higher than that represented by Tutsi elites given
that she had taken moderate views and built ties with Tutsi RPF leaders, and hence had the
power to appeal to both Hutu and Tutsi forces at once.
By late-1993, ethnic division in Rwanda had reached a point so high that the prior
liberalization efforts became irrelevant. Instead of staying as an idea originally aimed at
creating orderly governance and peace, democratization became quickly conflated with a
national security crisis. A priority order emerged out of this combination. Its civil
exponents lost popular support and legitimacy, became increasingly depleted, and
ultimately lost that democratic war. In the public view—partially resulting from the

having co-published an extremist pamphlet with Léon Mugesera, a Northern extremist elite known for his
venomous speech in 1992, entitled The Whole Truth on October 1992 War Imposed Upon Rwanda by
Aggressors from Uganda Armed Forces (Mageza-Berthel 2015, 58-9; Des Forges 1999, 63-4; see also
Brandstetter 2001, 160). since the introduction of multiparty in Rwanda.
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narrative cooked by the state—the democratization project had only sowed civil strife in
Rwanda. Public opinion believed the conflict would have been of a smaller scale had
democratization not complicated the strategies of the state and not forced its hand for
maintaining order, given the abrupt and ubiquitous participation of people in the conflict
in an attempt to save the state’s survival and their own. Democratization was not a battle
that the Rwandan society was ready or had organically prepared for. To be fair, while it is
true that democratization would have taken a different form without the civil war and the
Genocide, it is equally unclear what the course of democracy in Rwanda would have
become without enforcing the political freedom of 1990 by the international community.
What is though certain enough is that when the enforced liberalization veered into ethnic
and regional cleavages, it prompted the state to go to extreme lengths to nullify the
perceived threat, and that marked the beginning of anarchy.

A Review of Power Relational Status Quo in Rwanda’s Polity Since Independence
If the way civil society developed in Rwanda was organically flawed and difficult
to create liberal activism in Rwanda’s public governance, the Genocide that sought to
eliminate Tutsi from the public square in 1994 has intractably complicated every new
attempt to promote democratic governance. Aside from fundamentally changing the
sociology of Rwanda as a collective, the Genocide and the ethnic dynamics around it have
closed the space for any liberal democratic movement to flourish in post-Genocide
Rwanda. The Genocide has given the state power infrastructures robust enough to restore
its imminence at every level of ordering the society and to supplant all other forces seeking
to balance it, all in the name of avoiding reoccurrence of the past. The bar was way too
high for civil society groups to aggressively address the state and to achieve, in a normative
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sense, its conventional democratization objectives. To the extent that the political opening
of 1990 was about making the transition from the “supreme” state to a “moderate” or
diminished state possible, the state has proved savvy in using the Genocide to restore the
primacy it lost between 1990 and 1994. There is a convincing justification—stemming
from the horror of the Genocide—for the state to behave and act as a ubiquitous buffer
against return to the evil past and to insulate society from all forms of threat against its
integrity. This raises two questions. In what ways has this dynamic redesigned the
behavior of civil society in Rwanda? And, can political liberalization survive in such
environment despite the aspirations represented by the post-Genocide civil society? To
answer these questions, it is important to first remember that not only has the Genocide
transformed the workings of the state, it has equally transformed the Rwandan society and
the complete architecture of its social forces.
At the state level, the Genocide has exposed the complications that political
openings may entail in conflict-prone ethnic environments. That is, as Khadiagala (2004)
has rightly noted, constructing a democratic governance in post-conflict societies entails
“recreating a wide array of institutions against the backdrop of social and political
polarization” (p.1). Because violence decimates social consensus and civic norms, postconflict governance takes a shape-shifting focus of resuscitating effective state authority,
correcting past human rights violations, and promoting social reconciliation (idem.). Both
a combination of a history of violence and the difficult environment that the state inherits
complicate the strategies that civil society can use to effect democracy (Schmitter 2010).
A violent past sets contextual particularities in the processes of democratization in the sense
that the state employs it to alert the public to the possibility of toggling into same violence
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again if nothing is done (Wiarda 1993). But also, along that process of recreating a
governable environment, the state often commits the same misstates as those it seeks to
correct, including refraining and repressing political freedom. In crafting new institutions
to mitigate the problems spawned by the conflict, the challenge becomes for the state to
remain faithful to democratic principles, and for activists to hold the state accountable to
its action, and enabling participation (Khadiagala 2004, 1).
Most projects on developing democratic governance in Rwanda since the Genocide
still confront the dilemma arising from those two legitimately held and yet antagonistic
views. Such projects are faced with the choice between competing objectives; that is
promoting political liberalization on the one hand while remaining sympathetic to the
central state role on the other. As Khadiagala maintains, when the atmosphere of transition
from civil friction to peace is fragile, “donor programs seek to reconcile tensions between
political order and democratic governance, state and human security, and justice and
reconciliation” (idem.). The unique circumstances of the post-Genocide transition, the
legacy of the Genocide, and the lingering of its effects have hampered the search for broadbased governance in Rwanda (idem, 2). The impact of the Genocide on the beliefs and the
perceptions of challenging the state through democratic means has complicated the work
of civil society in Rwanda. The confluence of political freedom and an armed insurgency
in 1990 and the Genocide against Tutsi at the apex of that conflict rearranged the meanings
attributed to the concept of political freedom in modern Rwanda. For the state, a free civil
society did not intend to prop up the state but to destroy its authority. Civil society activism
denoted bad intentions against the survival of the regime and of the society. There was no
clear line separating armed and peaceful activism in the ethnically divided polity of
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Rwanda at the time. The public had widely bought into the belief that multipartyism
offered alternatives to the status quo but only for a short time because out of multipartyism
also came anarchy and a political disorder. Self-expression efforts—essentially replacing
the tradition of following the state’s directives unquestionably—led to acute division
among the population who were already ethnically vulnerable.

As democratization

proceeded, interethnic trust and general trust eroded overnight. The national social fabric
disrupted. A lingering collective trauma, a latent interpersonal contempt, and a general
state of public dismay all worked to the disadvantage of civil society and of the role civil
society intended to play in the Rwandan polity.
Part of why the state has not permitted civil society, to this day, to flock into streets
and burn things in Rwanda to voice concerns or protest some bad policy is the fear that
such freedom has the potentiality to turn the state upside-down, eventually driving it to
disintegration. The most memorable images of burning things on streets in the Rwandan
collective memory date back to the Genocide. Violence with burning fire was leveled at
the Tutsi population, then designated the primordial enemy, by the state-supported
extremists. This violence had a symbolic intent and meaning beyond the traditional
destruction through popular protest or unrest.

This one aimed at obstructing and

extinguishing the perceived obstructing enemy (Taylor 1999). Another violent protest
moment in Rwanda came about when Interahamwe militiamen infiltrated from eastern
DRC and conducted sporadic attacks across the Eastern villages of Rwanda between late
1994 and 1997. They would trap road grounds and other frequented areas with explosives
to which both pedestrians and vehicles succumbed. Disguised militias would launch
grenades and shell rockets at bypassing vehicles or explode one in a public market at
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daylight, and would ambush people and execute them. The tactic of burning vehicles and
other symbolically significant objects was also used by RPF, then rebels, after their first
launch of a guerrilla in 1990. One would also remind that RPF, the ruling party since 1994,
was once a civil society entity among other socio-political forces of the time.
It is simply unfathomable today to imagine Balloon and Minion CSO constituencies
coordinate action and congregate on the streets of Kigali determined to overturn some
major policy decision made by the Kagame government. Both the pre-1990 and the current
incarnation of the Rwandan state seem to have been aware of the potentialities and the
power that any organized opposition force has to inflict severe damages upon that state.
Therefore, the tactics of the state have consistently been those of pre-empting such forces
well before they can crystalize and pose a danger to it. All political activities hinting at
such historical references of opposition summon swift attention and or serious responses
from the state. It is not due to the lack of protective laws that keep people silent and nonaggressive toward the state. Memories and reference to the recent history may explain the
timid behavior of most organizations vis-à-vis the state. Such behavior is characteristic of
the old tradition of deference—as opposed to deterrence—with respect to the state and the
choices it makes for the society.
At the society level, it is important to understand the impact of the Genocide from
a historically structural vintage point. The structure of the Rwandan society has not been
simply a collection of dispersed and unconnected households (See Desmarais 1977;
Lemarchand 1970; Longman 2010; NURC 2004). The Rwanda’s social fabric was always
structured in local communities or spheres where collective memories and consensus are
built.

Just like in other rural African societies, Rwandan families reacted with a
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communitarian spirit when facing either external interventions or local tensions arising
from their living conditions (Lemarchand 1970; 2012, 270-3). This traditional mode of
coping with hardships was always supported by their communal ability to support one
another and also by the belief to count on that solidarity. However, prior to and after the
war and the 1994 Genocide leveled against Tutsi, the Rwandan trust evaporated,
significantly affecting all Rwandans and the structure of their social conditions. To a
significant extent, the war, the Genocide, and mass movements of refugees paralyzed their
ability to act together again. In April 1994, for example, the ‘relative’ trust felt by survivors
(Tutsi) was transformed into complete distrust. When the Genocide ended, over two
million of Hutu refugees fled into the former Zaïre, fearing reprisals from the survivors
and/or the new regime. When they returned in 1996, they came back with diminished trust
and fears of being denounced and of suffering acts of vengeance. All of the protagonists
in the Genocide were prey to very powerful emotions of fear, hatred, anger, despair, a sense
of abandonment, disappointment, shame (NURC 2005, 21). In addition, another important
section of the population (Tutsi), born and/or raised in neighboring Uganda, Burundi,
Zaïre, and Tanzania since 1959 repatriated following the RPF victory of July 1994.
Distrust has since fluctuated across segments of the population, hence affecting the
processes related to the reintegration and re-composition of communities. This confluence
of people of different historical and cultural backgrounds brought about social norms upon
which a new understanding of democracy would come from.
An environment combining distrust, a devastated state, failed cultural values,
economic uncertainties, a general despair, a collective trauma, and guilt of conscience for
many marked the start out of which current Rwandan civil society organization regenerated
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itself and was reorganized. Such a smorgasbord of people, traditions, views, experiences,
and ideas is fundamentally at the core of values and goals having defined the new civil
society’s behavior in Rwanda. A fragile environment—with collective trauma, contentious
backgrounds, and divided thinking and visions—became the embryo that conceived and
gave birth to a resurgence of civil society in the post-Genocide Rwanda. In a way, the
Rwandan society, at one point in time, was not only devoid of civil society, it also lacked
environmental conditions for it. And even though a wide effort has been directed by the
new government to help mitigate some of these environmental challenges, civil society is
still prey to that fresh history. That history has redirected the focus of actors in terms of
scope, interests, and strategies. Strategies for mobilizing a liberalizing civil society have
inherited a far restrictive history stemming from a severe conflict, markedly conditioning
the ways groups operate. The current civil society, just as any other entity in the Rwandan
society, comes from a fundamentally damaged background that is rooted in that history of
ethnic conflict. Despite the rapidly growing reemergence of grassroots associational
networks in Rwanda in recent years, the post-Genocide sociological environment is not yet
ripe for a liberal democratic culture to arise as a function of civil society activism.27 The
general public dismay, wide scale poverty, trauma among numerous Rwandans, self-

27
A USAID and the Government of Rwanda’s joint assessment (Rwanda and Development Partners 2008,
42) showed that there were over 37,000 active associations in Rwanda. Of them, 96% are located at the rural
or village levels—where more than 80% of Rwandan citizens/inhabitants live (Rwanda DHS III 2005, 25)—
while their age had not yet exceeded a decade. In addition, there are around 2,500 local NGOs registered in
Rwanda today (USAID 2011). In a sense, the resources out of which a new civil society can revitalize
democracy have lived on or are resuscitating in Rwanda; and they are located at the peripheral level. It raises
the question of whether this trend in associational movement in Rwanda has produced any different results
or will ever behave differently from the density of associations of pre-Genocide Rwanda? Given that a high
density of associations is not a new reality in Rwanda, in what ways are the new associations an asset to
political liberalization? Prolific associational movements had existed prior to the Genocide, the time they
disappeared. In fact, it is estimated (Uvin 1999, 164-5) that there were 3,240 registered cooperatives and
farmer groups in Rwanda by 1993. An additional estimate of 9,243 saving and lending groups, with
approximately 200,000 members, were functional.
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loathing and rejection, and many more plights stemming from a bad history that the society
is confronted with have all not only complicated but rendered practically impossible for an
organically liberal and independent civil society to emerge. The Genocide has even
challenged the perceptions of members on the kind of problems civil society can resolve.
For example, some in and some outside Rwanda do not understand why only the orphans
of the Genocide alone are beneficiaries of state funded educational support by the
government, while there are numerous other orphans in the country who are equally poor.28
There is no social contract yet among civil society groups with respect to the priority
problems of the society. It is difficult for civil society to have a unified voice on some of
these complicated issues; and much less is civil society made up of members—at any level
(national, local, and grassroots) of the society—immune to that damaged environment.
The post-Genocide political space was adapted to make it difficult for an energized
civil society to act freely on any such challenges. Certain laws created by the postGenocide state were purposefully to constrict debate over such extremely sensitive and
complex matters as a way of preempting recurrence of the past turmoil. For example, the
severity of the law against “the Genocide ideology,” the “never again” slogan in daily
discourse, and many other structural mechanisms enforced by the post-Genocide state are
both a constraining condition for autonomous civic activism to take root in Rwanda.29 The

28

The Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide (FARG) was set up by the post-Genocide Rwanda to
provide some moral rehabilitation and support to the victims. Assistance includes paying education cost for
orphans from the Genocide by this public-budget fund. The process of selection of such children was
participatory and began at the village level. FARG was decreed by law No 02/98 of 1998 and aimed to
provide assistance to the survivors of the period spanning October 1, 1990 through December 31, 1994. It
was amended by Law No 69/2008 of December 30, 2008 and again by Law No 81/2013 of November 9,
2013.

29

The Law No 18/2008 of July 23, 2008 aims to proscribe the “Genocide ideology.” It stipulates, among
other provisions, that a leader of an NGO incriminated with such a crime is passible to a punishment of an
imprisonment of 15 to 25 years along with a fine ranging between Rwf 2 to Rwf 5 millions. If the crime is
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state has re-designed the political space in the manner that is not easy for other social forces
to try to balance its governing centrality without being part of the protective state system.
Events from the past as well as the fresh memories of political liberalization in mid-1990s
have not given any advantage to the new civil society groups in their struggle to an
independent democratic force in Rwanda’s polity.

Conclusion
Going as far back as pre-colonial times, we do not find ingredients of autonomous
forces whose primary goal was to counter or undermine the state’s action. A strong social
capital always existed in Rwanda but always in support of the central authority.
Colonialism did not alter that structure of social order. It reinforced it and did not institute
recipes for a liberal constitutional democracy via independent organizational movement.
In fact, colonial order complicated the chance for a democratizing civil society when it
picked and switched sides, perturbing the stability of existing social order. That instability
is still an important ingredient in the ways Rwanda’s political culture has historically
adapted and changed to democratic pressures. Historical patterns that characterize state
and society relations in Rwanda are rooted in the fact that there was no organically held
view on the part of elites and population that a desired strong state comes from a polarized
polity.
The first rise of organized groups in Rwanda—in 1956—did not come out of
popular desire to countervail the power of the colonial state. It was a creation of the

linked to an association, an NGO, or a political party, such organization is dissolved and the fine increases
from Rwf 5 to 10 millions. The law is also intractable, albeit imprecise on details, on spreading the Genocide
ideology via documents, speeches, media, social media, and other avenues, all whose culprits can go to jail
for 20 to 25 years with a fine going from Rwf 2 to 5 millions.
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colonial state to channel economic needs of the colonial elite. Subsequent associational
movements were always viewed and treated as such. The pattern took roots and during the
democratization era, the Genocide exposed the weaknesses and the danger of enforcing
democratization through archetypes that are not organically grounded in the contextual
cultural realities. Before and after the outbreak of the Genocide, civil society split into
both “constructive” and “destructive” forces, and in remarkable instances turning against
the very population it claimed as its own constituencies.
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CHAPTER IV

CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN RWANDA: DOES
THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT ADD UP?
Connecting Rwandan voluntary associations to democratization requires us to
explore the wider economic context in which the interaction between the two occurs. After
all, economic well-being and political freedom do not rule each other out. They march in
tandem; they are intricately bound to one another. The underlying logic is rooted in the
idea that democracy and poverty are not inharmonious and that political development is
inextricably tied to economic conditions (Lipset 1959). Machiavelli would say that it is
difficult to be both poor and a good civic citizen at once (Rose 2016, 735-6; Del Lucchese
2009, 80-1). Over time, this enduring argument has evolved to support that the notion that
republican citizens must enjoy enough economic security in order to shield themselves
against authoritarian domination and to safeguard their equal rights status in the republic
(Rose 2016, 743; Waley 1970, 93; Dagger 2006, 166; Lovett 2010, 190-3; Pettit 2012, 1124). Advocates of this view also believe that citizens will develop civic virtues, support
public norms, engage in politics with the spirit of “contestatory vigilance” (Pettit 2012,
226), monitor the government, and avert eventual domination of public officials only under
the condition that they enjoy a secure economic environment (Przeworski and Limongi
1997).
This is essentially modernization theory on display. Scholarly authorities with this
view have continuously argue that economic development transforms social structures by
incorporating (and empowering) a middle class into the spectrum of governance (Inglehart
1997; see also Moore 1993). Because of the relative material comfort gained, the middle
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class is believed to inevitably seek to protect its status by intelligently taking part in politics,
resulting in an electoral power that serves as a bulwark of the democratic polity (Inglehart
1997). There is also an empirical convention (e.g., Inglehart and Welzel 2008) that poorer
countries inevitably experience neo-patrimonialism and identity community politics.
Similarly (idem), a society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored
elite will likely result in oligarchy, with a dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum, or in
tyranny, with popularly based dictatorship (idem.).30
But if building or achieving democratic habits in a republic requires certain
economic attributes and attitudes, then the question arises of whether there could truly be
alternatives for civil society in the absence of material security.31 Is it still possible for
organized groups to “invigilate public officials to respect the rule of law” (Rose 2016, 744)
and, with utter confidence, to denounce fraud, violence, infidelity in the republic (Pettit
2012, 127-9 and 225-9; Lovett 2010, 214-7) in the absence of a financially secure middle
class? To the extent that material security is a prerequisite of a healthy republicanism, what

30
Inglehart (1997), in his long career research on this phenomenon, has not established a causal linkage
between economic development and political development—because the sequence in this paradigm is also
debated—but he has consistently observed an enduring correlation between the two and seen that
modernization produces shifts in economics, politics, and culture. However, these shifts do not happen as a
linear process involving urbanization followed by mass education then occupational specialization and so on.
Rather, he asserts that cultural, political, and economic changes occur simultaneously and should be viewed
as interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Most relevant to this work in Inglehart’s analysis is his
explanation of the materialist-postmaterialist shift. Inglehart demonstrates that as citizens come to feel more
secure physically and economically, they become more prone to emphasizing postmaterialist, quality of life
issues, such as a cleaner environment.
31

There is a duel, in academia, over the interpretation of Machiavelli’s maxim, “keep the citizens poor.”
Classic republican theorists hold that Machiavelli meant to promote poverty, material austerity, soft living,
lack of luxury among citizens, or irrelevance of private wealth vis-à-vis the public wealth in the republic
(Skinner 2002, 176; Waley 1970, 93; Yoran 2010, 269; Nelson 2004; 76-7). On the other hand, neorepublican theorists interpret Machiavelli’s maxim as expressive of a value aimed to discourage material
pleasure at the cost of real public concerns (Rose 2016, 743-4); that citizens must not value personal wealth
more than the public good; that poverty was a necessary condition for a citizen to live decently (Rose 2016,
735; Viroli 2002, 76; Ionescu 1975, 255). In this chapter, I use the second interpretation of Machiavelli’s
interpretation of that civic-engagement versus wealth relationship.
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else could create civic virtues among citizens, as well as an ability to challenge the state’s
power when there is no financial well-being and autonomy to count on? Put differently, in
an insecure macro-economic environment, what else is likely to place political action at
the center of civil society’s priorities? In this chapter, I tested the extent to which
widespread financial insecurity was an impediment to civil society’s democratization
action in Rwanda. I wanted to look closely at the nature of relationship that exists between
the economic context of civil society and its political engagement with the state in Rwanda.
Simply put, this chapter assesses the degree to which civil society’s weak political behavior
is a function of lack of financial self-reliance.32
Here I explore the ties linking economic success to political engagement among
voluntary associations at three levels: the individual, group, and the country levels. I tested
three hypotheses. First, individuals who are active in civil society associations are those
with a relative material security. I wanted to assess whether engagement by civil society
groups was a result of material security of individuals who form that group. I sought to
determine whether economic goals were primary or secondary to activism in the choice
that individuals make before joining a group.

32

The sequence of influence or causality between economic progress and democratization has yet to be
determined in academia. One view on this debate holds that material conditions are a precursor to democratic
development (Linz and Stepan 1996; Dagger 2006), because it is possible to have authoritarian system and
economic reforms happen in tandem as a precursor to democratic transition; e.g., Spain and Portugal in the
1970s (Wiarda 2001). A neo-liberal economic view holds that economic development has not been
happening in the world because there are no democratic governments to support it in the first place (Collier
2007, 53-76; Collier 2009; Van de Walle 2001; Moore 1993). Another nuanced and non-zero-sum view
considers economic stability as one among many elements that work interactively and in tandem towards
solving the democratic equation. Linz and Stepan (1996, 5-6), for example, posit that economic development
is one among the five key arenas conditional to political consolidation. The complementary factors include
an independent vibrant civil society, a viable political society, the rule of law, and a usable bureaucracy. A
whole different look at this phenomenon claims that economic considerations are less important in the
equation of a democratic culture development, and that what matters the most are such factors as stable
borders, a large and diverse civil society, periodic alternation of political leaders and political parties, and a
minority that does not depend on coalition arrangements to have a voice (Bunce 2008, 25-40).
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Second, again deduced from neo-modernization theory, I posited that civil society
groups will not confront the state unless they are financially self-reliant. That is to say,
financial vitality for a given group is a necessary requisite for it to actively engage the state
on democratization issues. The idea I sought to test here was whether relatively well-off
groups were more inclined to demand political reforms of the state than more financially
marginal groups. To qualify a group as well-off, I began by defining what counted as
‘financial vitality.’ Namely, I defined financial vitality as the ability to continuously raise
operational support from international organizations or donors, rather than relying on
transient funding of marginal group members. I deemed financially viable those groups
whose survival depended on recurring contributions from members and or on a deposited
venture or assets generating financial resources in a sustainable way. Other groups with a
financial vitality are those who may not have assets or other form of investments but may
be involved in agriculture or other forms of revenue generating activities and in a
sustainable way.
Third, there are groups who essentially survive on writing grant proposals and
whose average annual budget may exceed that of any of the preceding categories. I deemed
such groups as non-financially viable but with a higher functional financial capacity.
Therefore, I looked at both long and short-term means of financial survival to qualify each
on the financial vitality spectrum. I hypothesized that in a weak national economic
environment, only groups that are financially vital survive the state’s potent coercive
instruments in their democratization struggles. Concurrently, I posited that the financially
dependent groups are vulnerable to external coercion (state and donors) and that in such
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situations all that matters for them is their own survival (members and the group), not
democratization.
The findings at all these three levels point to the contrary of what I hypothesized.
Financial vitality does not enable groups to engage into actions geared towards
democratizing the state. There is no direct association between the economic well-being
and political activism among civil society groups. Groups with a relative financial
independence and those with marginal means and whose survival exclusively depends on
donors all share the same behavior in the way they relate to the state. If anything, a strong
financial capacity gives civil society the ability to increase its national visibility and hence
increase opportunities for service delivery, but that is by no means an impetus for political
activism nationally.
The findings also suggest that groups represent a place where members come
primarily to pursue their social and economic needs, not as a training ground for
challenging the state. In addition, the interviews suggest that individuals do not join groups
primarily because they have secured a comfortable economic status and therefore that
democratization is an additional goal. Rather, in the majority of cases, groups attract
individuals who are essentially financially destitute, especially in rural areas. Membership
to a group is a path towards achieving and strengthening material needs; the goal for
members is never expressly political. Evidence also shows that just because some groups
have proved durable, and that they possess tools to generate financial resources, this does
not turn them into viable interlocutors of the state who are able to influence its behavior.
Quite the contrary, in engaging into organized efforts, groups gradually experience benefits
from the government in their individual and group life and end up embracing the state’s
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agenda. Groups willingly become adept implementers of state-directed development
programs. While the state is overly present in all spheres of society in Rwanda, which
makes everyone vulnerable to cooptation, there was no indication that ordinary rural groups
are coerced to cheer up and champion for the government and its programs. The state
exercises consistent control over them either way, and group members do not see it as a
coercion. Even the groups that are relatively comfortable in an economic sense, that status
does not give them any impetus to view the state differently. At the rural and poor level of
the society, mushroom civil society groups are inevitably linked to the government cause
because they, in most instance, have depended on its program to meet their economic
needs. On aggregate level, there is no visible linkage between economic factors and the
political outcome as a result of the work of civil society groups.
Instead, there certainly appears to be some other force that has been girding political
behavior within Rwanda’s organized entities than the economic power of groups or
individuals. The shallow political performance of civil society must be explained by other
factors besides their relative economic autonomy. Economic factors alone are not a good
predictor for the failure of political liberalization that the conventional wisdom expected
Rwanda’s civil society to furnish. The Rwandan political culture offers a far more tenable
explanation of civil society behavior than the economic capabilities of a group, as discussed
in chapter six. Politico-cultural forces are visible in the ways in which economic struggles
are waged across civil society groups. It enables civil society to seek and achieve economic
needs and goals altogether. It also remains a prevalent variable to explain the democratic
struggles behavior we see among the Rwandan civil society groups. Let us now look more
closely at each of the three levels of the economic analysis.
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Individual economic status and political engagement
At the basic level, I wanted to understand the economic impetus of an ordinary
citizen in Rwanda when they choose to join a given group. That is, I wanted to know
whether political engagement is the driver of individual participation in a group, or the
contrary, i.e., whether individuals joined groups in pursuit of economic advantage.
Overall, the findings did not surprise me. The salient driver for individual involvement
into group activities in Rwanda is economic. Individuals are looking for a place to elevate
themselves materially; they are not vocationally pushed into activism by a natural urge for
political justice or freedom. In the broad view of the picture, my interviews suggest that
there are three essential categories for what accounts for individual engagement into group
activities in Rwanda. Those are social, economic, and pseudo-political motivations.
Within the grassroots (mushroom) organizations, people are poor in general.
Associations are made up of people with limited or no economic means. Group spirit
attracts them primarily because it makes them feel better than remaining detached from the
community. They rely on the strength of the group to gain comfort and moral support
during adversity within the family, as in when a member is gravely sick and requires
transportation to the health facility far off their home. In such case, four men bring the
patient on ingobyi, a locally woven four-hand bamboo-edged bolstered stretcher, on their
shoulders to the health facility or the ambulance. Such cases typically come from very
remote and inaccessible places where it is impractical to drive, and it is generally because
they are too poor to live elsewhere.
Members of mushroom organizations also join them because they perceive that they
will benefit from the collective action that an individual labor would otherwise not give
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them, for instance, when they collectively decide to repair a broken bridge that connects
one village to another. Members from such groups that I interviewed told me that they
willingly take part in such activities because they know in advance that their child will use
that bridge to go to school in a neighboring village. They, themselves depend on a
functional bridge to attend church or when they go to a meeting on the hill across that
bridge to discuss their farming or livestock projects.
At no point in the course of my interviews with members of mushroom groups did
the exchange suggest that their membership had been driven by a desire to assess, much
less denounce, what local authorities were failing to do in their villages. Quite the contrary,
my respondents consistently voiced the view that they were appreciative of the support
stemming from the government to resolve their health needs and provide assistance in
livestock projects. To them, the government was there to protect them and help them fulfill
their material goals, and it was their view that all that could not happen without the
government. In a way, their view is that the government—across its structures—is an
entity that is needed to support their activities, not one whose intentions and activities are
to be decried. That is generally an economic sentiment that comports with the national
economic context. Rwandans are generally poor. It is true that Rwanda has registered
significant economic gains including lifting nearly two million people out of poverty since
between 2005 and 2014 (World Bank 2017). Yet an ordinary rural Rwandan remains
generally poor because 60% of them still lived under $2 a day by 2013 (World Bank 2013),
and over 70% of the rural population still live on subsistence farming (World Bank 2016),
and hence have not yet reached an economic autonomy necessary for civil society members
to turn their focus on the state in an independent way (Nkubito 2002, 33-34).
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Within balloon and minion organizations, the underlying motivation for individual
investment is also economic. This pool of organizations attracts individuals who are not
exempt from the economic needs of everyone else in the Rwandan society. The activists I
interviewed alluded to this syndrome as “esprit d’opportunisme” among leaders of civil
society in Rwanda. Both the leadership and the support members within Balloon and
Minion organizations pursue and see their positions primarily as a route to personal
material security. In a sense, CSOs have become a medium for “waiting” personal
prominence for many in the civil society elite. That waitingness has interlocked economic
struggles and political activism of members of civil society. That has the immediate
consequence of failing civil society at becoming a prevalent actor that can influence the
agenda setting in the process of national policies. My respondents expressed lack of
confidence in the ability of leaders to genuinely act on behalf of their constituencies. They
indicated that leaders of prominent groups were generally operating outside the primary
responsibilities of civil society, and that they had used the visibility earned from
associational leadership to target employment in better positions within the government.
In a sense, a CSO is a good place to earn notoriety that propels their leaders to prominence.
One of the most cited examples is that Ms. Edda Mukabagwiza. This public figure had
served as the leader of HAGURUKA—a prominent local human rights organization
providing legal aid to vulnerable people—before she was appointed the Minister of Justice
and then the Ambassador of Rwanda to Canada.

Rose Mukankemeje also headed

HAGURUKA before she was recruited by the government to head the Rwanda
Environmental Management Authority (REMA).

As these examples suggest, many

individuals see leadership in prominent civil society groups as a stepping stone to
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remunerative public service in Rwanda. The real cause of eager participation in these
groups is an incentive that is located in that material pursuit.
“[…] people who make up civil society are also members of political parties. Most
of them are in the ruling party [RPF]. The interests of an individual and those of the party
are above those of the members of the organization. […], look at the most powerful women
in this country. They are among those who began civil society in Rwanda when it did not
exist. Today, they all have become nice and comfortable people but also vulnerable
because none of them can criticize the government. So, civil society is nearly absent here;
it only exists in theory..” (key informant in Kigali in 2015).
Table 4.1 is a good illustration of the ways in which economic struggles of the civil
society elite are waged in the name of the battle for democratization. Based on the data
from 1992 on one balloon CSO in Kigali, the table exemplifies the nature of struggles that
lie between the thirst for political mobility and how civil society truly cares about playing
the role of state challenger. It shows a pattern whereby becoming prominent in civil society
is a pre-condition for becoming prominent in the state apparatus. Given the historical role
of the state for upward mobility in Rwanda (see the last two sections in this chapter), some
CSOs have become “a nursery that grooms future politicians” (a key informant in Kigali,
2015) in Rwanda.

The social pressure to access the economic privileges that the

government bestows upon the most vocal leaders of civil society inevitably take primacy
the organizations’ stated mission to democratize the state. But most importantly, it shows
how that esprit d’opportunisme, along with other factors explained by the pressures of
history on individuals, have complicated the ways in which we assess the workings of
democracy not just in Rwanda, but also elsewhere in Africa. That state of affairs raises the
question of whether democratization can be understood in just the ‘numerous-CSOs-isequal-to-democratization’ framework. Or whether it is utterly possible for individuals
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representing civil society to sacrifice the economic advantages that the state represents to
them and charitably commit to purely non-personal objectives of democratization.

Table 4.1: Inventory of Former Members of PROFEMMES-Twesehamwe, a CSO,
Who Ascended to Prominent Positions in the Government
No

Name

Position held at
CSO

1.

Rose Mukantabana*

2.

Zainabo Kayitesi*

Member of the
steering
committee
Member of the
steering
committee

Years
spent at
CSO
1999-2003

Positions held in the state apparatus
•
•

Speaker of the Parliament
Head of REMA

1992-1995

•
•
•

Second top tier of the Supreme Court
Minister of Public Service and Labor
Executive Secretary – Ministry of
Land, Rehabilitation and
Environment
President of the National Human
Rights Commission
Commissioner at the African
Union’s Human Rights Commission
Minister of Gender and Family
Promotion (MIGEPROF)
Member of the East African
Legislative Assembly
President of the National Women
Council (NWC), a Constitutionally
mandated body to empower women
Commissioner at the National Unity
and Reconciliation Commission
(NURC)
Senator, Rwandan Parliament-Upper
Chamber
Permanent Secretary Ministry of
infrastructure
Secretary General MIGEPROF
Judge – Ministry of Justice (in the
2nd Republic)
Lawyer of the Ministry of Education
(in the 2nd Republic)
Vice-President of the Senate,
Rwandan Parliament-Upper
Chamber
Vice-Mayor of the City of Kigali
Head of Division in the Ministry of
Transport and Communications
Head of climatology service in the
Ministry of Infrastructure
(MININFRA)
Senator, Rwandan Parliament-Upper
Chamber

•
•
3.

Oda Gasinzigwa*

Member of the
steering
committee

1994-1998

•
•
•
•

4.

Marie-Claire
Mukasine

Member of the
steering
committee

1994-1996

•
•
•
•
•

5.

Jeanne d’Arc
Gakuba

Managing
Director

1996-1998

•
•
•
•

6.

Thérèse Bishagara*

Chairperson

1997-2001
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•

No

7.

Name

Solina
Nyirahabimana*

Position held at
CSO

Years
spent at
CSO

Executive
Committee
Member

1992-1995

Positions held in the state apparatus
•
•
•

8.

Jeannine Kambanda

Executive
Secretary

1999-2001

9.

Alphonsine
Mukamugema

Member of the
steering
committee

2001-2003

•
•
•
•
•

Berthe
Mujawamaliya
Agnès
Mukabacondo
Edda
Mukabagwiza*

Member

Unknown

•
•
•

Member

Unknown

•

Member of the
steering
committee

1999-2000

13.

Agnès
Mujawamariya*

14.

Zaina
Nyiramatama*

Member of the
steering
committee
Member of the
steering
committee

•
•
•
•
•

2006-2011

•

10.
11.
12.

15.

Spéciose
Mukandutiye

16.

Immaculée
Mukarurangwa

17.

Fatuma Ndangiza

Member of the
steering
committee

Member of the
steering
committee
Member

•
2007-2009

•
•

Unknown

•
•
•
•

Unknown

•
•
•
•
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Board of Rwanda Local
Development Support Funds
Ambassador of Rwanda to
Switzerland
Minister for Cabinet Affairs in the
Office of the President
Clerk of Chamber of Deputies
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
(MINAFET)
Rwanda Ambassador to Singapore
Member of the Parliament
Vice-President of the Forum of
Rwanda Women Parliamentarians
(FFRP)
Bourgmester
Mayor of Muhanga District
Member of the Parliament
In charge of gender promotion in
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) party
Ambassador of Rwanda to Canada
Minister for Justice (MINIJUST)
Secretary General (MINIJUST)
Member of the Parliament
Member of the Parliament
Head of the African Union Liaison
Office in Chad
Executive Secretary of the National
Children Council (NCC)
Chairperson of the FFRP
Chairperson of social affairs in the
Parliament
Member of Parliament
Mayor of Huye District
Bourgmester
Executive Secretary of
ASSOFERWA
Member of the East African
Parliament for Rwanda
Second top tier of the Rwanda
Governance Board (RGB)
Ambassador to Tanzania
Executive Secretary of the National
Unity and Reconciliation
Commission (NURC)

No

Name

Position held at
CSO

18.

Angelina Muganza

Member of the
steering
committee

19.

Valerie
Nyirahabineza

Member of the
steering
committee

Years
spent at
CSO
2000-2002

Positions held in the state apparatus
•
•
•

1999-2001

•
•
•

20.

Immaculée
Mukankubito

Member

2010-2012

•
•

21.

Yvonne
Mutakwasuku

Member

2012-2013

•
•

22.

Immaculée
Mukankubito

Member

1994-1997

•
•
•
•

23.

Yvonne
Mutakwasuku

Member

2000-2005

•
•

24.

Odette Kabaye

Member

2001-2005

•
•

25.

Jane Abatoni Gatete

Vice-President

2008-2009

•

26.

Claudine
Nyinawagaga
Marie Mukantabana

Member

1999-2003

•

Member

2000-2001

•

27.

•
28.

Marie-Josée
Mukandamage

Member

2007-2009

•
•
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Executive Secretary of the Public
Service Commission
Minister of State in Charge of Labor
Minister of Gender and Women
Promotion (MIGEPROF)
Member of the Parliament Rwanda
Member of the East African
Parliament for Rwanda\
Minister of Gender and Family
Promotion
Deputy director of Never Again
Rwanda
Deputy director of Institute of
Research for Dialogue and Peace
(IRDP)
Mayor of Muhanga District
Member of the Parliament of
Rwanda
Deputy Director of Never Again
Rwanda
Deputy Director of Institute for
Research and Dialogue for Peace
(RDP)
Head of Institutional Capacity
Building at the Ministry of Local
Administration (MINALOC)
Employee of the Canadian Agency
for Cooperation (ACDI)
Mayor of Muhanga District
Deputy Director of the National
Commission against the Genocide
(CNLG)
Expert at the Ministry of Justice
(MINIJUST)
Chairperson of a women
entrepreneurship promotion
organization called Duterimbere
Director of Rwandan Association of
Trauma Counselors (ARCT)
Mayor of Gasabao District
Minister of Gender and Family
Promotion (MIGEPROFE)
Vice president of the Rwandan
Senate and chair of the Women's
Parliamentary Forum
Judge to the Supreme Court in July
2009
Vice-President of the High Court of
the Republic

No

Name

Position held at
CSO

Years
spent at
CSO

Positions held in the state apparatus
•
•

•
•
•
29.

Julienne
Munyaneza

Member

Unknown

•

30.
31.
32.
33.

Nura Nikuze
Espèrance Mwiza
Constance Rwaka
Immaculée
Mukarurangwa
Mugabo
Marie-Immaculée
Ingabire
Isabelle
Karehangabo

Member
Member
Member
Member

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
1992-1995

•
•
•
•

Member

1999-2003

•

Executive
Committee
Member

2003-2007

•

Member

2003-2007

34.
35.

36.

Francesca Twikirize
Tengera

•
•
•
•
•

Vice-President of the Supreme Court
and President of the Court of
Auditors
Director of Administration and
Finance and Director of Legal
Affairs and Human Rights in the
Prime Minister’s Office
Director of Board of Directors to the
Social Security Fund of Rwanda
(CSR)
Legal Advisor to the International
Transportation Company in Rwanda
(STIR)
Legal Advisor to the Rwanda
Pension and Retirement Scheme
(CER)
Secretary General of the Ministry of
Gender and Family Promotion
(MIGEPROFE)
Member of the Parliament
Member of the Parliament
Member of the Parliament
Member of the Parliament
Head of Transparency International
Rwanda
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry
of Justice
Member of the Media High Council
Employee of the Supreme Court
Member of the Parliament
Chair of the National Council for
Children
Director of a department at Rwanda
Tea Authority.

Source: Compiled from direct interviews at PROFEMME-Twesehamwe, reports, local
newspapers, the website, the article of Muhirwa (2013)33, and the Internet. Note: The * denotes
that the individual was an activist in more than one CSOs.

33

Muhirwa, Olivier. 2013. “Urutonde rw’abagore banyuze muri Pro-Femme bakaza kuba ibikomerezwa,”
Igihe Newspaper of March 7, 2013. Retrieved from http://www.igihe.com/amakuru/u-rwanda/urutonde-rwabagore-banyuze-muri-pro-femme-bakaza-kuba-ibikomerezwa.html on March 2, 2018.
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Analyzing the financial autonomy of groups and political activism
To assess the role of economic power in enabling civil society to democratize the
state in Rwanda begins by analyzing the past behavior of civil society groups. At the group
level, one would expect that those groups with some relative economic power would
behave differently and use their financial advantage to move from service delivery to the
channeling of political demands from the public to the state. Yet the supposition that
organizations with sufficient economic wherewithal to make them autonomy would make
a difference in the struggles to challenge the state does not appear to hold when one
examines the wealth across organizations in Rwanda.
The work of Uvin (1999) examined the impact of donor’s aid to the associational
movement in Rwanda on democratization in Rwanda and found no correlation between
economic power of organizations and democratic results in Rwanda during the multi-party
era. Until the Genocide, Rwanda was counted among the most generously aided countries
in the world. Development aid alone was superior to private investment and commercial
exports combined (idem, 41).34 The development aid that Rwanda received from the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 1991, 189) equated to
11.4% of its gross national product (GNP) in 1989-9, which was higher than the average
aid Africa and other poor countries received. In the 1990s, Rwanda received even more
development aid because it increased from an average of $45 per person in the 1980s to
$80 or more; Uvin (1999, 41) cites the structural adjustment programs as the major cause
of that increase. He (idem) also estimated that each six-person household had received an

34

Uvin notes that data on development aid included the money earmarked for technical assistance but that
the work of Voyame et al. (1996, 51) contended that actually much of it never reached the destination.
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average Rwf 57,600 ($480) in development aid in 1992, i.e., more than its total income in
the whole year. An estimated 200 donor agencies were present in Rwanda in 1986,
including 20 bilateral, 30 multilaterals, and 150 NGOs (Voyame et al. 1996, 60). They
managed a portfolio of over 500 projects that year (idem). Uvin (1999, 42) estimated that
the ubiquity of development aid in Rwanda made it the highest density of technical experts
living in the country per square kilometer in Africa. That means there is no place in
Rwanda where they had not heard about or been under some influence of foreign aid
instruments. It also means that organized groups were the most sub-level channels through
which this foreign aid went through. The ideas brought about by the aid community were
undeniably pervasive in the Rwandan collective mind including in the private sector. An
estimate of 70% of public investment between 1982-87 came from foreign assistance
(World Bank 1989b, 11).
But despite the abundance of aid that a dense network of associations had been
receiving from the international aid community, Rwanda’s democratic experiment did not
benefit from it. Up until the mid-1990s, the church was the largest non-state actor, with
colossal wealth and a larger membership than that of other organizations (Longman 1995a;
Longman 2010).

Contrary to expectations, Uvin (1999, 166-168) found that the

organizations who had the most colossal resources were instrumental in dissemination
violence rather than supporting democratization. For example, after the state, the church
was the most powerful organization in Rwanda up until the Genocide. As the work of
Guichaoua shows (1995a, 18), the Catholic church owned most schools, most land, and
health care centers; it was a significant investor in lucrative businesses, it was also heavily
involved in agriculture, handicraft, and was the most connected with international donors
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and other alliances. Longman (2010) has also demonstrated the extent to which church
had an unparalleled social clout. Even protestant churches, the minority in Catholicdominated Rwanda, owned 300 elementary schools with 173,000 pupils, 20 high schools
with around 4,700 students, 480 centers for adult literacy, and a bevy of hospitals (Gatwa
1996, 39).

But as both Uvin (1999) and Longman (2010) have argued, none of that

colossal economic power of the churches was used to reinforce Rwanda’s fragile
democratic experiment.

The colossal economic opportunities that organized groups

managed represented ripe opportunities to ground Rwanda with a sustainable democratic
culture. If we were to believe the theory on the causal mechanisms between financial
autonomy of groups and democratization, then the “successful […] economic and social
development” (World Bank 1989b, 3; Voyame et al. 1996, 57) that Rwanda had registered
in the years preceding the Genocide would have fundamentally altered the democratic
course without the possibility of regressing. But it did not.
After the Genocide, we see a similar trend in civil society to that of the multiparty
period of the early 1990s. Civil society again gained political autonomy through economic
empowerment and yet remained politically inactive. Civil society as a collective entity is—
on aggregate—economically stronger than ever before.

The aid community has

uninterruptedly pumped more money into this sector since 1995. Based on the OECD
report (2017), the National Demographic Health Survey (DHS 2015), the National Institute
of Statistics in Rwanda (2016), and the World Bank data (2016), each Rwandan received
on average $101.8 from the development each year between 2010 and 2015.35

35

Calculated based on the average bulk of development aid dispensed by the OECD between 2010 and 2015
and the average resident population of Rwanda between 2012 and 2015.
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Comparatively, the average GDP per capita during the same period was only $660.78.36
Meanwhile, Rwanda’s economy steadily grew at an average annual rate of 8 percent
between 2001 and 2015 (World Bank 2016; NISR 2015, 3-5), even though the struggle
against poverty is still on-going, since 72 percent of Rwandans still live on subsistence
agriculture (NISR 2015, 4). Rwanda is above the average mean aid (2.0 percent versus 1.7
percent) out of the total 59 recipients (individual states and bureaucratic bodies) of the
OECD aid in Africa between 2010 and 2015. Rwanda has consistently received more aid
per capita than all its neighbors in the same period (more than twice than that of Uganda,
and nearly twice that of Burundi and that of Tanzania).37 The results of economic
opportunities that Rwanda has enjoyed over the years—all commensurate to Rwanda’s
competitiveness—are evident on the ground. Such success is reflected in the performance
and achievements of civil society groups. A study conducted by the Rwandan Civil Society
Platform (2011, 31-2), commissioned by numerous international agencies, to present a
situational analysis on the work of civil society, showed that over 20 percent of the incountry budget in the fiscal year 2009/2010 had been expended only by Civil Society
Organizations. As the same report indicates (p. 27), the total in-country money that was
directly managed by CSOs went almost exclusively into development service delivery and
concentrated in the areas of health (29.7 percent), education (21.1 percent), social
protection (22.8 percent), and agriculture (15.3 percent).

36

World Bank Country Data, GDP, Rwanda. 2016.

37

I could not find data on how much development aid went directly through the hands of civil society and
which one went through governments in Tanazania, Burundi, and Uganda. The table is meant to provide a
simple comparative view with the role that civil society in Rwanda plays in the development action (because
more than 20% of Rwanda’s GDP is expended by CSOs).
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Parallel to that, the church and other voluntary organizations remain more
economically empowered even than in the 1990s.

Out of the total 2,842

primary/elementary schools counted Rwanda in the 2016 year, 1,854 (65 percent) are
church-owned and count 1,660,163 student population with 28,400 employees
(MINEDUC 2017, 22-25). Parent associations, another important component of civil
society, whose members and leaders are also generally members of a church, own 4.3
percent of the total in-country elementary education establishments too (idem).38 The
church also owns 60 percent of secondary schools (937 out of 1,575), another important
area in Rwanda’s economy with a 553,739 student population, employing 28,785 personnel
(Idem, Pp. 33-34). See also Tables 4.2 to 4.4.
It is true that the Catholic Church and the state have had a tumultuous relationships
since the Genocide (Longman 2001; Maillard 2014) and that such a relationship has
continuously been at the center of a mutual effort to re-normalize (Igihe 2017; RFI 2017).
Yet it also true that the Catholic church remains by far not only the most economically
sound social organization in Rwanda, with almost as much social clout at the state itself.
The Catholic Church alone runs 40 percent of all elementary and secondary schools
combined. The churches, mostly the Catholic Church, also owns universities, vocational
training centers, numerous adult literacy centers, commercial banks and other microfinance institutions, insurance companies, hotels and guest houses, and private radio
stations. They own shares in financial markets, own some of the most expensive and
exquisite buildings in the country, and are involved in numerous other lucrative activities,

38

On how religion continues to intersect with other spheres of life in Rwanda (even when it is the primary
driver of personal choices), see the work of Fox 2012; Kubai 2007; Longman 2010.
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hence remaining a crucial actor in Rwanda’s economy.39 Impressed by this aggressive
approach to wealth accumulation, some in Rwanda refer to this evolution of church
workstyle as “la bourgeoisie catholique.”40
All of that makes the church, following the state, the second largest employer in
Rwanda (even though most of these schools receive, to a degree, subsidies from the state).
Assets present a unique advantage to the church because with such investment comes
influence and the logistical advantage associated to it. One would therefore suppose that
the church would utilize its ability to rapidly project throughout national communities and
to use that unparalleled social clout to rally constituencies around its goals in ways that
breed consequential political activities. Yet, civil society as a collective has not yet succeed
at using its economic influence to accomplish more than developmental work in postGenocide Rwanda. This takes us back to the question of the true association often put
between well-financed civil society organizations and political activism in Rwanda’s statesociety relations. Despite change in economic capacities, civil society has not moved away
from service delivery to channeling social demands to state authorities.

Economic

development is the field that civil society is best equipped to do, political development is
not. In addition, the behavior of organized groups has not changed as a result of economic
change in CSOs. By deduction, tt appears evident that political behaviors are guided by

39

As examples, the Université Catholique de Kabgayi, the Christian University of Rwanda (CHUR), and the
Catholic University of Rwanda (CUR) are all owned by the Catholic church (Ntambara 2010). Both the
Adventist University of Central Africa (AUCA), commonly known as Mudende, and the University of Lay
Adventists of Kigali (UNILAK) are owned by the seventh day Adventists church. Other universities such as
Kibogora Polytechnic (KP), and Protestant Institute of Arts and Social Sciences (PIASS) are also Protestant
church owned. In the banking, insurance, and micro-finance sectors, examples of church owned institutions
are COGEBANQUE (Catholic church), the Inter-diocese network of microfinance (RIM), CORAR insurance
company (Catholic church), the GOSHEN microfinance (Assemblies of God), and Amasezerano Community
Bank (Anglican church).
40

From one analysist I interviewed in Kigali.
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some deep-seated customary order (or something else to be identified) rather than by
economic autonomy.

Table 4.2: Primary and secondary schools in 2016 by ownership
Primary
Secondary
School by ownership
# students
Percentage # Students
Percentage
Public
725
25.5%
460
29.2%
Catholic
1,137
40.0%
620
39.4%
Protestant
640
22.5%
279
17.7%
Adventist
57
2.0%
22
1.4%
Islamic
20
0.7%
16
1.0%
Parents associations
122
4.3%
106
6.7%
Others
141
5.0%
72
4.6%
Total
2,842
100.0%
1,575
100.0%
Source: Compiled from statistics of the Ministry of Education, 2016.

Table 4.3: Population in primary and secondary education in 2016 by ownership
Primary
Secondary
School by ownership
# students
Percentage # Students
Percentage
Public
770,642
30.3%
173,109
31.3%
Church, and Others
1,775,621
69.7%
380,630
68.7%
Total
2,546,263
100.0%
553,739
100.0%
Source: Compiled from statistics of the Ministry of Education, 2016.

Table 4.4: Workforce in primary and secondary education in 2016 by ownership
Primary
Secondary
School by ownership
# staff
Percentage
# staff
Percentage
Public
12,102
27.9%
8,632
30.0%
Church, and others
31,284
72.1%
20,153
70.0%
Total
43,386
100.0%
28,785
100.0%
Source: Compiled from statistics of the Ministry of Education, 2016.
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Financial autonomy of civil society: an empirical look
To test this relationship evident in a qualitative analysis, I collected empirical data
and analyzed the political participation of CSOs in relation to their financial situations. I
wanted to see if the financial and domain variations that exist among CSOs would point to
differential behavior in their relationships to the state. To begin, I carefully selected sixteen
CSOs by their location and member constituency category. Eight of them are Mushrooms,
and were selected from four different provinces of the national territory. Another eight are
all based in Kigali, the capital city, but claim to have representation throughout the country.
Six of these are Balloon organizations, owing to their inflatable and fluctuating character
in activity, ideology, and longevity. They are numerous such organizations in Rwanda,
some existing for only as long as one funding cycle. The remaining two are in the category
I named Minions, having been created by state agents. When they have funding, Balloons
and Minions are generally financially well off compared to the Mushrooms. Unlike the
more popular and rural Mushrooms, Balloons and Minions also feature a structured
functional framework.
I met with the leaders of all of the Balloon and Minion organizations. These were
typically the Executive Secretary, a permanent position with the most institutional memory,
together with one or two technical personnel who were also permanent members of the
organization. From their websites or the materials I received during the interviews, I
gathered information on what each organization had achieved in the previous three years,
and the budget they had expended. In addition, I conducted a focus group discussion with
a select few (8 to 12) members in each of the eight Mushroom groups, and also an interview
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with leaders of such groups separately. Where available, I also collected written reports
on Mushroom activities.
To analyze the capacity and roles of these groups, I used a four-part procedure.
First, I attributed a score to each organization to reflect their financial power. The score
ranged between 0 and 4, zero indicating the lowest level in budget spending, four the
highest. The numbers associated with these rankings are provided below in Table 4.2.
Then I created an index called “CSO Financial Ability.” Next, I created another index
called “CSO financial vitality,” which consisted in determining the level of self-reliance of
an organization, based on its source of funding. From that, I attributed a score of 0 to 3,
zero being the least financially vital, 3 the most. Third, I created the “CSO Theoretical
Vocation” index, based on their stated ‘mission statement’ and stated ‘goals’. I categorized
them into three groups: “political democratization oriented,” “development oriented,” and
“non-bound” organizations. Fourth, based on records and the type of actual achievements
in the previous three years, I created the “CSO Activity-based Vocation” index, which too
led to a threefold typology: “only political democratization groups,” “other type of
democratization-state building groups,” and “Neither.”
When I cross-tabulated my new variables to assess the variation of political-activity
behavior in relation to financial capacity, the results did not reveal anything new or that I
had not observed during my interviews and other exchanges I held with informants. The
findings show no correlation between being financially independent and active political
engagement. However, what I had not expected to find out is that mushroom organizations
have a more practical record of achievements in both promoting development, and
demanding more state accountability at the local level. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 illustrate the
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financial vitality of organizations based on whether they are national or grassroots oriented.
Table 4.7 encapsulates the activity-type for CSOs at those two levels (central & grassroots).
Table 4.5: Sampled Organizations by Financial Vitality
0 1 2 3 4
Average
Mushrooms 6 2 0 0 0
.25
Balloons
0 0 0 4 2
3.33
Minions
0 0 0 0 2
4.00
Total
6 2 0 4 4
Note: 0 indicates that the organization had an average annual budget of Rwfs 50,000 –
500,000; 1 for Rwfs 500,001 – 3,000,000; 2 for Rwfs 3,000,001 – 8,000,000; 3 for Rwfs
8,000,001 – 20,000,000; and 4 for Rwfs 20,000,001 and above. Rwfs 787 equaled $1.00
at the time I collected data.

Table 4.6: Sources of Organizational Funding
Members Lucrative
Donors Government
Others
Regular
Activities
contributions
Mushrooms
8
8
2
2
0
Balloons
0
0
6
0
2
Minions
0
0
2
0
2
Total
8
8
10
2
4
Note: Organizations (as Mushrooms) collect regular member contributions and
simultaneously collect revenues from projects such as farming and livestock. A few of
them also received aid from government programs in the form of a cow or agricultural
seeds, which projects are another source of the associational wealth.
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Table 4.7: Frequencies of open-ended comments of CSOs on their democratic
participation by their financial vitality and their partisan valence
Financial Ability
Democratization objects
Civic Engagement (national)
Attend parliament public debates
Give written inputs on new law drafts
Done research-based advocacy to parliament
Have published research-based report on social issue

0 1 2 3 4 Tot Partisan
Valence
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

4.4
7.1
3.8
4.7

Civic Engagement (local)
Attend planning meetings of sectors
Attend planning meetings of districts
Ever took a local issue to those meetings
Local officials accepted or looked into that issue

8
0
6
6

1
0
2
1

0
0
0
0

0
7
4
4

0
1
4
4

9
8
16
15

16.2
19.9
15.1
20.8

Other Democratization Action
Mobilize others to solve a local issue
Meet members regularly to discuss village problems
Group leaders are elected in transparency
Group has statute and other written rules
Group rules and statute are always followed
Take to local officials a problem we can’t solve
Report misconducts of village leaders to higher
officials when necessary

6
8
8
8
8
6
6

2
0
0
0
0
2
2

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

4
4
4
4
4
0
0

4
4
4
4
4
0
1

16
16
16
16
16
8
9

26.4
39.4
32.4
33.5
29.9
31.7
37.2

Political Rights and State Accountability
Ever publicly or in writing decried state officials
Some leadership activities do not benefit the group
National leaders care for all Rwandans

0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
6 2 0 4 4 16

— 19.4
— 24.4
34.3

Note: All valence scores indicate the level to which groups are attracted (positive favor)
or are averse to (negative favor) the government’s effort on the same corresponding issue
(positive & negative values). N=16.
Again, none of these variations seem to create a positive change in the ways civil
society groups interact with the state on purely political issues. The one area that a CSO’s
financial power strongly correlates with is “other forms of democratization,” representing
the activities that the state is already invested in or encourages, such as participation in the
Joint Action Development Forum, and in resolving local problems at the village level. But
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that correlation is also the same even among mushroom groups, whose economic power is
indeed marginal.
Tables 4.8 shows no positive correlation between being financially able CSOs and
democratic engagement at the central level; and that there is no positive correlation
between grassroots organizations and democratization at the central level. The negative
correlation is confirmed and strong at various degrees of financial vitality of organizations.
These findings confirm and corresponds to my findings in interviews.

That is,

organizations (mostly based in the capital city) who appear to be financially prepared, who
have the ability to hire well educated personnel, and who possess logistical equipment
adequate for mobilizing and conducting activism throughout the country are not any
different than those without financial vitality on the question of democratization.
Conversely, grassroots organizations, the most financially destitute, were more
democratically organized and involved in developing the society than their national
counterparts.
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Table 4.8: Regression Table on
Democratization at the State Level

Financial

Self-reliance

Conditions

and

Demands for Political Accountability from National Officials
Members financial situation
Members give regular financial contributions
Member’s lives have improved because of being
members

— 13.8***
(.62)
— 22.7***
(.21)

Sustainable funding strategies
Hold regular fundraising activities
Yearly budget (or most of it) self-funded

Financial Conditions or CSOs

Own equity and other assets
Not paying office other rental cost because owns the
building
Are into other commercial activities to raise revenues
Financial dependence
Yearly budget funded through donors (NGOs and
others)
Often borrow from bank or lending institutions to fund
activities

— 4.4***
(.06)
— 19.4
(.12)
— 3.4***
(.23)
— 1.6
(.41)
— 19.4***
(.32)
—9.4***
(.21)
—3.9***
(.12)

Correct Prediction
—83%
N
(9)
Note: Entries are logit estimates; standard errors in parentheses. Only responses to the
questions making up the ‘national political accountability’ predictor were included in the
analysis. ***p < .001. N is the composite sample.
Considering that the first generation of civil society failed to transform the
economic clout into a democratization success, the challenges remained the same and
mostly increased in the future generations. Peter Uvin (1999, 43) calls those challenges
the “forbidding obstacles” that Rwanda shared with other poor countries. The World Bank
ascribes this pattern to a “vicious circle of poverty” that leaves the poor as “the chief
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victims and the chief culprits” (World Bank 1994b, 29). We have nearly a similar situation
in Rwanda after 1994. The church is richer than it ever has been in the past; and Rwanda
continues to receive generously from the aid community. But even the most financially
empowered organizations make do not attempt to constrain the state, or play the role of
transmitting demands from the population to state authorities.

Table 4.9: Comparing net aid received in $US millions, GDP in $US millions, and
population in millions between Rwanda and its neighbors in 2010 – 2015
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Rwanda Aid
GDP in $$
Aid/gdp %

1,033
5,774
18%

1,263
6,492
20%

879
7,316
12%

1,086
7,623
14%

1,035
8,016
13%

1,082
8,261
13%

Population
Aid/pers $

10.2
101

11,5
12

11
81

11.1
98

11.3
91

11.6
93

Burundi Aid in $$
GDP in $$
Aid/gdp %

628
2,027
31%

572
2,356
24%

523
2,472
21%

559
2,715
21%

515
3,094
17%

367
3,067
12%

Populat.
Aid/pers $

8.8
72

9.0
63

9.3
56

9.6
58

9,9
52

10.2
36

Aid in $$
GDP in $$
Aid/gdp %

2,960
31,408
9%

2,442
33,879
7%

2,822
39,088
7%

3,434,
44,333
8%

2,649
48,197
6%

2,580
45,628
6%

Population
Aid/pers $

46.1
64

47.6
51

49.1
58

50.1
68

52.2
51

53.9
48

Aid in $$
GDP in $$
Aid/gdp %

1,690
20,186
8%

1,573
20,177
8%

1,643
23,132
7%

1,700
24,600
7%

1,635
27,295
6%

1,628
27,059
6%

Population
Aid/pers $

34.9
50

35.1
45

36.4
45

37.5
45

38.9
42

40.1
41

Tanzani

Uganda

Source: Compiled from World Development Indicators (2017); National Institute of
Statistics of Rwanda. 2015. Democraphic Health Survey (DHS) 2014-2015. Kigali,
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Rwanda; EICV Rwanda (2016); Tanzania Ministry of Health, Community Development,
Gender, Elderly and Children. 2016. Demographic and Health Survey and Malaria.
Indicator Survey 2015-2016; Institut de Statistiques et d’É tudes É conomiques du Burundi
2016-2017; Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2016. Demographic Health Survey (DHS). Key
Indicators Report; OECD 2017.

The Dynamism and Challenges of Civil Society in Rwanda’s Macro Economic
Environment
“There are two debates on the role of the civil society organisations in
developing countries by international scholars. On one side, civil society
is seen as a counter power to government, and on the other civil society is
seen as an effective partner in the service delivery and development
process. Rwanda favours the latter approach.”
Hon. Protais Musoni41
Analyzing the nature of state-civil society relations in Rwanda also requires us to
examine them in the country’s macro-economic context. That is, we must search for
relationships between the motives and activism of civil society and the wider environment
of development that has historically encapsulated all social forces in the country. From the
post-independence era, there has been consistency in the ways in which politics and the
politics of economic well-being have affected organizational tendencies. Across time,
Rwanda functioned as a state-directed economy, meaning the state was always both a
policy designer and interventionist. That structure has always challenged the goals for civil
society to be independent. Therefore, the dominant role of the state in the economy cannot
be separated from the difficult condition that civil society must meet first, that is to achieve
economic security that would allow it to be independent from the state.

41

See MUSONI, Protais, “Building a Democratic and Good Governance Culture: Rwanda’s Experience and
Perspectives,” a paper presented at the International Conference on Elections held at the Intercontinental
Hotel, Kigali, Rwanda between 7th and 9th June, 2004. At that time Hon. Musoni was Minister of State for
Good Governance, MINALOG, Rwanda.
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Let us begin by acknowledging that economic performance is one of the sources of
the state’s power—through tax collection principally—but also a way to gain popular
legitimacy. For a state-directed economy like that of Rwanda, this undermines the effort
of civil society to achieve financial independence since that independence would
necessarily diminish the state’s power over the economy. Insofar as the state remains a
dominant active economic actor, one wonders how possible it would be for civil society to
achieve its economic independence and hence balance the state’s power in return.
In Rwanda, being independent but separate from the national agenda to fight
poverty always protrudes, in the eyes of state elite, as being anti-Rwandan. There is
virtually no other theme as unifying as development in Rwanda. Everyone wants it and
everyone knows that development comes through the state. Such has been the dogma that
both leaders and citizens have subscribed to throughout the three Republics of Rwanda.
The following (Toraccinta 1988) is the answer that Juvénal Habyarimana, the then
president, gave to Télévision Suisse Romande (RTS) in 1988, when Jean-Claude Chanel
and Guy Ackermann, two journalists, asked him why Rwanda was the only country in the
world without a national television station:
“..because we are poor. But there is no regret for that. We want a television that
serves the purpose of development. Not a television to show Cowboy movies
daylong, or to air what is happening in Paris or what is happening in Brussels. We
want a television that is the engine of development: how to run a cooperative, how
to properly vaccinate their children…when and at what frequency, how to fight off
land erosion, …that is the television that we want—a television of the mass, not of
an urban elite.”42

42

Obtained from the archives of Télévision Suisse Romande, the show called “Temps Présent,” episode
titled “Afrique de l’Espoir” by Claude Toraccinta, in 1988. Documentary found on Youtube at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zU-QWfhIXnU on August 13, 2017.
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Habyarimana’s statement encapsulates a central truth on how economic forces and
the questions of civil liberties have always interacted in Rwanda’s political landscape. The
paternalistic tone of the response is a testament to the limits of civil society’s goals for
freedom in Rwanda since colonial times. The positioning of this former Head of State on
the role and place of the broad civil society in Rwanda prompts one to wonder whether
unrestrained civil liberties would have been destined to a different fate than its current state
of affairs. Let us reflect here.
By evoking poverty in response to a purely journalistic question, the contemporary
leader of Rwanda was reminding the world that standards had been set about what priorities
in developing his country ought to be. He meant that no social entity was good unless it
enabled his duty to fill his people’s granaries, and that if any non-developmental entity
aimed to achieve other goals, then it was unwelcome in his Rwanda. He essentially meant
that the potential liberties represented by TV broadcasts were not a substitute for his effort
to mitigate hunger and promote good health in Rwanda. Evoking Paris and Brussels,
Habyarimana was fundamentally rejecting a mode of life that came from the West, unless
it embraced and supported his vision for Rwanda. Habyarimana had, from this response,
a clear sense of what the order of priorities was between economic freedom and civil
liberties in Rwanda. As if the role of TV was limited to airing just Western movies,
Habyarimana wanted to affirm that his duties—as the “father of the state”—were to care
for Rwanda’s “children” and not to teach them how the children of France and Belgium
behaved towards their parents.43 He saw the success of his duty in his ability to drop food

43

The father and family metaphor is best developed in the work of Schatzberg (2001).
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on his people’s plates and in insulating them from fatalistic diseases caused by hunger and
improper vaccination. To him, TV represented leisure that would distract from his antipoverty programs. But most crucial, his reference to “mass” versus “elite” interests
represents the way counter-state forces have always triggered a duel that is difficult to
reconcile. That is the hierarchy that must separate all entities competing to resolve people’s
problems. On the one hand, Habyarimana cast himself as the sole individual with best
interests of the people at heart, and that such other forces (represented by TV) were a false
on the other. It affirmed that the norm in Rwanda was such that the masses are more
legitimately important than the elite, and that among his tasks was to impede the elite from
getting in the way of people’s interests.
Food versus free speech has always been at the core of civil society’s struggles to
be an important voice in governing Rwanda. To the extent that Rwanda’s economy is still
too small to provide even basic subsistence needs for the mass, it makes it nearly impossible
for civil society to win its civil liberties struggles. Rwanda’s leaders present themselves as
providential, protective, and the ultimate recourse in the provision of societal necessities.
They also use Rwanda’s socio-economic needs as a pretext to repress any possibility that
civil society might organize itself as a critic or watchdog of the state. In so far as civil
society forces remain dependent and vulnerable, their role in the provision of welfare to
the population must be fused with the goals that the government sets.
Throughout time, the state in Rwanda has been skillful at pulling everyone in the
society in line with its agenda. And for a long time, Rwanda’s rulers have constructed the
state’s role as nothing other than promoting economic development. This has consistently
been a strong argument in the sense that society is poor and Rwanda’s citizens survive on

122

a subsistence economic basis. Poverty makes it difficult for any other social goal to gain
attention and eventually prevail if the fight against poverty is far from being won. That
creates a situation whereby both the state and civil society seem like two antagonistic forces
fighting to drive the well-being of the population, except that the former wages it in an
economic logic while the latter is widely judged (by international agencies) on its ability
to balance the state’s power, or democratize. But one other big challenge for civil society
in Rwanda is that it is financially weak, giving the state the upper hand in the implicit
debate. But even if it did not have a financial problem in the first place, the most dominant
challenge for civil society has to do with Rwanda’s political culture as a whole. The state
in Rwanda has been consistently good at providing a compelling justification for
prioritizing poverty over political freedom. And the world agrees on that assessment.
In the first Republic, i.e., the era following the end of monarchy in Rwanda,
Kayibanda, who was the first elected president, built his entire governing style around
development strategy. When he became the president in 1962, Kayibanda built a posture
of a legal-rational thinker and leader who wanted to revolutionize the economic life of his
people. He had what he called “the four pillars of development” for the country: (a)
education—to train a generation of technocrats in all economic sectors; (b) agriculture—
because it was the sole major source of wealth of the population, (c) infrastructure—in
transportation, hospitals, education, telephone communication, …to enable people to meet,
interact, communicate, and be informed, and (c) manufacturing—starting with agricultural
transformation (Foka 2017). Kayibanda created new structures to deploy and control his
power, and those included “commune,” the small bureaucratic unit below a prefecture on
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the national organigram of power structures.44 Kayibanda always alluded to communes as
the “motor of development” and sought to make them the middle passage for his hopes and
expectations to lift Rwandans from poverty.45 During his rule, Kayibanda successfully
legitimized his development vision both internally and externally. In fact, the Swiss
government gave him a personal economic advisor who was directly paid out of the
development fund resulting from their bilateral partnership (Scherrer 2002, 77-8).
In his time, Habyarimana was hailed by nearly all development partners, as well as
the international community at large, as a “good manager” (Foka 2015). A substantial
literature has documented Rwanda’s cherished image in the world community as a state
characterized by efficient use of aid, good governance, stability, lack of corruption, serious
vision for the country, and commitment to development of its people under Habyarimana
(Schürings 1995, 495; Renard and Reyntjens 1993, 11, 18; Reyntjens 1994, 35; Guichaoua
1995a, 33; Willame 1995b, 436, 445; Brusten and Bindariye 1997, 12; Voyame et al. 1996,
61, 64). Coming up on its thirtieth anniversary of bilateral cooperation with Rwanda, the
Swiss Development Cooperation agency’s 1991 annual report expressed its “admiration”
for Rwanda for “the government’s seriousness in its desire to develop the country” (in
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A commune was headed by a bourgmestre, French adaptation to the Flemish title, burg-meester, or the
master of a village. There were 143 communes in Rwanda under both the first and the second Republics.
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At the same time, as shows the 1957 document of “Hutu consciousness (Bahutu Manifesto)”, Kayibanda’s
rule (1962-1973) was built on a ‘racist’ and pervasive anti-Tutsi ideology, which finally was the leitmotif of
his development agenda. In Kayibanda’s psychie, the Rwanda’s problem was that there were two Rwandas,
and that of Hutu and another of Tutsi, that were unrelated, unrelatable, separate, and de facto not meant to
intercourse in the first place (Clark2006). As Scherre’s accounts (2002, 77-8) suggests, Kayibanda framed
his action on the basis that the fundamental problem of Rwanda stemmed from “the monopoly of one race,
the Tutsi” and that such had destined “the desperate Hutu to be forever subaltern workers.” Kayibanda then
viewed development as the most potent tool to uplift the underdeveloped (Hutu) mass, which the language
coded as the “living forces,” who had “freed themselves from the yoke of their feudal masters” (idem; see
also Voyame and Gern 1996; Friedli 1997). While he championed for development, some characterized the
Kayibanda’s regime as “ethnocracy” (Scherrer 2002, 77-8). For an extended discussion on this topic, see
(Prunier 1995, 9, 37 ff; Newbury 1992; Lemarchand 1970).
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Voyame et al. 1996, 61, 64). A consensus existed within the bilateral and international
community acknowledging that Habyarimana’s leadership placed development and wellbeing of his people at the center of his policies and political action.46
To rally everyone around his political and economic agenda, Habyarimana created
a single legal party that widely became accepted in the public mind as the “movement,”
the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), in 1975. The party was
the center where virtually every social, economic, political ambition for Rwandans had to
be channeled (Reyntjens 1986). MRND was crafted as a way to avoid alternative avenues
through which civil might contest the state’s rather totalitarian approach to development.
It was intended to be a composite entity that would absorb all ambitions and goals for
Rwandans. To legitimize the party, Habyarimana gave it the slogan of “peace, unity and
development” [for all Rwandans]. Habyarimana used the metaphor of a ship whose sole
mission was to save everyone from poverty. Habyarimana called and expected everyone
to be a party to that Rwanda “ship” project. “… If there is a ship aboard which we will
cross the sea …and that you’re not on it, how are you going to cross that sea?” he once said
in a public address (Radio France Internationale 2015). The MRND called upon every

46

Again, even within the international community, the analysis was absorbed by economic performance, and
completely disowned other equally important issues such as the human rights violations, especially the
targeting and killing of thousands of Tutsi across Rwanda’s regions, offices and agencies that were
simultaneously being committed by the same regime way before even the Genocide properly commenced
(des Forge 1994). The aid community kept its blind eye and deaf ear even amidst the ubiquitous policy of
exclusion built on an ideology that Uvin (1999) alludes to as the ‘racist Hutu’ “imagined political
community” (Pp. 37; 35-37); this systemic racist policy allocated children in school, public employments,
and in military recruitment based on statistical ethnic quota that disfavored Tutsi ethnic members. The danger
of this anti-Tutsi sentiments was not something new in the ears of the international aid community because
aid activities increased even after Kayibanda, the first president, expressed unequivocally Genocide-charged
romanticisms that Tutsi rebelling against him with the intention to seize power could be certain that “the
whole Tutsi race will be wiped out” (Erny 1994, 62-63). As an example, TRAFIPRO, the largest cooperative
in the country (actually once headed by Kayibanda himself), lost all its 91 Tutsi employees in 1973, but in
the following years, its patron (the Swiss Development Cooperation agency) increased aid and began
“rwandanizing” (Uvin 1999, 38) all of its activities with complete disregard for the marginalization of Tutsi
in Rwanda (see also Guichaoua 1995a, 19).
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organized structure and regional entity of Rwanda to mobilize all of their energy for
development (Newbury 1992, 195).
Habyarimana employed a “responsible democracy” strategy to mobilize everyone
around national development. The aim was to bring everyone into the workforce. The
time for rhetoric to meet pragmatism had come. In the 1970s, agriculture fed over 90
percent of the rural Rwandan population. Habyarimana did not want anything else to
detract from this goal. He wanted to ensure that the rural area was not emptied of its
working people and hence reinstituted a society-wide manual labor requirement to promote
the agricultural sector. Development was the only song in town, and all organs of the state
had to dance to that tune.
Agriculture was at the center of the state’s development strategy in the 1970s, even
though the results were limited. The year 1974 was, for that purpose, baptized “year of
agriculture,” but the year ended with a general famine, which pushed Rwanda to call for
international aid.

The agriculture failure of that year only reinforced President

Habyarimana’s obsession with agriculture, however. Even the army was mobilized to help
develop this economic sector. The army was ordered to be a party to the agricultural
development cause. The state successfully channeled the military’s vivacity and energy to
the development mission.

Aside from other non-military services that the army

effectuated, such as helping repair crumbling bridges and educating non-educated youth,
soldiers were required to offer farming and livestock work twice a week. In 1975, the
entire country was like a vast farmland. The strategy allowed Rwanda to feed itself, but
also served to prevent the emergence of an autonomous civil society.
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In the third Republic (1994-2018), development continued to be the focus of the
Rwandan state, but agriculture was subordinated to more 21st century ambitions.
Development, though, has remained an essential dimension of whatever intersects with life
in Rwanda. It is also a metric against which all legitimacy is gauged. It permeates every
structure of the society and has become as the sole anchor to achieve advancement of
Rwandans.
Paul Kagame’s rule set out high archetypes for what a Rwandan life must be like
in the future. Those standards were articulated in the principle document called “Vision
2020,” first published in 1999. Out of it came the Economic Development and Poverty
Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), a policy document that describes the vision, and lays out a
plan to realize it. EDPRS aims to transform Rwanda into a middle-income country by year
2020 by achieving an ambitious growth target of 11.5 percent on average, by raising GPD
per capita from $225 in 2000 to $1,240 in 2020, by bringing poverty under 30 percent, and
by restructuring the economy towards services and industry.47 The EDPRS identified and
is framed around 14 major economic sectors, and has set quantified benchmarks and with
corresponding timelines against those strategic milestones.48 The EDPRS is an ambitious
meta-plan, the logic of which is difficult to imagine considering Rwanda’s past and

47
In 2012, the government revised the Vision 2020 document and raised the target for GDP per capita from
$900 to $1,240 to adjust it to the updated World Bank’s world income categories: lower ($1,006 to $3,975;
upper ($,3976 to $12,275); and high ($12,276 or more). When EDPRS 2 (revised) came out, it reviewed the
target GDP again to $1,000 by 2020 (World Bank 2017; see also EDPRS 2 (May 2013). The updated Vision
2020 document reassures that Rwanda will be in the lower middle-income threshold by 2020. See the
document Republic of Rwanda. 2012. Rwanda Vision 2020, Revised 2012, retrieved at
http://www.minaloc.gov.rw/fileadmin/documents/Vision_2020_.pdf on December 6, 2017.
48

The fourteen EDPRS sectors are: (01) General Public Service, (02) Defense, (03) Public Order and Safety,
(04) Environmental Protection, (05) Agriculture, (06) Industry and Commerce, (07) Fuel and Energy, (08)
Transport and Communication, (09) Land Housing & Community Amenities, (10) Water and Sanitation, (11)
Youth Culture and Sports, (12) Health, (13) Education, and (14) Social Protection.
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structural disadvantages. Its geographic predisposition which has less farming land and
costly infrastructure, but it is also landlocked, which makes it difficult and expensive to
trade with the world. Drawing inspiration from the South-East Asian models, Kagame’s
main goal is to make Rwanda “the Singapore of Africa.”49
Domestically, the state has created a vast network of institutional infrastructure to
promote and implement the vision. It began by rolling out a series of structural reforms to
implement this ambitious development enterprise since early 1999. The Rwanda Revenue
Authority (RRA), the tax collection agency, was established in 1998 to finance national
development programs (Hope Magazine 2016). RRA takes an 18 percent Value Added
Tax (VAT) portion off every invoice and is strictly enforced. Paying a day late means the
bill can be doubled (Kanamugire 2016; RRA law on payee penalties).50
Security forces have also been reorganized, but continue to have a role in
development. The Rwanda National Police (RNP) was created in 2000, replacing a mix of
para-military and civil defense forces that protected and enforced the law under the
preceding regimes.51 The Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) replaced the Rwanda Patriotic

49

The Rwanda Development Board was created specifically to model the “international best practice
examples of Singapore and Costa Rica” with a dearth of technical backstop of experts from the “Singapore
Development Board,” World Bank, IFC, and the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair (see RDB website
at http://www.rdb.rw/about-rdb/history.html retrieved on December 20, 2017).

50
According to the RRA 2016/7 fiscal reports (p. 38), tax liabilities in that reporting period had involved
1,177 cases totalizing Rwf 21.8 billion ($1.00 = Rwf 850). Of them, 116 cases were heard in the court of
law, and 93 were ruled in favor of RRA.
51

The Rwanda National Police (RNP) was created by law No 09/2000 of June 2000 and later was amended
by another law No 46/2010 of December 14th, 2010. It has regularly trained professionals with specialized
units including a criminal investigation department, traffic and road safety, a children and family protection
division, a fire fighter brigade, an anti-corruption division, an anti-smuggling unit, forensic investigation
laboratories, and service dogs. The RNP has three schools and gives a Bachelor’s degree, Graduate, and nondegree certificates to its graduates. The curriculum also integrates courses on human rights violations and
protection as well as fighting gender-based violence. This information was retrieved from the RNP website
at https://www.police.gov.rw/home/ on December 10, 2017.
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Army (RPA) in 2002 and has, as part to its mission, “to contribute to the development of
the country.”52
Returning to civil society, the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) was established
in 2009 to coordinate, stimulate, and promote the national economic development with a
special focus on promotion of the private sector.53 It takes as little time as six hours to
register and obtain a certificate at RDB.54 As described elsewhere, the main purpose of the
RDB is to channel the country’s many CSOs into the implementation of Kagame’s
development vision. It implicitly discourages them from taking any critical stance against
the government’s priorities or policies. There is also the Rwanda National Cooperative
Agency (RCA), yet another institutional provision whose essential role is to regulate,
coordinate, and channel all “economic, social, and other activities” into the “general
interest” of the nation.55 Philosophically, there is no distinction between what RCA
considers a cooperative from what a typical civil society organization does. The RCA
defines a cooperative as “an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet
their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned
52

See the Mission Statement of RDF as stated on its website at https://mod.gov.rw/about-the-rdf/rwandadefence-force/#.WmyoQ1yfZ-g, retrieved on December 10, 2017. The RDF was established by Law No.
19/2002 of May 17, 2002. According to World Bank’s 2015 statistics, the RDF is a professionally trained
force of 35,000 personnel comprising the Rwanda Land Force, and Rwanda Air Force branches.
53
RDB encapsulates all agencies associated to do with development under one roof and, through its numerous
agencies, RDB implements tasks related to “business registration, investment promotion, environmental
clearances, privatization and specialist agencies which support the priority sectors of ICT and tourism as well
as SMEs and human capacity development in the private sector” (TIGR 2017).
54

See, The Investment Guides Rwanda (TIGR). 2017. “Business Registration.” Kigali, Theiguides.org
(TIGR). Retrieved at http://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/rwanda on December 10, 2017.
55

From the RCA official website at http://www.rca.gov.rw/spip.php?article1 retrieved on December 20,
2017. RCA was established by Law No 16/2008 of June 11, 2008 establishing Rwanda Cooperative Agency
(RCA) and determining responsibilities, organization and functioning of Law No 50/2007 providing for the
establishment, organization and function of cooperative organizations in Rwanda. This information was
retrieved at http://www.rca.gov.rw/spip.php?article2 on December 20, 2017.
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and democratically-controlled enterprise, according to internationally recognized cooperative values and principles.”56 The RCA’s mission to promote cooperative movements
is also directly connected to the national development vision, considering the dominance
of farmers in the realm of cooperatives (MINECOFIN 2011).
Local government is another area of reform, but again focused on development.
The “Decentralization and Good Governance (DGG),” a vast territorial restructuring
campaign of March 1999, changed old communes structures into districts, a new “local
government” unit, or the locus defined as “the foundation of community development”
(MINALOC 2011, 6).57 Districts represent the chief physical structures where achieving
development, i.e., effective implementation of vision 2020, passes through. The Mayor,
head of the district, is the chief executive officer with the power to oversee and coordinate
all development activities in their district.

The Ministry of Local Government

(MINALOC), the direct supervisory structure above the Mayor, requires that everyone
doing anything in the district—public, private, civil society and all other non-state sectors
in their infinite variety of specialty—congregate under a platform called “Joint Action
Development Forum” (JADF) every month to plan and evaluate the progress district plans
of action (MINALOC 2011, 6). Districts also set Imihigo, annual performance contracts
with the mother ministry (MINALOC), in line with the EDPRS/Vision 2020. Then,

56

TIGR (The Investment Guides Rwanda). 2017. “Business Registration: The Rwanda Development Board,
A
One-Stop
Shop
for
Investors.”
Kigali,
Theiguides.org
(TIGR).
Retrieved
at
http://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/rwanda on December 10, 2017.
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It is the Rwanda’s Constitution (Article 167) that requires that local government structures be the primary
locus for community development. The DGG reform created new administrative units by shrinking them
from 12 to 4 provinces, 130 (communes) to 30 districts, 1545 to 416 sectors, and 9165 to 2148 cells. Along
with this reform, some public services such as birth and marital registration, once far off several households,
were brought down to the Sector, entity below District. For details, see MINALOC (Ministry of Local
Government). 2011. Decentralization Implementation Plan (DIP) 2011-2015. Kigali, Rwanda.
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MINALOC evaluates, ranks, and rewards outstanding performing districts every year at
the results dissemination meeting in the presence of the president of the Republic, who
personally hands the awards. It is hence nearly impossible for a civil society organization
to operate outside the district’s knowledge and framework of activities without the risk of
being expelled out of that district or sanctioned.
The government has also created a plethora of other initiatives and programs
primarily directed toward protecting the socially vulnerable, developing purchasing power
for the rural poor population, and thus alleviating poverty. Those include Vission2020
Umurenge, which aimed to give employment opportunities to the poorest and most
vulnerable (women and youth) to work through public work (MINALOC 2011, 19). The
Girinka Munyarwanda Program with its motto “one cow per family” aims to fight
malnutrition among small children by giving a milk cow to homes with such risk and fulfill
the “one cup of milk a day” goal for all school children (Abbott and Malunda 2014, 11).58
The national health insurance scheme, Mutuelle de Santé, aims to insure everyone in
Rwandan households within its grand strategy to reduce preventable mortality.59 The “Bye
Bye Nyakatsi” [Bye-bye-Grass-Huts] campaign is another radical initiative aiming to
revitalize landownership and to modernize housing by replacing thatched-roofs with metal
sheet roofs. This campaign was executed with brutal efficiency, as even government
officials admitted (Rumanzi 2011; Rwanda News Agency 2011): over 98 percent of grass-

58

The government of Rwanda aimed to give out 350,000 milk-cows to homes with between 2006 and 2015,
which represented 14,5% of the totality of Rwandan households. Abbott and Malunda (2014, 11) estimated
that 180,000 households had received a cow in 2013.
59

According to the statistics of the Ministry of Health (2010, 6), Mutuelle de Santé had covered 8,419,560
population (86%) by end of 2009; enrollment had risen from 7% in 2003 when it was launched.
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thatched huts were razed in just six months (OHCHR 2012, 8).60 The hasty pace (January
through June 2012) with which the Bye Bye Nyakatsi campaign was executed is perhaps
the best illustration of Rwanda’s resolute pursuit of a development agenda. The program
illustrates its unassailable determination to combat with full force anything obstructing its
vision for the people of Rwanda.

Civil society (including local media) has been

systematically bound to these goals without resistance on the part of its leaders.
“[...], when Nyakatsi were being demolished, there was a pregnant woman in the
Eastern Province who went to stay in a banana forest and was rained on with her newborn
for a week. No newspaper wrote about it, but it was a big headline when a priest criticized
Bye-bye-Nyakatsi in a mass and later jailed. […] it is akin to that old story: ‘…the news
is not the dog who bit the man but the man who beat the dog,’ (an informant in Kigali, July
2015).
The Kagame regime has rolled out many other social protection schemes which
cannot be fully documented in this chapter. Those described above, however, show that
Rwanda’s development agenda today also exhibits an ideology that no other societal force
has the practical ability to withstand. Ministers have gone to jail for embezzlement and
other common misuses of public goods that their counterparts in other African states easily
undertake without punishment (Bachorz 2009; Economist 2012; East-African 2016).
Development is a wage issue in the way politics is lived in Rwanda. The state has
successfully securitized it. It is as a common resource as clean air or water. Abusing it is

60
The eradication of Nyakatsi houses was widely criticized for its extreme haste and is generally faulted to
have lacked consultation with the displaced families, as well as to have lacked alternative or fully-usable new
housing (Rumanzi 2012; OHCHR 2013, 8). One priest was reportedly imprisoned for publicly criticizing
the hasty way the ‘bye bye Nyakatsi’ campaign was implemented (See OHCHR 2013, 8).

132

seen and treated as abusing the collective Rwandan life just as the common resources that
all benefit from and have the duty to protect. For Kagame’s government, poverty is the
most lethal of Rwandans’ illnesses and development must be prescribed in immediacy
while other concerns may have to await.
What is noteworthy is not just the impressive degree of economic gains Rwanda
has realized since the end of the Genocide, but also the degree to which it has legitimized
this “Rwanda miracle” also outside of Rwanda. The World Bank reported that “Rwanda
had met most of the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) by the end of 2015” (World
Bank 2017).61 GDP (real growth) has been around 8 percent every year between 2001 and
2015 (World Bank 2017).62 The World Bank recently ranked Rwanda first in East Africa,
second in Sub-Saharan Africa, and number 41st in the world as a place easy for doing
business; it had been ranked number 150th eight years previous to that (idem). It takes less
than a day to fully register a business company in Rwanda (World Bank 2018; TIGR 2017).
Rwanda has enjoyed social gains along with its economic progress. The New York
Times has placed Rwanda on the list of places to visit in the year 2018 (Kamin 2018). The
world has also come to know Rwanda as a country at the vanguard of the progressive
feminist cause because, thanks to its constitutional mandate, 64 percent of Rwanda’s
parliament members are women, while 30 percent of its cabinet seats are occupied by
women (World Bank 2017). Life expectancy has risen to 66.6 years in 2015, while it was
29 in 1994 and 48.3 in 2000 (World Bank 2017)63. Child mortality is down by two-thirds
61

World Bank. 2017. Country Overview, Rwanda. November 06,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview on December 20, 2017.
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World Bank. 2017. Country Data, Rwanda. Retrieved at https://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda on
December 20, 2017.
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(World Bank 2017), while maternal mortality declined by 77 percent between 2000 and
2013 (WHO 2014; Worley 2015; Ministry of Health et al. 2014).64 Similarly, nearuniversal education enrollment has been achieved in Rwanda (World Bank 207).
Furthermore, the net enrollment rate in primary education for school age girls in 2015 was
97.4 percent and that of boys was 96.3 percent (NISR 2016, 8; see also Ministry of Health
et al. 2014, 9, 16). In addition, there was one medical doctor per 60,000 people in the year
2000; today, there (NISR 2016, xvii) is one doctor per 15,000 people. Similarly, malaria
related deaths plummeted by at least 75 percent between 2000 and 2014 (WHO 2015, 64).
Rwanda recently also became the first country to fly drones to transport and deliver
hospitals with blood all over the country, enabling timely transfusion to patients (Baker
2017; Simons 2016; McVeigh; Hotz 2017).65 Rwanda has also connected the full national
territory with a high-speed optic fiber infrastructure to ensure that 95 percent of the
population has access to high speed (4G) Internet (GoR 2010, 54-66). The mobile
telephone density in Rwanda by the end of 2015 was 77.8 percent (NISR 2016, 84) while
99.11 percent of the national territory has telephone network coverage, representing 99.88
percent of the population-inhabited territory (idem). Again, the government justifies this

64
The Ministry of Health et al. (2014) states: “Rwanda had already achieved an under 5 year mortality rate
(U5MR) of 54/1000 LB in 2013, a reduction of more than 70%.” (p. 4). Reports retrieved at
http://www.who.int/pmnch/knowledge/publications/rwanda_country_report.pdf and at
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2015/rwanda-maternal-health.aspx on December 20, 2017.
65

Baker, Aryn. 2017. “U.S. Startup Zipline has teamed up with the Rwandan government to deliver blood
supplies by drone.” Time. July 20, 2017; retrieved at http://time.com/rwanda-drones-zipline/ on December
21, 2017. See also Simons, Dan. 2016. “Rwanda begins Zipline commercial drone deliveries.” BBC. October
14, 2016; retrieved at http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37646474 on December 21, 2017; McVeigh,
Karen. 2018. “’Uber for blood’: how Rwandan delivery robots are saving lives.” The Guardian. January 2,
2018; retrieved at https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jan/02/rwanda-scheme-savingblood-drone on January 15, 2018; Hotz, Robert L. 2017. “In Rwanda, Drones Deliver Medical Supplies to
Remote Areas.” WSJ. December 1, 2017, retrieved at https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-rwanda-dronesdeliver-medical-supplies-to-remote-areas-1512124200 on January 15, 2018.
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Internet revolution in terms of development. It views and has integrated Internet as a tool
to accelerate “the socio-economic development of the country” and to “create an
information and knowledge economy” (idem, 16).66

Another area in this “Rwanda

miracle” is to do with the corruption that is nearly imperceptible. In 2011, a Transparency
International survey noted that “more than 80 percent of Rwandans have neither
encountered nor witnessed corruption.”67 The 2015 Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
report by Transparency International ranked Rwanda the fourth least corrupt state in Africa,
and number 44 in the world.68
But Rwanda is also subject to growing criticism regarding its “miracle.” An
increasing volume of scholarship has contrasted the “Rwanda miracle” narrative with a
rather more negative analysis.

Reyntjens (2013), for example, posits that the post-

Genocide state’s emergence as a ‘success’ is ersatz, insofar as it owes it to the dexterous
manipulation by Kagame of both internal forces, including the reification of his “for us or
against us” (p. 61) strategy towards civil society, and the international community who,
out of their “Genocide guilt,” have turned him into their “darling” (p. 253). Reyntjens’s
work goes as predict—albeit unconvincingly (Day 2017)—that, unless it ended, the

66

Ax exemplified in one of his speeches delivered in 2006, President Kagame has always been unequivocal
about his glee with technology: “We have said it time and again: the role of ICTs in national, continental
development and, specifically, in wealth creation, employment generation, and poverty reduction, cannot be
over-emphasized. Disease, illiteracy, poverty and other ills are challenges that must be addressed if we are
to attain a good quality of life. Fortunately, ICTs present themselves as key potent tools that can be used to
address a number of these challenge” (Kagame, speech at the official opening of the Regional ICT Investment
Summit in Kigali, Rwanda, May 4-6, 2006, cited from Economic Commission for Africa 2007, 2).
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See Transparency International survey summary on Rwanda’s Bribery Index, retrieved at
https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20110513_rwanda_bribery_index on December 20, 2018.
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In East Africa, Tanzania came at the 117th place, both Kenya and Uganda the 139th, and Burundi the 150th
respectively. The three African states above Rwanda on CPI (and their ranking position in the world) were
Botswana (28th), Cape Verde, and Seychelles (both 40th). There are 168 total countries ranked on CPI by TI
in the world.
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Rwanda’s strategy will toggle the region again into a new round of mass killing. Strauss
and Waldorf (2011) have termed post-Genocide Rwanda’s political order as “a
transformative authoritarianism” (p. 5).

Similarly, Cheesman (2018) has ascribed

Kagame’s hailed model to his apt usage of “political dominance and tight centralized
control of patronage networks.”69 Pehuria and Goodfellow (2018) have sought to unearth
“the disorder of ‘Miracle Growth’ in Rwanda” (p. 217), showing that this model is a facade.
Even the most popular agricultural program—in which over 70 percent of Rwandans are a
part of—has been criticized to be not what it claims to be (The Conversation 2017). Mann
and Berry (2016) have argued that Rwanda, through its dominant RPF party, is determined
to produce economic growth because it is the only way it can survive the pressure from
both internal and external opposing forces.
Either way, to juxtapose ‘democratic enterprise’ and ‘development enterprise’ in
the Rwandan context and to understand the place of civil society in such a binary beg for
discussion extending beyond here and now. It requires us to analyze the pervasive role of
wealth in the struggles that have historically opposed those at the helm of the state and all
others carrying the banner of political liberalization. But most crucial, it also requires us
to analyze the history of Rwanda’s power struggles from the broad comparative scholarship
on not just post-conflict political order, but also on how other ordinary states in Africa have
always survived pressures from societal organized forces.
The classical scholarship on state building has it that states run into the syndrome
of ‘dual challenge’ in that process. On one side, the state seeks power, to be strong, and to
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Cheeseman, Nic. 2018. “Why Rwanda’s Development Model Wouldn’t Work Elsewhere in Africa.”
Theconversation.com. Retrieved at https://theconversation.com/why-rwandas-development-model-wouldntwork-elsewhere-in-africa-89699 on January 10, 2018. Cheeseman is a professor of Democracy and
International Development at the University of Birmingham with a focus on Africa.
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build strong institutions with authority and capabilities, often through crude extractive
means (Tilly 1992; Tilly 1985; Gurr 1988). On the other side, as the state establishes and
morphs into a strong organization, the nascent elite faces threats stemming from existing
or emerging opposing forces and thus the necessity to reinforce control over them (Reno
1999; Regan and Henderson 2002; Skocpol 2014). Squaring this (theoretical) process with
the political and economic development in Rwanda helps us see the challenges that civil
society encounters in Rwanda.
Peter Uvin (1999, 19-23) gives us a good historical analysis on the ‘dual challenge’
as well as the fundamental significance of economic goals that analysts often fail to account
in explaining Rwanda’s political strife. When it became a presidential republic on July 1,
1962, one mono-ethnic political system had been replaced by another. A small Hutu elite,
educated and now supported by the colonial rule and the Catholic Church, had taken power.
PARMEHUTU, a party whose ideology was built on anti-Tutsi jingoism, became the site
upon which power struggles were defined and established in the first Republic. Tutsi, now
ousted, lost the political and social power and more than half of them were massacred and
fled into neighboring regions.70 The Belgian colonial rule shaped the new political order
when they switched their favor to a small educated Hutu elite (Prunier 1995, 49) and hence
propelling them to a political power. Following the so called social revolution of 1959,
power relations were inverted. The Hutu elite was now on the top, the former Tutsi
aristocracy was depleted, and the Belgian colonial elite had withdrawn from power. Yet
70

Ethnic statistics on Rwanda, and on Rwandan refugees in particular, have always been a contested terrain
(Prunier 1995, 61-74), skeptics pointing that those numbers were always been written by those in power…
but some estimates have it that more than 2,000 Tutsi were killed between March and April 1962, and at least
another 10,000 of them were massacred. And there were between 15,000 and 20,000 Tutsi killed between
1963 and 1964. During this time, about 250,000 Tutsi fled the country (see Kuper 1977; Lemarchand 1970;
Prunier 1995; Watson 1991). Descendants from this wave of Tutsi refugees formed the recruitment ground
for the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) soldiers who invaded Rwanda in October 1990.
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the Bazungu who stayed and whose number did not decrease maintained economic and
administrative dominance in the first presidential Republic. Their influence even increased
as Rwanda began to receive more development aid (Uvin1999, 20). The handful Belgian
colonial elite owned “the largest concentration of the financial resources, well-paid jobs,
foreign education opportunities, cars and fuel, brick houses, telephones, and other
instruments of development of power” (idem). At the same time, thousands of Tutsi stayed
in Rwanda, and some of them were well educated and relatively wealthy. Similarly, the
lives of many Hutu remained miserable and did not improve well after 1962. The new
power holders faced the challenge of knowing how to subvert the threats that those three
categories of people (Muzungu, disenfranchised Tutsi, and mass impoverished Hutu)
represented to their power. The new elite, led by Kayibanda, wanted to have the capacity
to deal with the competing forces stemming from the economic power that the Bazungu
held still. They also needed to justify their grip to power to the Hutu population to whom
restoration of social justice had been promised.
Understanding the ways in which the Kayibanda regime handled that power
struggle dynamic is very important because in Rwanda—perhaps just as elsewhere in
Africa—the state has always been the major source of wealth accumulation (Reyntjens
1995c, 284). The less than one percent of all the people who were wealthy, urban,
educated, Westernized, well-traveled had become so primarily because of the access to and
the positions they held within the state system (Bayart 1986). This group of people were
often referred to as the state class meaning that, unlike in Marxist thought where the
bourgeoisie was defined on the basis of their control of the means of production, here the
elite was a group of people who possessed control over the state. In Rwanda, the state has
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always controlled nearly all avenues for self-enrichment and upward mobility. The state
has always possessed the ability to shape and to disable one’s possibility to ascend to that
mobility. At that time in the past, for example, the state was the largest employer in the
country, followed by the Catholic and the development aid community followed the state
in that order, but even in the private sector, the Ministry of Labor controlled and required
approval of all jobs (World Bank 1994b, 21). Education at all levels—and all the
opportunities that aligned with it such as traveling abroad—the standard route for upward
mobility, was state controlled as well. As Cart (1995, 476) has argued, controlling state
revenues and the development aid offered such an exceptional advantage for personal
enrichment and patronage and therefore for fighting resistance movements that came one
after another in the decades that followed.
Therefore, as Uvin (1999, 21) observes, Rwanda has never been an exception to the
syndrome of dual challenge that African states face in state building. That is, to capacitate
the state as a strong institution with authority and capabilities in the first place, to establish
pervasive and enduring state control mechanisms each time that there is a new elite at the
helm in the second place. Rwanda has always been “exceptionally successful” (idem) in
the midst of the dual challenge. Other scholars (Straus 2013; Longman 2009; Reyntjens
2013) have also observed this Rwandan state’s idiosyncratic ability to pervade all and all
remote corners of the territory to achieve its goals and simultaneously. One example of
how that thesis holds true for Rwanda is the remarkable fact that a single party was always
able to rule in each of the three Republics, and each with strong representation to the very
bottom micro organizational structure of the country without any true challenge to such
order.
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But thinking about the intersection of economic processes and the political
struggles in Rwanda prompts us to also look at the argument often made in the study of
Africa on the general lack of political progress. That view commonly claims that state
building in Africa will remain an impossible mission until states become strong and able,
not the sluggish, fragile and powerless entities that can penetrate all spheres of social
organization and economy to the very remote rural areas where the majority of its people
still reside. This broad view that African state structures are inherently weak compared to
those elsewhere in the world is popular even outside academia, even though it is also
contested and faulted for being essentially Eurocentric and objectively ungrounded (see for
example Olivier de Serdan 1995; Sangpam 1993). Yet, that argument has limitations when
applied to Rwanda. As Uvin (1999) again notes, “Rwanda [is] in every meaning of the
term a strong state, both in its capacity for effective and uncontested control of its entire
territory and in the muscled nature of the exercise of this power” (p. 22).
In addition to building the state into a strong organization, the second challenge for
the elite is to strengthen the control over existing forces stemming from the society. Again,
this is not unique to Rwanda because every regimes seeks to achieve control nonetheless,
either by coercion or other creative strategies for legitimation (Uvin 1999, 23). In Rwanda,
all regimes have always been effective and successful at both strengthening the state and
controlling potential threats. The first Republic, i.e., the Kayibanda rule (1962-1973),
persecuted, chased, and killed most former Tutsi power holders and Tutsi politicians as
well as other opposition Hutu politicians who did not join his Parmehutu party (see for
example, Nkunzumwami 1996). Under the second Republic, i.e., the Habyarimana rule
(1973-1994), many power holders of the first Republic were killed, including Kayibanda.
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There was no other party or other channel than his MRND party to express a view; the
legal system was independent on paper only; and other numerous human rights abuses were
reported (see for example Humana 1992; ICHRDD 1995; Kabirigi 1994). In the third
Republic, it is the same word-by-word list of abuses as in the second Republic that the
current RPF and the Kagame regime (1994-2018) are depicted with. There is perhaps no
other critic than Filip Reyntjens (2004; 2006; 2009; 2011; 2013) who have
systematically—albeit problematic scholarship—exposed the third Republic’s underbelly,
its authoritarian style, and structural violence. Therefore, political and economic struggles
have always been intertwined in Rwanda. Control of the former has always affected the
latter across regimes. The only difference has been the pace at which and the extent to
which Kagame has chased and taken development, and legitimized it among the population
after such events as the Genocide.

Between ‘Development Enterprise’ and ‘Political Enterprise’: The Ambiguities of CSOs
and the Clear Choice for Mushrooms
Between the dualism opposing the Rwanda miracle and its critics lies a lingering
question of whether civil society can truly wield some kind of popular power and check
the unrestrained state power. To the extent that the economic goals and gains are deeply
associated with the personae of Kagame, what are the possible instruments can civil society
utilize to level itself up to that reality? It simply is an unlikely situation. Part of why civil
society has failed the democratization hopes primarily stems from its inability to sell its
action to the citizens and legitimize it at the same degree as the state sells its action. An
ordinary citizen at all levels of the country knows all the economic programs of the
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government at heart. They are able to explain them when asked without hesitation. They
can link Vision 2020 to life in their community. Civil society has not been able to deploy
in the community to a level commensurate to that enjoyed by the state. Quite remarkably,
some grassroots civil society members too do not imagine their daily lives outside the
seminal role of Kagame. When I asked Mushroom members (in all four Provinces of
Rwanda) whether they could not rely on their numerical advantage to achieve progress,
hence avoiding dependence on the government, they would almost effortlessly counter
with reference to “tubikesha umubyeyi wacu [all thanks to], Kagame Paul.”71 It was almost
as if there was no other thing to be acknowledged for their success than the Ubutegetsi
bwiza (normal-healthy and responsible leaders), spearheaded by the president of the
Republic.
On no occasion did any participant of my focus group discussions (Mushroom
members) ascribe their changed life to the work done by a Balloon or Minion, who usually
operate as their ‘mother organizations’. Tutelary CSOs usually are based in the capital city
and the tutored grassroots associations such as those I interviewed are rural. They both
keep, in theory, a patron-client interaction based on technical and financial support that it
seemed unlikely for the former to dominate the responses I received from members of the
latter. All of my interviewees had some lucrative activities (mostly in farming and
livestock) in their associations. Members and the group had received aid of some sort
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“Umubyeyi wacu” is a contextually charged phrase whose English translation, “our parent,” does not by
any means encapsulate the culturally coded wealth and the semantic versatility that it imbues and relays for
the user altogether. It conveys the maternal, protective endearments as well as the fatherly reassuring
sentiments. It exudes both a state of feeling reassured and of venerability simultaneously. Just like my
respondents, many use that term to denote president Kagame and to express him a reverence stemming from
his appreciated stewardship. Other times, my respondents (especially elderly ones) alluded to president
Kagame as “Mzee kijana,” which is a variation of ‘umubyeyi’ and which conveys equal beliefs and
sentiments about him but with emphasis on his “youth.”
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directly from the government programs such as the Girinka Munyarwanda (one cow per
household), crop-augmenting agricultural seeds and fertilizers, and homes built for the
most vulnerable or as part of the land reform policies. Participants told me that being in
association had provided them a means to access cash, enabled them to pay the cost of
education for their children, build and repair their homes, dress themselves and their
children, and resolve other quotidian needs.
In the Eastern province, one of my participants was a minority Twa member,
sharing day-to day-life with both survivors and perpetrators of the Genocide. “I would
have not quit a hut to live in house with electricity. Today, I push something with a finger
and the house is lite up. All leaders from the past had excluded us from history, but Kagame
is not like them. ‘Nyagasani w’i Rwanda’ [The god of Rwanda] bless him. […] I would
not have changed my profession of building and burning pots in clay; it is a laborious
work, it pays nothing…, but today, I don’t live at the foot of the cliff anymore. I live with
people. I have a home. I met people. We love each other. I ask that you look at me; would
you have known that I used to live behind history [connoting that he is Twa] if I didn’t tell
you?” my interlocutor said to me. Of course, this and other anecdotes only illustrate the
overarching argument I am making, but they highlight the disconnect that we see among
members of civil society on what matters for them. All the components of this Rwandan
civil society do not share a vision nor goals. They are not a united front on the question of
balancing the power of the state. Members’ views on what place the state should represent
in the society and on how much power it should have are scattered. And it is particularly
so because the economic needs of individual members have yet to be sufficiently met.
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As long as the government remains successful at demonstrating and persuading an
ordinary citizen that it is working on their behalf, and that its mission is to improve their
lives, then the popular interpretation of state – civil society relations will remain skewed.
And many CSOs understand this reality but still behave in a manner contrarian to it. That
is why numerous organizations find their most comfortable role in development service
delivery, as opposed to criticizing the state’s performance and limitation of freedoms. They
believe the government’s dogma and have rationalized their focus on development
activities, as opposed to executing political goals. When I interviewed the Head of the
Rwandan Development Board in summer 2015 and asked him what his institution’s
expectations from civil society groups were, his answer was unequivocal: “we want them
to be a party to the national development agenda because they, too, are members of our
society.” In that rationale lies the conundrum Rwanda’s civil society faces; civil society
leaders face the choice of either participating in state-directed development schemes, or of
opposing them, but if they choose the latter, they are immediately accused of opposing the
common good. This is the dilemma that civil society has not been able to overcome, either
ideologically or in practice. They have fully accepted the state’s narrative that their
appropriate role is to devote themselves to the state’s economic development program.
An assessment conducted by the Civil Society Platform (CSP), an umbrella
organization for CSOs, showed that the majority of major CSOs in the country willingly
participated in implementing the state’s development vision, EDPRS. The report presents
achievements of national CSOs by development pillars outlined in the EDPRS. It also
showed that CSOs alone had executed more than 20 percent of composite development
achievements by 2010, including those in areas such as agriculture, health, and social
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protection where they lifted the burden to a degree of 40 to 60 percent (Civil Society
Platform 2011, 32).

That indicates that even the most technically equipped and

knowledgeable leadership in civil society has no interest other than to follow the state’s
lead, rather than offering a competing vision. The same report underscored the state’s view
in a stark language: “Given that CSOs in Rwanda have this level of expenditure in terms of
overall national expenditure in the key EDPRS sectoral areas, it is recommended that the
government give close and further consideration to the formalization of interaction with
CSOs on a continuing basis in order that key sectoral investments are effectively
addressed” (idem). Clearly, unless there had been an alternative set of agenda that civil
society deemed better, and through which it felt more relevant or emboldened and
conducive to advance its cause, the CSB would not have been so eager to execute more
tasks on the state’s development agenda. It would not have espoused or been praised the
state’s agenda so ardently. It is not only because CSOs’ power is inferior to that of the
state; it is also because the state has compellingly converted the population in believing
that only a state-led project in which civil society plays a subordinate role can deliver
development. In the sense that “development” is central to most Rwandans, the state makes
it difficult for CSOs to compete against the state in their appeals to the populace. As a
result, espousing state’s programs becomes the only avenue for CSOs to reclaim selfimportance and relevance in the wider national order. Table 4.11 illustrates how CSOs has
moved with the government’s development compass and benefited from its developmental
programs.
Table 4.10: CSOs expenditures by government’s economic sector in FY2009/2010
EDPRS Sector

CSO Expenditure
(% total)

145

04 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
22%
05 AGRICULTURE
41%
09 LAND HOUSING & COMMUNITY
22%
AMENITIES
11 YOUTH CULTURE AND SPORTS
33%
12 HEALTH
46%
13 EDUCATION
24%
14 SOCIAL PROTECTION
60%
Source: Copied from the Rwanda Civil society Platform’s Mapping Report 2011, p. 32.

Conclusion
There are three levels at which civil society intersects with political development
in Rwanda, individual, group, and the macro national economic environment. On the
individual level, people join mushroom or grassroots associations primarily to meet their
material and emotional needs.

Participating in associational movements bestows

opportunities to socialize and help resolve economic needs of an individual; it is not a
function of a natural call that individuals experience with the sole intention to challenge
the political order. Individuals are generally poor and even poorer at the grassroots
associational level. Therefore, associations are meant to address basic local problems that
are outside the processes of countering the state. But in their endeavors, individuals within
grassroots groups wind up, consciously or otherwise, building communities and
constituting empowered structures that are useful in state building and eventually local
strands of democracy. Yet, associations at the bottom of the society are vital forces of
democratization (at the lower levels of the society) that receive little to no attention in the
ways in which we think about democratization.
On the group level, CSOs that are financially viable are not likely to conduct
themselves any differently. Some (relative) financial independence does not necessarily
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make them change behavior or mission and hence make aggressive with the state. Quite
similarly, financially destitute groups and those with a financial vitality all behave in a
similar fashion in the ways they approach the state and its authority. Because of the leeway
that the historical context and other cultural realities have given to the state, CSOs and the
issues of democratization have become secondary in terms of what matters for the public.
To the extent that development is creating real-life changing effect for the population, the
work of CSOs on democratization is an issue that matters virtually among the elite only.
That puts even more at odd the effort to construe civil society groups as a force that can
truly challenge the state on the simple basis that economic autonomy will make it happen.
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CHAPTER V

CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC LIBERALIZATION IN RWANDA:
DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER?
In the previous chapter, I looked at economic explanations for the barren
democratic relationship of civil society and the state in Rwanda. As we have seen, just as
we saw analyzing historical accounts, economic struggles for civil society represent more
an expression of some internal realities than an actual hindrance to liberalization. In this
chapter, I move the focus to institutional accounts. I seek to understand whether there is
any institutional answer to the central research question: what has precluded civil society
from democratizing the state in Rwanda? The starting assumption is that the lack of
democratic progress in Rwanda despite the expansion of civil society is explained by a lack
of favorable political institutions. That is, are political institutions the independent variable
that accounts for non-democratization? The goal here is to describe any constraining or
enabling pattern embedded in the workings of institutions within the Rwanda’s political
trajectory since the beginning of an organized civil society.
Since the time of Aristotle, institutions were conceived as a disposition that could
potently structure the behavior of both the governing and the governed individuals
(Aristotle 1996).

Thomas Hobbes, an exponent of the political thought during the

devastating English civil war, advocated for the institutional Leviathan to save humankind
from its destructive state of nature. John Locke then developed a practical framework upon
which modern governments drew the conception of public institutions and built
contemporary democratic structures (Hooker 1965). Political science, more so in the post1980s, has accorded more attention to institutional function not just in policy studies but
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also in accounting for all of the phenomena of the political world (Peters 1999, 3). There
is a widely held view in the general field of social science that institutions are—in various
capacities—potently linked to the mechanisms that produce better government or
otherwise (Weaver and Rockman 2010; Weimer 1995; Weingast 1996; Shepsle 1986).
Douglas North (1991) posited that the role of institutions was to reduce uncertainties.
But a facile connection of institutions to political phenomena belies the complex
features of institutions that produce the actual good government. One problem with the
ways in which institutions have been utilized in scholarship is the costly dismissal of the
origin of forces that make institutions functional, either for democratic or other ends. That
is, institutions might more properly be seen as an intervening variable than as a root cause
of political behavior. One premise about the institutional benefits is that they shape
patterns of social interactions; but at the same time, institutions also take shape and
sometimes emerge out of such social interactions (Goodin 1998). If what produces
institutional success lies in the interdependence with other social structures in the wider
realm of societal order, then institutions cannot be not isolated from a whole range of
constraints that affect individual behavior in the society, whether governing or governed.
It also means that institutional analysis needs to extend beyond the implicit understanding
of them as fundamentally autonomous of other impulsive forces that conditions behaviors.
A second problem—subsidiary to the former—with the ways in which institutions
are analyzed is lack of cognizance of the limited explanatory power that institutions carry.
Considering the panoply of competing organized entities in the society, each vying for
social control and to impose a social order of their (Migdal 2001), institutions cannot offer
us isolated and autonomous answers to the sources of political phenomena. This means
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that institutions can only offer partial and hence complementary explanatory powers to
such puzzles in the political world (Ostrom 2015; 1986) and in the use of its methods (Roth
1987).72 Yet, factors interacting with institutions and hence affecting institutional results
receive only little attention in our understanding of how institutions affect political
phenomena.
The third problem is definitional and is about the wholesale application of the
institutional approaches to the problems of political phenomena.

“Institutions” is a

generously loaded and a spaciously encompassing concept that often escapes distinction in
analyses.

Economic institutions, social institutions, cultural institutions, security

institutions, religion institutions, can all be subsumed into the common usage of the
concept. The biggest semantic problem is with “informal institutions.” There is no sharp
line between political culture and informal institutions. In this research, I have use a
narrowed and specific definition of institutions. A functionally precise definition is more
useful for understanding the true role that institutions can play in fostering good, i.e.,
democratic, governance.

Defining Institutions in the Context of this Research?
By institutions, I focus on the central role of the law in governing. That is, one
must consider principally the ways in which the law is organically linked to the real world
for improving governance. As such, my usage of the concept is about how the law is

72
No one single approach can fully provide explanations to all political actions (Peters 2011, 2). There are
alternative and complementary explanative approaches to consider (cultural, economic, historical) that, as
Hart argues, should “be appreciated for what they are and not what they are assumed to lack from […] the
practices of the discipline with which [one is] most familiar” (Hart 2001, 11). Others have even argued for
an “eclecticism of approach,” which “is likely to pay greater intellectual dividends for political science than
is a strict adherence to a single approach” (Peters 2011, 2).
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applied through public institutions. It is a conception borrowed from Peters’ (2011)
theorizing of institutions that “the law is very much a formal institution of government,
developing and imposing a set of clearly articulated norms and values for the society” (p.6).
The idea, in this classical conception of institutions, is that the law is imbued in institutions,
and that law is central and an essential element of governing for most continental countries.
Peters contends that given the ways in which the law frames the government and how
government affects behavior of its citizens, “to be concerned with institutions is to be
concerned with the law” (idem). The focus here is not on the structure of institutions, as
in the branches of the government or the aspects of a presidential or parliamentary, federal
or unitary government. Rather, I will explore whether legal institutions were the basis for
shaping and understanding the political phenomenon herein under exploration, i.e., the
failure of a burgeoning civil society to bring liberalization to Rwanda. Or simply put, is
there any way legalism of institutions was crucial for molding relational patterns that have
characterized state and civil society interactions in governing the Rwandan society? This
quest will lead to answering an important part of the central research question, that is, is
there any dominant effect of law in the failures of civil society to democratize the state in
Rwanda.
But treating law as an independent variable—effects of the law on unimproved
state-civil society relations—is not enough of analysis and would tell us only a partially
satisfying story. It is equally important to treat law as a dependent variable—that to
understand other factors having affected the domination of law in civil society’s quest to
democratize the state. It is important to analyze law from a two-way vantage point because
the association often made between law and institutions in the realm of governing is also
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complex and can take different variations. As Peters (2011) argues, the relationship
between the two (law and institutions) is, to a degree, a function of “different national
perspectives on both law and governing” (p.7).73 If institutional explanations of democratic
phenomena constitute something that extends beyond just having law in place or applying
it, then it is appropriate to assume that institutions alone do not always determine individual
behavior. It also suggests that politically there may be other logics behind individual
behavior aside from institutional demands. It also means that instituting institutions for
democracy is not always tantamount to instituting democratic values. That raises the
question of the origins of institutions and of whether institutions, by virtue of mere
existence, are what civil society lack in order to democratize the state? I discuss that
question in Rwanda throughout this chapter.

Civil Society in Pre-1990 Institutional Context
As we have seen in chapter 3, the pre-1990 laws governing civil society actions
were instituted purposefully to bring civil society groups aboard the state driven
developmental machinery. It was not a benevolent move on the part of the state to give an
impetus to potentially dominant structures that were going to check the state’s action or
help it check itself. The first legal measure to ever allude to organized entities in Rwanda
was the royal decree of August 16th, 1949, issued to meet certain demands of the colonial
administration. The decree was enacted to give cooperatives the legal authority to operate,
but only for a duration of five years. The first cooperative of the time processed milk
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On the ways in which institutions of governing become effective as a function of citizens’ perspectives on
law, Peters (2011, 7-10) cites Germany as an example. The new generation of the German elite accepted the
domination of the law and incorporated that belief into their socialization, which became a way of life upon
which was built a civic responsibility and their collective commitment to the state. See also Konig 1993.
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destined to serve the needs of colonial dignitaries and the royal family. Its location was
not fortuitous. At the center of Rwanda’s power locus, in Nyanza—where the kingdom,
the education elites, and the colonial administration were based—was born the first
organized group, not to oppose but support the power system which devolved into
Rwanda’s modern state. No other known group at the time in Rwanda adopted a different
course of action and behavior than that of supporting the political system and its
patrimonial programs.
A new law of June 24th, 1956, expanded the number of cooperatives and increased
their legal authorization to a duration of fifty years. Following independence, the Rwandan
state enacted a new law in 1966 that was geared toward promoting cooperatives and
elevating peasants out of poverty through promotion of coffee and tea growth. The state
launched the Office in charge of Cooperatives and Community Development in 1980. In
1988, the state decreed the creation of the Ministry of Youth and Cooperatives to streamline
activities of development through cooperatives.74 Out of this series of laws, was born a
collection of economic development oriented organizations, including many coffee export
companies commonly known as OCIR Thé and other minerals extraction and export
companies. The government named 1989 “the year of self-organization of the rural world”
(Uvin 1998, 165). Subsequently, a special presidential fund was mobilized the same year
to incentivize and promote such initiatives through the provision of small loans and grants.
Thus, Rwanda’s legal framework harnessed the activities of the country’s NGOs to the
goals of the state from the beginning.
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For an extended review of the history of cooperatives in Rwanda, see the work of Seruvumba (1992);
Nzisabira (1992); Musahura (2012); Uvin (1999: 163-8).
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Travail, Fidelité, Progrès (TRAFIPRO), a state created and dominated entity, was
another innovative brand of cooperative, purely commercial, that derived from that series
of laws that had begun in 1956. TRAFIPRO began as small in scope, but later became
ubiquitous throughout Rwanda. Its secretary, Gregoire Kayibanda, later became the first
President of the newly created Republic of Rwanda. Concomitant with his involvement in
managing the business of TRAFIPRO, Kayibanda was also the leader of PARMEHUTU,
a Hutu nationalist and major political party under whose hospice he ascended to
presidency.

Kayibanda was also a chief editor of Kinyamateka, the major national

newspaper affiliated with both the Catholic church and the state.75 While it was then
difficult to separate church, economic, and state powers, the simple fact that the leader of
the first interest group in the history of Rwanda’s civil society was inextricably linked to
the central power structures makes it difficult for institutions to have been independent or
amenable for independent civil society groups to rise. It will always be known that the first
civil society organizations in Rwanda did not arise independently of the state, and enjoyed
no legal protection to act independently of the state’s control. The history of institutional
and civil society relationships in Rwanda has been one that channels them toward
bolstering the state system, not to act outside the reach of its control.
When he became the president on October 26, 1961, through a controversial
electoral process (Akyeampong et al., 2012, 2), Kayibanda invented his own governing
style. Rather than appealing to the afflicted parties or governing inclusively, Kayibanda
behaved faithfully to the divisive ideals as he and his fellow Bahutu nationalists had
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Kinyamateka was the oldest of the newspaper in Rwanda. It was founded in 1933 and a staunch channel
of state’s activities within the wings of the church (see Guichaoua 2010, 142-143).
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elaborated in the infamous “Bahutu Manifesto” of 1957.76 By 1965, PARMEHUTU was
the only legal party allowed to work in the new “democratic” republic of Rwanda. In the
same year, Kayibanda won an election, in which he was the only name on the ballot.
Without a single political opponent—not in the country nor on the ballot—Kayibanda
again won the next quinquennial electoral exercise of 1969. In those two elections—
electing legislators too—only members of the PARMEHUTU party were permitted to
stand for election and claim seats in the parliament.77
Considering the peculiar foundation of the Republic of Rwanda, it becomes
extremely complicated to determine how its institutions could have possibly served to favor
autonomous civil society. From a colonial system that nourished acute division and
ethnicized politics, to the first founder of the state with an atypical political trajectory,
through practices of monopolization of power, cooptation of virtually every other emerging
power center, and selectivity of governing, Rwanda’s political landscape was by design
deprived of organic ingredients for an activist civil society. The simple fact that the first
president had emerged from a context of a “civil society,” albeit a state-controlled one; that
he had worked in the media and understood the importance of self-expression values more
than many in the country, that he had the best education by comparison, and that he came

76
The Bahutu Manifesto was a political document put together by eight Hutu intellectuals on March 24,
1957, three years prior to Rwanda’s independence from the Belgian colonial rule. In the document, the
authors describe the problem of Rwanda as stemming from what they alluded to as an “indigenous racial
problem,” i.e., that caused by the Hamitic and foreign originating oppressors, the Tutsi. The authors sent the
10-page document to the Vice-governor general of Ruanda and demanded to save Hutu from the
“exploitation” by the ethnic Tutsi. They also demanded liberation of the Hutu from the White colonials. The
“Bahutu Manifesto”—a priori a rebuttal to Tutsi and their past—was, in a large measure, the basis and the
site upon which Kayibanda defined and implemented the social, economic, and political agenda as it had
envisioned within the Hutu nationalist movement. For details on this Rwanda’s political episode, see
Mamdani (2001, 43-4); see also Trotten et al. (2007, 33-4).
77

See Akyeampong et al. 2012, 2; see also Nyrop 1985, 89-91.
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from a historically afflicted background—all should have permitted him to govern in an
accepting, tolerating, and inclusive fashion. He did not. His illiberal political behavior
was not caused by lack of laws or constraining political institutions. Instead, there was
virtually no separation between him, institutions, and the state. The president and the law
were practically equals. And the state was a pyramid, at whose apex sat the President alone
to know what was suitable for all. In the constitution of November 24th, 1962, Kayibanda
openly forbid communist activities and propaganda on the territory of Rwanda.78
Conversely, had Kayibanda used his political privilege to promote a culture of free
institutions and instill democratic values into the public life as the country transitioned
from a monarchy to a republic, a different consequence might have been possible for civil
society. It would have meant for many in Rwanda that checking and engaging the state
civically was possible.

It would have cultivated activism as a culturally legitimate

possibility in the processes of governing. But the behavior of the first president of this
republic reinforced a longstanding pattern for state-society relations to run in only one
direction—that is from politics to society, not as much society shaping politics. It hauled
over the old unidirectional governing habits in the colonial system. To the extent that
1961—the year of independence and the first ‘democratic’ elections in the land—marked
a critical juncture in Rwanda’s public life, the behavior of the founders of this republic
became paramount in shaping behavioral patterns in subsequent administrations, in other
intermediary institutions, and in civil society.
That is indeed what happened when Habyarimana took power through a military
coup that toppled Kayibanda on July 5, 1973. Only a day after that putch, Habyarimana
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Article 39 of the November 24, 1964 Rwanda’s constitution, enacted under Kayibanda, stipulated that “All
communist activities and propaganda are prohibited.” See also, Nyrop 1969, 89.
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suspended all activities of the then unique party of Gregoire Kayibanda (PARMEHUTU),
dissolved the National Assembly, and created a national unity and peace committee whom
he tasked to advise the head of the state, him. Less than a month later, that committee gave
way to a government, which was made up of civilians in majority and only four generals,
including himself. In 1975, Habyarimana created the National Revolutionary Movement
for Development (MRND) to which every Munyarwanda had to be a party. The party
claimed to encourage “responsible democracy,” meaning “the free expression of ideas on
condition that they are seen as useful to the collectivity and are articulated publicly” (Mfizi
1983, 161). On December 20, 1978, a new constitution was promulgated. The new
constitution unambiguously gave precedence of MRND over any other structure to set and
direct the agenda in the national development system of this second Rwandan Republic.
It clearly stipulated that MRND was the unique organ through which views on the future
of Rwanda would be channeled (Newbury 1992, 198). A week after the enactment of this
new constitution, Habyarimana was the only candidate and was elected closed to 99% of
population.
The paradoxes surrounding what was meant to be a harmony between an
institutional order and the actual political practice in the pre-1990 Rwanda beg for
reflection here. While the aim for the 1978 constitution was a return to institutional rule,
where the population would have the last say on matters of power, and that the military’s
action would be subordinated to the civilian rule, things worked in a perverse order in
practice. MRND, the unique party system, took precedence over pluralism of alternatives.
In fact, article seven of the 1978 Constitution plainly mandated that MRND was the sole
avenue where all political activities were to go expressed. The Constitution glued everyone
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to MRND as the only label of political identity. The text in Kinyarwanda, the language of
Rwanda, stated it better than its translation in French, the only two official languages then
used, that “Uwitwa Umunyarwanda wese aba ari muri Mouvement Revolutionnaire
Iharanira Amajyambere y’u Rwanda” (whoever called Rwandan is by default an integral
part of the MRND). Another paradox is that while the Constitution meant to give way to
the free will of the people and enable them to achieve, complete, and protect the gains of
the 1959 revolution (see Gatwa 2005, 115; see also Reyntjens 1986, pp. 273-98), it also
concentrated the privilege of power into one Habyarimana’s oversight. There was no
distinction between the Constitution, the President, and the party.
It is clear that, prior to 1990, a civil society aspiring to be a muscular democratic
force in Rwanda’s political space was not palatable to Rwanda’s political leaders of the
time. The state created a crescendo of legalistic dispositions with the primary purpose of
bolstering the forces that implemented its developmental agenda. Institutional provisions
were not meant to harbor a force that would operate outside the state’s control.
Cooperatives, agencies, and research agencies of the pre-1990 period, as well as the laws
that decreed them, all served the purpose of strengthening the state and shielding it from
eventual threats from society. They were not meant to limiting its reach. In a practical
sense, there was virtually no separation between such institutions—the law—on the one
hand, and the state—embodied by the President—on the other.
It is also unclear whether and how having different laws—those lenient to
autonomous organized groups—would have altered the governing style and hence
balanced the state or open the political space for social dissent. But it is equally plausible
that such laws—had they been decreed, enforced, legitimized, and exemplified at the helm
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of the central state—could have begun a new way of political life that all would have
submitted to and practiced in the republic. It did not happen. Perhaps change could have
happened, had both Kayibanda and Habyarimana given a good example. But it did not
really happen anywhere else in Africa, including in Gambia, Senegal, and Botswana,
among Africa’s nominal democracies. Even un-colonized Ethiopia remained deeply
authoritarian. All of these states coopted autonomous civil society organizations. That did
not happen. But because of the simple fact that no such good example was given by leaders
of the time, it undermined the importance of institutions going forward. And if institutions
could not protect principles of democracy, then they could help civil society either. They
became something that civil society cannot rely on to achieve it democratic goals.
Instead, when Juvénal Habyarimana—the minister of defense—took power
through a coup d’état against President Gregoire Kayibanda on July 5th, 1973, Rwanda’s
authoritarian qualities were only reinforced. President (General Major) Habyarimana
created the National Revolutionary Movement for Democracy (MRND and ruled under that
single-party system until 1990. Habyarimana’s ruling style differed in no way from that
of his predecessor. It took five years to hold the first presidential election. And when that
happened, Habyarimana run unopposed and alone on the ballot in 1978. He engaged in
the same empty political theater again in 1983, and again in 1988 winning 98.98%, 99.97%,
and 99.98% of votes in the successive “elections,” respectively (African Elections
Database, 2017). His political behavior did not stem from any democratic impetus, was
not consonant with liberal ideals, and he did nothing to catalyze or encourage democratic
governance during his rule. Until the democratization pressure of the 1990s gave him no
room to wiggle, there appeared to be no other impetus for him to have launched Rwanda
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on a pluralistic political path. There existed no provisions for presidential term limits
anywhere in Rwanda’s legal system. MRND was the sole legal party in the land, racking
up the totality of parliamentary seats in the electoral cycles of 1978, 1981, and 1988 (idem).
During the Habyarimana regime, institutional dispositions were created to promote
associational life. But just as during the first wave of organized groups to ever exist in
Rwanda, the legal means deployed toward revitalizing associational life in Rwanda until
1990 aimed only to fulfill other goals than democratization (see Uvin 1998; Nzisabira
1992).

The government decreed such laws principally to create a social force that

supported its patrimonial development system and to draw the world’s financial
community into that agenda (Uvin 1998). The government named 1989 “the year of selforganization of the rural world” (Uvin 1998, 165). Subsequently, a special presidential
fund was mobilized the same year to incentivize and promote such initiatives through the
provision of small loans and grants. The Western aid community actually embraced this
brand of state-society relations; rather than challenging the system, the donor community
supported it. The World Bank report in 1987 hailed the government’s faith in the
associational movement and argued that “the widespread presence of cooperative,
associative and risk-sharing groups…[was] largely responsible for the vitality of local
communities” (World Bank 1087, 28).
Rwanda’s ability to persuade CSOs into its development program makes Peters’
question even more relevant, where do institutions come from (2011, 29)? One wonders
whether law alone would have been enough to start a long pattern of mutual influence in
the state-society interactions. To the extent that institutions are assumed to mold human
behavior, one looks at Rwanda’s case and wonders: what makes that kind of influence

160

possible and what causes individuals and institutions to interact effectively? The rational
choice approach to institutions thinks that behavior change is not a phenomenon that
originates from a deep-rooted conception of national history, but rather from a purely
rational calculation of utility or psychological reaction to stimuli (Bates 1988; Harstad and
Marrese 1982; Chen and Plott 1996; March and Olsen 1983; March and Olsen 2010), and
yet the behavior of Rwanda’s political class and population in public life seems to come
from the just opposite logic of that thinking. It appears that the sort of influence that
institutions exert on individuals, at minimum, does not always happen in the same way in
all political settings.79

The relationship between Rwanda’s political institutions and

individual behavior (the governing and governed) legitimizes the theoretical question that
Peters (2011) raises, that is whether institutions are something that can be designed
purposefully, or whether they are an organic “outgrowth of human process that escapes
designs” (p. 22). We will return to this question in chapter six, teasing out cultural
explanations to this phenomenon. But table 5.1 gives a snapshot on the institutional
landscape that civil society organization operated in prior to the introduction of
democratization. Table 5.1 illustrates the legal environment in which pre-democratization
groups functioned, as well as its limitative prescription, and the type of activities that such
groups were circumscribed to.
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On the limits of rational choice explanations (as in the context of Rwanda’s institutional development), see
the work of Rakner (1996); Peters (1993); Stein and Wilson (1993). On alternative explanations on sources
of institutionalism, see Meyer and Rown (1977), Durkheim (2013).
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Table 5.1: Pre-1990 Legal Framework For Civil Society Groups

Laws exist to support C.S. action
C.S. take actions without other influence
Laws are respected by state
C.S. bargains with the state on policy
formation
They channeled demands of people to the
state
Examples of C.S. protesting any state’s
actions
Mechanisms for enforcing the law are in
place

Mushrooms
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

Balloons
Y
N
Y
N

Minions
Y
N
Y
N

n/a

N

N

n/a

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Civil Society and Democratization in the 1990s: What Happened to Institutions After
Opening the Political Space?
We now know that Rwanda’s pre-1990 institutions had no pretention to promote
an associational life meant to be a counterforce to the state in governing. But the end of
the Cold War, i.e., frustration with one party-rule system across Africa, as well as the
pressure from the world community for democracy brought about the hope that Rwanda,
like other African states, was finally moving toward a political opening. In Rwanda, 1991
to 1993 became popularly known as the period of “democratic transition” (Guichaoua
2010, 3; Longman 1999).

President Habyarimana opened the political space and

implemented several institutional reforms, which on paper looked good enough to put
Rwanda on a democratic path. In 1990, for example, President Habyarimana in a solemn
speech called for freedom of human rights organizations to form and investigate the abuses
of which law enforcement agencies and the army had been accused (Belga 1990). He had,
a few months prior, constituted what later became known as “Commission Nationale de
Synthèse,” a body of experts representing various domains and socio-political forces in

162

different regions of the country, to examine requirements and how democratization would
to be implemented (Kiesel 1991).

The commission represented voices from youth,

peasants, working people, academia, and the Catholic Church. The commission was tasked
to consult with the population throughout the nation, generate major ideas for the new
constitution, and recommend new legal dispositions that President Habyarimana later
demanded the parliament “to approve such laws with no delay” (idem, p. 6).
As Longman has thoroughly described (1999, 339-243; see also Kiesel 1991;
Ushatse 1990; AFP-BELGA 1991), the Rwandan parliament adopted a new constitution
on June 2, 1991, after meaningful debate. The new constitution allowed multiple parties
to operate and compete politically. It limited the presidential term to only five years,
renewable only once. It also established the position of Prime Minister, an office to be
occupied by a representative of the major opposition party. This new institutional order
brought to life an opposition force stemming from both political and civil society entities.
Opposition parties rapidly formed and freely begun to race in strategies to recruit the
highest number of adherents in the country. The number of political parties grew from the
only one (the MRND) to 23 in total (Freedoman et al. 2006, 197) in the course of less than
four years. Up until the eve of 1990, there had been only one (state controlled) radio station
airing statewide and two written newspapers in the land.80 But as the democratization era
unfolded in 1990, more media channels opened to give voice to various social forces. For
example, a total of 72 newspapers were created (ibid.). Considerable popular gatherings
organized and mobilized to put pressure on the government to address their demands,
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Those were the national Radio Rwanda and two written newspaper, Kinyamateka (pro-state church edited)
and La Nouvelle Relève, the only non-Kinyarwanda paper; see Guichaoua 2010, 142-143.
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sometimes successfully.81 Further, human rights organizations increased in number and
prominence.

Large public rallies across parties took place throughout the country,

gathering as many as 30,000 people, each promising to be the ideal alternative to the
Habyarimana’s durable but oppressive system of ruling. Parties went to great strength and
unified their determination to break away from the status quo era. They formed a coalition
and demanded that President Habyarimana form a multi-party government to oversee the
transition until a democratically elected government could be established. In response, a
coalition government was duly constituted, and free elections were scheduled for 1993.
Simultaneously, Rwanda’s associational life increased exponentially in both
numbers and visibility. Rwanda’s civil society of the early 1990s was viewed as “one of
the strongest in Africa” (Uvin 1999, 163; see also Brusten & Bindariye 1997, 30; World
Bank 1987; Longman 1999, 339). Ntavyohanyuma (1985, 198) has estimated that there
was at least 1 farmer organization in every 35 households, 1 cooperative per 350
households, 1 NGO per 3,500 households, and that more than 12% of Rwandans belonged
to some peasant organization up until the Genocide. As Longman (1999, 340-1) has
argued, associational groups of that time represented new opportunities and alternative
avenues for the people to the patrimonial structures of power that the state had for long
successfully tied them to for regime support. News laws were adopted to provide a legal
framework for that democratic transition. Proponents of democracy and Westerners who
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One such success came about when Habyarimana released several Tutsi members previously arrested in
connection to RPF attack of 1990 (Freedman et al 2006, 197). RPF had exercised pressure on the government
of Rwanda since 1987 demanding that it accepts return of refugees, conducts political reforms, and institutes
democracy. The intransigence of both parties led to the October 1, 1990 RPF attack in the North of Rwanda
from Uganda. The government reacted with viciousness including attacks on Tutsi in the night of October
4, 1990 and massive arrests of some 8,000 people called “Ibyitso” (interior traitors) in Kigali, Butare, and
other places (ibid.). The international community, embassies and NGOs such as Human Rights International
Federation (HRIF), and the Association Rwandaise pour la Défense des Droits de la Personne et des Libertés
Publiques (ADL) put pressure on Habyarimana, which resulted in their release without trial.
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had recently visited Rwanda were unanimously optimistic that Rwanda was on the verge
of a democratic transformation (Longman 1999, 339; Kiesel 1991; Braeckman 19).
Following the normative logic of triumphant liberalism, everything was in order for
Rwanda to experience that “democratic revolution” that Huntington (1991, 33) had
predicted for continental Africa.
But in the end, Rwanda’s political trajectory took a tragic turn (Longman 1999,
338). Rather than resulting in a pluralistic democracy, Rwanda’s trajectory veered towards
Genocide, culminating with a start of systematic killing on April 6, 1994. Instead of
serving to support democratization, the political capital thus far mustered resulted in a
political tsunami. Where ballots were about to replace bullets, the results went the exact
other way around, in spite of Rwanda’s new institutions. The re-distribution of power took
place, but the change went in the worst direction. Not institutional norms that the National
Commission of Synthesis had so worked to institute, nor the crescendo of organized groups
could save the democratic project that Rwanda was promisingly transitioning into. Instead,
insecurity, shaping along ethnic division, reigned throughout the country. The economy
deteriorated as a result.

Members of the inner circle of the president successfully

scapegoated the opposition for the nation’s problems and inflamed the population with a
venomous rhetoric against the minority Tutsi ethnic group. On the evening of April 6,
1994, a plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down.82 That night
marked the beginning of the Genocide instigated against the minority Tutsi ethnic group.

82
There is no consensus established to this date on who is responsible for shooting down the plane which
carried Presidents Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira (Burundi) on the night of April 6th, 1994.
The pro-Habyarimana camp blamed RPF and successfully utilized it to fuel anti-Tutsi sentiments, while proRPF accounts blamed it on the extremists within the Habyarimana regime, purportedly because the President
had weakened the country by softening towards RPF demands (see Longman 2010; 1999).
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The presidential guard and other armed forces immediately took control of the capital city
of Kigali and proceeded to systematically eliminate key opposition politicians and critics
of the regime. The next day, a new president was sworn in and another government
constituted. RPF—then rebels partially integrated into the regular army—resumed the
fight declaring the Arusha peace accords forfeited. In the following days, Interahamwe, a
trained military wing of MRND, directed by local authorities and supported by soldiers,
hunted down and executed members of the Tutsi ethnic group wherever they hid, in the
bush, in churches, and in other buildings. As they did so, extremists also engaged in
looting, burning homes, and slaughtering their victims’ cattle. As many as one million of
Tutsi and ideologically moderate Hutu had died by July 1994. Around three million more
people fled into exile into neighboring Zaire, including the remnants of the government,
fearing reprisals as RPF was gaining displacing the embattled government forces. As Tutsi
were being massacred by the now extremist regime on the one hand, RPF rebel forces were
fighting the government army, on whom the international community had imposed an arms
embargo, briefly precipitating some military set-backs. As RPF fought the governmental
forces, the state and most of its institutional apparatus (ministers, the treasury, the national
radio, etc.) moved from Kigali, then to the center, then to the south west of Rwanda, which
became their last exit point into the neighboring Zaire. The war and the Genocide officially
ended in the first week of July, with RPF seizing power, constituting another government,
and ending the Genocide.
The ways in which the democratic transition unraveled in Rwanda raises three
important questions for a hypothesis of institutional causes. Why were the institutional
gains that Rwanda had achieved between 1991 and 1993 unable to save its democratic
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experiment? What factors drove the newly effectuated institutional reforms to a quick
demise? And, in what ways were those institutions helpful or harming to civil society –
state relations? To understand this evolution, one needs to understand the advent of
(institutional) democratization as a phenomenon that was not happening in vacuum or
without a parallel system. Significant political reforms were de jure implemented during
the four years that preceded the Genocide, but de facto those did not result in a fundamental
political change. For example, while 72 newspapers were created during the four years
preceding the Genocide, virtually a third of them (n=22) were openly Hutu extremist or
belonged to the “Hutu Power” ideology (Freedman et al. 2006, 197). Of the 23 political
parties that were formed between the introduction of multiparty system on November 13,
1990 and April 1994, the majority were created from a regionalist foundation or strategy
and aimed to be effective by recruiting more members who shared the views of MRND
and came from the North (ibid.; see the list of the parties in appendix). In addition, while
the Habyarimana government opened up the political space and allowed competing forces,
it had less of a connection to his willingness to enable absolute working of democracy in
Rwanda’s than to his strategic calculation for survival through foreign support (Freedman
et al. 2006, 197; Longman 1999).83
A few Rwanda specialists have explained the unexpected results of the new
democratic institutional rules and the resulting behavior only in the logic of power
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It is often cited that Habyarimana (and many other African leaders of the Cold War era) opened the political
space in 1990 because of the pressure from François Mittérand, former French President, the USA, the
Bretton Woods Institutions, as well as other international organizations as a condition to obtain more aid.
That is why, while the regime embraced the principles of democratization, it also radicalized and practiced
violence in parallel. For example, after the attack of Ruhengeri by RPF rebels on January 23, 1991, Bagogwe
(Tutsi) people were massacred in Mukingo (a commune in Ruhengeri) on January 25, 1991, and again in
Kinigi on January 27, 1991, and again in Gaseke and Giciye on February 2, 1991 and again in Gigogwe in
the night of 3 and 4 February 1991 (see Freedman et al. 2006, 197). The government created institutions of
democratic governance while refraining and taking away liberties of certain groups of the population.
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dynamics. For Longman (1999) and Straus (2013), there is no substitute to the unassailable
nature of the state’s power in political business in Rwanda. Because the state has always
been strong, all attempts to balance that power are immediately dealt with because they are
perceived by the state as diminishing, not empowering the same state. In a way, underlying
the state’s supreme place in the realm of governance is the suggestion that there can be
nothing that should attempt to undermine that very principle (see also the description that
Reyntjens 2013). Therefore, the conception that civil society as an institutionally enforced
entity, along with other politically freed forces were truly going to be the guarantor of
liberalization and democratization of the Rwandan polity proved to have been an illusion.
To the extent that civil society and all other non-state political freedom fighters were able
to constrain the state’s power, they constituted a liability, not an asset, to the survival of
the state’s imminent nature. While the state opened that political freedom for such forces
to work in the republic, it never truly permitted them to challenge it in any way. Indeed,
the Genocide represented the ultimate recourse to which the state turned to regain and
reassert the control it perceived as evaporating (Longman 1999, 390; 2009). The advent
of democratization brought about a climate in which the state and its power structures were
being challenged by forces represented by the civil society and the new political parties.
Therefore, the failure of democratization in the 1990s was not a result of lack of
institutional freedoms; rather, that failure is explained by something else located in the
cultural habitus. It is precisely when such power reached the verge of its overthrow that
the promises the democratic wave came to a crisis that produced mass murder.
Considering Rwanda’s experience, the conception that civil society has the power
to balance the state for the sake of good governance calls for a nuanced discussion. It also
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calls for a reflection on the dominant, Western view of state – society relations. This view
still conceptualizes democratic transition from the logic that “strong” societies give rise to
weak states. Migdal (1988) contends that states tend to be weak when they come from
stronger, more complex, and more independent societies. But that view has shown its
limitations in light of Rwanda’s democratic experiment. It is a purely zero-sum argument.
What is to be clarified here is that Migdal’s argument does not suggest that too little power
for the state or too much power for the society is good. Instead, Migdal is describing the
complex nature of competition that exists among a myriad system of rules (including the
state) who, individually and continuously, vie for social control. He also suggests that it is
when the state feels threatened by what he calls “centrifugal forces” (2001, pp. 72-75, 137,
144) that the risk of disintegration looms. He suggests that enough power is needed for the
state to exercise control and contain destructive tendencies in the society. In light of
Rwanda’s experience, the ensuing question is how to determine when the state will use that
power to be destructive instead of containing destruction; we know that talking about a
strong civil society in Rwanda, as Longman (1999) describes it, meant a diminished state.
It meant the suppression of the supreme state and the establishment of a constrained state.
That is how “the growing strength of the society in terms of its independence and capacity
was rapidly balanced by an increase of the coercive capacity” through its “expansion of
military personnel and armament” of militia and other forces following the invasion of RPF
in 1990s (Longman 1999, 340). The Genocide illustrated a continuation of the strength of
the state “in a coercive sense” (ibid.). The Genocide was a means to which the state
resorted to reassert control and eliminate challenges to the existing structures of power that
civil and political societies were leveling against it (ibid.). The Genocide was a by-product
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of the inherent destructive tendencies stemming from the complete absence—real or
virtual—of the state that Kaplan (2002) imagined when he wrote of “the coming anarchy.”
In a sense, Kaplan’s (2002) argument implicitly supports the notion that the state ought to
remain strong, so that the state of nature would not prevail. It also suggests that nothing,
including institutions, is likely prevent the state of nature from prevailing in the case of a
complete absence of a Leviathan, the state.

Post-Genocide Institutional Development: New Hopes for Civil Society?
As we have seen in chapter 3, the post-Genocide civil society faced more stringent
challenges than in any other time before. That is because the post-Genocide regime has
rendered it challenging for organized entities to vocalize individual freedom and civil
liberties in the manner that does not border on the malevolent rhetoric and divisionism of
the past. The regime has accomplished this partly through the institutional set-up for
regulating civil society organizations. For civil society, the conundrum has been to strike
the right balance between fighting for individual liberties, while remaining sensitive to the
fragile inter-ethnic communal environment and to the state’s centrality. To the extent that
the state’s power evaporated at the height of ethnic violence in mid-1994—despite recourse
to extreme violence as the last resort to save it—the new government has learned a great
deal from that episode. It has carefully curtailed forces conceived as threatening its
eminent role in the society. That then raises two questions. First, in what way has the postGenocide legal institutionalism engaged civil society aspiring to address the state? Second,
what kind of civil society has emerged out of the new political conditions and how is it
likely to remain?
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Because the Genocide had destroyed the antebellum state and its institutions, the
new environment offered hard choices for the new civil society to be a countering force in
governance. Two competing end goals were in display. On the one hand, the state ought
to permit democratic rule by keeping the political space open and creating an inclusive
system of government and other state institutions to tackle the problems the citizens faced.
But the state also had to reconstitute its authority by restoring order and addressing the
pernicious problems of security in an environment that had become anarchical. There was
a deep division on those two goals because one called for resuscitating the state’s
dominance over society, while the other aimed to erect a system based on real participation
by social forces. As Khadiagala (2004) has noted, national security and restoring territorial
order took precedence over all other state’s priorities. Building a democratic governance
in the post-Genocide Rwanda was secondary to state’s power reaffirmation. That is why a
wide-open governance scheme got underway slowly, cautiously, and guardedly. In fact, a
participatory governance did not get underway in the post-Genocide Rwanda until the
launch of the national decentralization and good governance (DGG) program in March
1999, five years after the end of Genocide.84 The DGG plan claimed to regionalize the
state’s powers and resources, democratize local governance structures, and involve
citizenry in the management of public affairs as well as in development (see GoRMINALOC 2012). Under this post-Genocide administrative reform, the first popular
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DGG was part of a wide array of reforms the new government of Rwanda began to put underway to address
a dire political, economic, and security state since 1999. Those reforms stemmed from a series of national
consultation ad hoc meetings on revamping the socio-economic-political status of Rwanda. In the end, those
reflections were condensed in guiding national documents called “Vision 2020” and the Economic
Development Plan for Rwanda’s Sustainable Development (EDPRS). The government of Rwanda requires
NGOs to reflect and document the way they fulfill the goals and activities highlighted in such national
documents within their strategic and yearly planning.
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election took place that same year and only at the local level. A similar process took place
in 2001 at regional level. It consisted in merging the old territorial and administrative
system of many communes into fewer districts, supposed to be more effective as opposed
to dispersed structures of governing. The 2001 reforms thus involved electing mayors of
the new 30 districts.

Other legal reforms involved adoption of Gacaca, a new

reconciliation-driven justice system rooted in traditional modes of arbitration, in 2000, and
writing a new constitution during the months that followed.85
At the national level, a constitutional referendum and legislative and presidential
elections took place on May 25, September 25 to 30, 2003 respectively. The new
constitution institutionalized new initiatives for decentralizing governmental powers and
democratizing the state. For instance, it proposed a semi-presidential political system and
a bicameral parliament. It also integrated commemoration of the Genocide, proscription
of the Genocide ideology and divisionism, as well as other special measures restraining
political activities at the national level.86 But while the new constitution took a vehement
stance on ideological divisionism, it also subscribed to fundamental democratic principles
of freedom that are of universal standards. The constitution is indeed quite precise on that
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The Gacaca jurisdictions were tasked to try thousands of subnational cases related to the Genocide crimes
and infactions.
86
See The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (approved on May 26, 2003). The constitution references,
in a vivid way, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 9, 1948; the International
Convention against all forms of discrimination of December 21, 1965; the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights of December 19, 1966; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights of December 19, 1966; the Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
of May 1, 1980; the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights of June 27, 1981; and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child of November 20, 1989. Such principles have been operationalized into subsequent
national policies or laws (see for example, the National Decentralization Policy by MINALOC of 2012; the
Organic Law n°08/96 of 30th August 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the
Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 1990; amended by the Organic
Law No 40/2000 on January 26, 2001; and again by another Organic Law No 16/2004 on December 31, 2004;
etc.).
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by unequivocally reflecting a textual expression of good governing principles in Rwanda.
It even references and reaffirms adherence to such principles including respect for human
rights and equality, anti-discriminatory measures, encouraging participation of citizens in
public affairs and demanding accountability from public officials, free and fair elections,
the rule of law, and principles of consultation and consensus building through dialogue.87
In a normative sense, prerequisites for participatory governance—in its multifaceted
form—have an institutional basis in Rwanda.
There is nothing, in the classical institutional sense, precluding freedom of civil
society activism from taking place in Rwanda’s governance.

That is, fundamental

institutional provisions exist and are in harmony with the fundamental legal texts in
Rwanda. For example, article 35 of the 2003 Constitution stipulates that “freedom of
association is guaranteed and shall not require prior authorization” under provisions of the
law. “Freedom of peaceful assembly without arms is guaranteed if it is not inconsistent
with the law” (article 36). Similarly, article 45, says that “all citizens have the right to
participate in the government […], whether directly or through freely chosen”
representation. It also prescribes, in article 47, the endgame for such participation. That
is “the duty” of all citizens “to participate through work” for “development of the country”
and “to safeguard peace, democracy, social justice and equality for motherland.”
Because constitutional institutions of Rwanda do grant rights and civil liberties to
citizens, civil society constituencies have the freedom to influence its governance. In a
sense, Rwanda—by integrating the notions of participatory popular democratic governance
into its most institutionally constraining document—has broken away from the classical
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See al. no 9 in the Preamble of The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (approved on May 26, 2003).
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regimes of pre-1990 Africa, and has hence avoided that an eventual recentralization of
powers or administrative despotism (providential and tutelary state) deracinates democracy
(Bienvenu 2006).
But only a fast reading of the constitution of Rwanda would belie the difficult
association that exists between rules and actual routines in Rwanda. It also sends us back
to Peters’ (2001) question on the origins of institutions. By analyzing the relationships that
have characterized the state and civil society linkages after the Genocide, one wonders
whether institutional rules alone can commit institutional members to behave in ways that
may even, as March and Olsen (1989) reflect, “violate their own self-interests” (pp. 22-3).
The lingering question lies in whether new institutions in Rwanda can prioritize democratic
rules over national security interests (whether of the governing and the governed).
We have an example of that complicated duality from the past. In December 1995,
the government of Rwanda expelled 38 foreign NGOs and suspended the activities of 18
more (mostly locals) partnering with the former.88 At that time, without a constitution yet
but a series of organic laws governing the transition instead, an estimated 154 NGOs were
present on the territory of Rwanda but the government was never truly enamored by their
activities (see the article written by Prunier in 1995). The government accused them of
inefficiency, divisionism, lassitude, and fomenting Genocide ideology, and did not hide its
unpleasant view of foreign NGOs. “There are probably not twenty of them who perform
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The European Union made a public denouncing announcement but that did not lead to any concrete action.
See Official Journal of the European Communities, C 17, Vol. 39, January 22, 1996, p. 0204. A report by
USAID in 1996 also depicted the tumultuous relations that existed between NGOs and the government of
Rwanda during that crisis era in the political life of Rwanda (USAID 1996, 54-57). The report particularly
highlighted the complicated balance that was absent between an expression of freedom that such (well off)
NGOs enjoyed in Rwanda while the state officials and personnel pained to even transport themselves to
execute their duties. When state’s interests clash with democratic activism, the former will unlikely lose the
battle.
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any kind of useful service,” said Jacques Bihozagara, then Minister of Rehabilitation, to
Prunier in 1995 (ibid). The Minister cast them as uncoordinated, duplicating government
services and wasting resources, and selective in their focus. He also expressed that many
of the NGO’s expatriate personnel were too young, inexperienced, racist, and exploiting
the NGO status privilege to avoid compliance with the state’s laws such as that of
registering their organizations on the ground that “[they] are an NGO and as such want to
have nothing to do with a government” (ibid.). But more remarkable than anything else,
the government consistently minimized the importance of the work of NGOs and
questioned the quality of their relationship with the society, which delegitimized the
importance of international NGOs as a whole. During that interview, Minister Bihozagara
depicted to Prunier a dynamic mirroring two antagonistic interests between NGOs and the
people. That, on the one hand, of rich and insensitive NGOs (4WD vehicles, cellular
telephones, comfortable homes) and that of suffering citizens (emotional rawness, poor,
physical affliction), on the other. To a certain degree, the government could not even make
a distinction between NGOs and private business entities, insofar as the former were
content “with taking pictures for fundraising purposes back home than with actually”
helping people in Rwanda (ibid.). Similarly, Reyntjens quotes Denis Polisi, the then
Secretary General of RPF, who on June 15, 1997 referred to NGOs as “those business
enterprises called NGOs” and lampooned the “latest invention of NGOs, namely civil
society” (2004, 185).
In the years that followed, that complicated relationship between the government
and the NGO community became the basis upon which new institutional laws now
governing the relationships of the state and NGOs were framed. For example, article 38-
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40 of the NGO law No 20/2000 of 26/07/2000 states that every Non-profit making
Organization working in Rwanda must submit, by latest April 30 of each year, to the
relevant government authorities, a detailed report of its achievements, its balance-sheet
and financial situation for the ended exercise.89 The NGO law is supplemented by another
Organic Law O.G. n° 7 of 01/04/2001 to govern the making of NGOs. The latter, which
is an operational law for Civil Society activities, proscribes subversive political activities
and orders all NGOs to renew their registration with government officials every year. Also,
ministerial regulations on the work of NGOs require them to report information on the
source of their funding, demographics of their personnel (domestic and foreign), and the
nature of their work to ensure they are aligned with governmental vision for the society
and are not division harboring.

Conclusion
To conclude, Putnam was right to assert that “institutions are devices for achieving
purposes, not agreement” (1993, 8). He observed that developing institutionalism was
important for democratic performance, but most important that engraining a type of
institutionalism in system of order that is already established was the most difficult thing
to achieve. Just as Arturo Israel has argued, it is a one thing to build a road, building the
organization that manages it is another (Israel 1987, 112).
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See the NGO Law No 20/2000 of 26/07/2000. The article states that “The governmental authority
responsible for the nonprofit organization may at any time request data and documents on its activities, which
must be delivered within a month. Additionally, every nonprofit organization in Rwanda must submit a
detailed report on its achievements, balance sheet, and documentation of its financial situation to the authority
by April 30 of each year. These reports are forwarded to concerned Ministries by May 31 and to the Cabinet
by June 30. The non-delivery of reports can result in the suspension of an organization’s activities.”

176

In Rwanda’s colonial era, institutions served to reinforce the power of the
colonizers by closely regulating the role of non-state associations and channeling them to
the purposes of the colonial state. This established in the political culture the role that
CSOs should play vis a vis the state. The same role was re-produced during the one-party
era of Kayibanda and Habyarimana, with institutions reinforcing the idea that CSOs
organizations should serve state purposes. In the 1990-94 era, new institutions were
adopted and adapted to the pressures of history—especially seeking to resonate with a
traumatized, fearful, and angry population. But just as in the past, new institutions were
crafted to reflect the traditional precedence of the state over other social structures. That
reordering of institutions and of the society as a collective has restructured the role of
CSOs, subsuming them into the execution of the state directed development agenda.
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CHAPTER VI

FAILURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY – DEMOCRACY IN RWANDA: IMAGINING
POLITICAL CULTURE AT THE CENTER

“Some writers have so confounded society with government as to leave little or no
distinction between them, whereas they are not only different but have different origins.
Society is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness. The former
promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections; the latter negatively by
restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse; the other creates distinctions. The
first is a patron; the last, a punisher. Society is a blessing. At best, government is a
necessary evil.”
A passage from Thomas Paine’s Pamphlet “Common Sense” written in 1776.
“What is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
You must first enable the government to control the governed and, in the next place,
oblige it to control itself.”
James Madison, from the Federalist Paper No 51.
In the previous chapters we have seen the limits of institutional and economic
arguments about our central question, namely, “why is the growth of civil society unable
to support the emergence of a democratic trajectory in Rwanda?” We initially thought of
economic and institutional explanations as independent variables that might explain
Rwanda’s failure to start along a democratic trajectory. But in a way, the findings showed
that neither of them provides us with compelling explanations as to why democratic
tendencies have not emerged across the three post-colonial regimes that Rwanda has
witnessed. Rather, the findings have shown us that institutions and the economic struggles
and the democratic outcomes alike are affected by the variable I have previously alluded
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to as “something else.” That previously nameless variable is political culture. It is a force
so powerful, with enduring influence over the ways in which the state has always related
to the society (and to civil society or other opposition forces), that it seems to be at the
center of a thick description of Rwanda’s non-democratic political trajectory. In this
chapter, I will describe the origins of the behavioral patterns and the ways in which that
behavior has played an important role in the state’s relation with civil society and the
society as a whole. This will show how political culture has shaped the unchanging
democratic outcomes in Rwanda.
But first, what is political culture and how do I conceptualize it in this chapter?
There is no standard agreement on what constitutes political culture, but there is a broad
(and hence loose) conventional view that it is a guidepost for thought and action, a
conditioning agent, which encompasses the various patterns of orientation a specified
group holds towards political phenomena whether cognitive, affective, or evolutionary (see
Ross 1997, 74; Almond and Verba 1963; Elkins and Simeon 1979; and Wiatr 1980, 106).90
But because of its expansive broadness, scholars have, over time, adopted a more singular
approach to defining and deploying the concept of political culture, choosing to focus on
one or two attributes, such as trust (Putnam 1993), tolerance (Inglehart and Norris 2003),
efficacy (Diamond 1999), or secular and post-materialist values (Inglehart 1990; 1997;
2000).91 For practical purposes, I use a conception of political culture in this chapter that
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Lane (1992), for example, asserts that “a major difficulty in achieving a clear overview of the field of
political culture has been the fundamental failure to settle on an operational definition of the internal structure
of political culture, that is, of the variables of which it is composed” (p. 363).

91
Given that my purpose here is to link political culture to political outcome (democracy), I want to also
acknowledge that not all scholars are in agreement on the relevance and ways of using political culture as an
explanatory variable. The debate on the place of ‘political culture’ as both a concept and a tool for explaining
political events is a field of wide contestations and contradictions. For example, Muller and Seligson (1994)
refute Inglehart’s (2000) as well as Almond and Verba’s (1963) contention that civic values or culture impact
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follows Pye’s (1968) definition of it is a product of both the collective history of a political
history and the life histories of members (or events) of that system. I found that both
‘historical events’ and ‘culture’ were good elements of the concept for analyzing and
describing political outcomes in Rwanda’s political system. As Inglehart and Baker (2000)
have argued, major events in a society leave markers of enduring effect. They shape new
social realities and people adapt to the changes left by such events; they behave in reference
to such events and these become an important part of their overall belief system. Therefore,
events of the past produce a collective memory, which becomes a condition for subsequent
human behavior. Or differently put, “values can and do change [but] they continue to
reflect a society’s cultural heritage” (idem, p. 49). Therefore, a mélange of events in the
evolution of a society, culture, and other social forces produce a value system that either
reinforces or constraints self-expression and the subsequent inclination for collective action
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 135-145; 210-230).
Describing and explaining Rwanda’s political system through the lenses of
‘political culture’ offers a unique advantage to our effort to understand the workings of
politics there. It is an important concept in this analysis considering that many students of
Rwanda have used a wide array of empirical evidence and other theories, but no one has
yet taken a cultural approach to the Rwanda’s political evolution. That is, there has been
no interest in describing democratic events in Rwanda as something phenomenologically

democracy and not the other way around. In their own cross-national regression analysis, Muller and
Seligson (1994) find no impact of civic values on change in democracy. Rather, they find that one of the
variables, interpersonal trust, is actually affected by democracy. Similarly, Wilson (2000) agrees that through
quantification of culture Inglehart gives us a more practical framework for studying modernization, “one that
is not linear, deterministic, or tied to Westernization or democratic theory” (p. 259). But in the same logic,
Jackman and Miller first question the analytic usefulness of the concept and cast doubt on its return in the
political science analysis (1996a); they also (in 1996a) disagree with Inglehart and Baker (2000) that cultural
change is a slow process; they don’t find culture as significant for economic development, and hence.
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sunk into their cultural evolution. Reyntjens (2013), for example, the most-published
scholar on post-Genocide Rwanda, offers only simplistic (and one-sided) narrative
materials and descriptive accounts without extending the answers beyond the immediacy
of the current regime. His studies of Rwanda also lacks broad comparative perspectives
on political regimes (Day 2017). From a rational-choice approach, Straus (2006) and
Straus & Waldorf (2011) have described the structures used by an authoritarian state, but
have not taken interest in seeking the genetic patterns or origins of structural violence in
Rwanda. Only Peter Uvin (1999) nearly touched this missing link in the studies of Rwanda
when he noted “the vision of Rwanda as a country—its challenges, its priorities, its people,
its politics—is remarkably similar across agencies and people” (p. 9) and lamented that
“… there is almost no information on what people think, feel, hope for, believe in, dislike,
or dream of; their social relations and conflicts; their perceptions of development, the
state, or the aid system; or their resources, networks, capacities, or aspirations” (idem)
against which his scholarship could provide “only indirect, occasional glimpse into the
realities of Rwandans as people” (idem).
It is this element that cuts across political events, epochs, and outcomes that I refer
to as political culture and that this chapter examines. In Rwanda’s political system, a
succession of momentous events have taken place, leading to considerable political
evolution since the end of the monarchical system in 1959. Yet there appears to be one
thing that is not fundamentally changing, namely, the patterns in power relations between
the state and the people. The pattern has always been that of a supreme role of the state,
which is reflected in the ways people respond to and participate in presidential elections,
mobilize in political parties, prepare before presidential and parliamentary elections, and
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respond to presidential election outcomes. As Figure 6.1 and Tables 6.1-2 show, the
unassailably supreme place of the president in electoral process has been a constant in the
history of Rwanda since independence.

Outcomes of Presidential Election Since
Independence
100.00
99.97

99.98

100.00

100.00

0

0

1.02

0.03

0.02

1965

1969

1978

1983

1988

98.98

98.79

95.1

93.08

4.9

6.92

2003

2010

80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00

1.21

-

% Winner

2017

% Total Opposition Votes

Figure 6.1 Presidential Election Tendencies Since Rwanda Became a Constitutional
Republic Source: Compiled from the “African Election Database” and Rwanda’s
Electoral Commission
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Table 6.1 Trends in Popular Participation in Presidential Election Since
Independence (Rwanda)
Total
registere
d voters

Total
Total
vote
Invalid/blan
Valid
% turnout
%
k votes
%
%
Votes
100.0 1,261,45 87.5
1.9 1,236,65 98.0
0
7
4
1965 1,440,440
24,804
8
7
3
100.0 1,434,97 90.3
0.5 1,426,70 99.4
0
8
1
1969 1,578,704
8,276
7
7
2
100.0 2,070,56 98.9
1.0 2,049,43 98.9
1978 2,091,688
0
21,126
2
6
2
9
8
100.0 2,364,59 97.1
2.9 2,295,91 97.1
1983 2,433,265
0
68,673
0
9
2
0
8
*198
100.0 2,740,67 99.9
0.0 2,740,43 99.9
8 2,740,920
0
243
1
4
7
9
9
100.0 3,812,56 96.5
1.5 3,754,56 98.4
2003 3,948,749
0
58,001
2
6
7
5
8
100.0 5,049,30 97.5
1.3 4,983,39 98.6
2010 5,178,492
0
65,912
1
0
1
2
9
100.0 6,769,51 98.1
0.1 6,757,20 99.8
2017 6,897,076
0
12,310
8
4
4
5
2
Source: Compiled from the “African Election Database” and Rwanda’s Electoral
Commission. *Mean data are for legislative elections; presidential data are unavailable.
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Table 6.2 Trends in presidential winning and power distribution among political
parties since independence (Rwanda)
1965
Y

1969
Y

1978
Y

1983
Y

1988
Y

2003
Y

2010
Y

2017
Y

% Winner has been incumbent
Winner's party is the majority in
parliament
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
# of official parties registered in
country
3
3
1
1
1
9
10
12
Total # candidates in the race
1
1
1
1
1
3
4
3
Source: Compiled from the “African Election Database” and Rwanda’s Electoral Commission.

What ones notes from Figure 6.1 and Tables 6.1-2 is a type of social conformity
that is unvarying irrespective of change in ideology, leaders, and ethno-political structures.
They also show a social proclivity not to challenge authority. For example, at the dawn of
independence, there were at least three opposition parties, including UNAR (Rwandan
National Union), APROSOMA (Association for Social Promotion of the Masses), and
RADER (Rwandan Democratic Rally), as well as independent candidates. Yet, Grégoire
Kayibanda (Hutu) ran twice unopposed (1962-1973), racking up the totality of votes
(100%) each time. Then came Juvénal Habyarimana (Hutu) who took power through a
military coup in 1973. Habyarimana created the MRND party and run unopposed every
five years until 1990, each time winning 100% of the votes. In fact, his MRND was the
only party that the Constitution allowed to exist in Rwanda. When political space opened
throughout Africa in 1990, thanks to the wave of democratization, the number of political
parties in Rwanda grew from 1 (MRND) to 26 in 1994 but elections that were supposed to
take place in 1993 never did. The country quickly descended into civil war, which
culminated in the Genocide early the following year. Following the end of Genocide in
1994, the RPF has been the single dominant party. The next presidential elections did not
occur until the end of a transition that was sanctioned by a popular referendum, resulting
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in the Constitution of 2003. Paul Kagame (Tutsi) has averaged 95% of votes in the last
three elections. His 2017 re-election owes it to constitutional amendments of 2016 which
were also approved by a popular referendum.

Recent constitutional provisions permit

Kagame, in theory, to remain the President of Rwanda until 2034. Most opposition parties
of today are members of a club called the National Consultative Forum of Political
Organizations (NFPO), a constitutionally mandated platform aiming to regulate and
balance political ambitions and the lessons of history.92 To this day, most political parties
have not chosen to send their own candidate to contest the presidential race. Instead, they
have each time endorsed the candidacy of Paul Kagame, even though they have regularly
participated in parliamentary elections and won seats in the parliament.

By Which Variables to Measure Political Culture in Rwanda?
I explore political culture and how it has shaped political outcomes in three separate
dimensions: social capital (social trust and institutional trust), risk aversion, and deference
to the state. I examine the forces of trust as both vertical (citizens versus government) and
horizontal (social trust) and the ways in which they manifest and create social realities that
have historically translated into certain power configurations at the national level. I also
describe ways in which institutional trust has legitimized the state’s supreme role in
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The National Consultative Forum of Political Organizations (NFPO) was established by the Constitution
of the Republic of Rwanda of June 4th, 2003 in its article 56. It began its activities on July 25th, 2003. From
its website, the mission reads as “The NFPO works as a platform where Political Organisations recognized
in Rwanda meet and discuss on the country’s problems and national policies, in the purpose of consensus
building and national cohesion. The NFPO is a permanent framework for capacity building for member
political organizations in the development of political activities and political service provision. It is also a
framework for conflict mediation between political parties and for the promotion of the code of conduct
which should characterize the political leadership in Rwanda” (NFPO 2018, accessed on March 8, 2018, at
http://www.forumfp.org.rw/?HISTORICAL-BACKGROUND-OF-THE-NFPO).
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governance. Second, I explore “risk aversion” as another determinant of behavior that is
rooted in collective cultural norms. I describe ways in which the aversion that Rwandans
in general and active civil society participants in particular have for political risk based on
past events. This risk aversion has empowered the state and given it legitimacy to act on
their behalf without popular demands for accountability and how that has shaped state-civil
society relations in general. Third, and consistent with the previous arguments, I examine
the extent to which deference to the state has always been a force even within civil society
itself. I show how the principle of challenging the state is culturally foreign to the history
of political citizens of Rwanda, and how it proved incompatible where tried in the past.

Rwanda’s Civil Society and Democratization Through the Logic of Trust and Social
Capital
From de Tocqueville (1945; 2000) to Putnam (1993; 2000) through Fukuyama
(1995), we understand the importance of trust in building a democratic governance.93 That
is—by virtue of proximity, interaction, collaboration, and mutual reciprocation—a process
of horizontal networking leads to the formation of ‘social capital,’ or positive social forces
that permeate institutions of governance. As a consequence, such forces, fundamentally
stemming from the principles of inclusion and wide participation, allow widespread social
mobilization and partnership. The formation of social capital permits the creation of a
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Both Inglehart (2001; 2005) and Fukuyama, 1995 (and also Putnam, 1993) have established a connection
between ‘social trust’ and development of ‘democracy’ in the sense that trust promotes liberal ‘selfexpression’ values and leads to citizens’ participation in ‘decision-making.’ Fukuyama (1995) even posits
that ‘low-trusting’ societies are disadvantaged in the realm of development because they are unable to
develop large, complex, and social institutions. Briefly, interpersonal trust, tolerance, and participation in
decision making all correlate with democracy. And in a sense, building a strong civil society transits through
a sense of strong trust, civic virtues, and communal belonging. This is the 'civic culture' that Putnam
discovered in Northern Italy, or the ‘communal republicanism’ that Tocqueville ascribed the success of the
American Political system to.
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democratic culture in the society and gives society such benefits such as peace, mutual
tolerance, education enhancement, children’s welfare, economic prosperity, reduced ethnic
violence, and good institutional performance (see Norris and Inglehart 2004, 181; Tilly
2004, 103, 134-136; Tilly 2005; Brown and Ashman 1996; Paxton 2007, 50). In a sense,
it is difficult to imagine a democratic culture in the absence of a high level of social capital
and widespread social trust.
But if trust is such an elemental recipe in the production of a democratic culture—
because without it people and groups cannot mobilize, consult, discuss, build consensus,
or make policies—then there is a problem we should not ignore in the ways in which civil
society has developed in Rwanda. In the sense that CSOs draw on trust to mobilize forces
that alter the unchecked character of state rulers, then what does it mean for such groups to
mobilize in an environment that lacks trust? Importantly, what makes for CSOs’ possibility
of success if there is no trust on both intra- and inter- group levels, what Praxton (2007)
describes as “the glue that binds a social system together” (p. 47)? In addition, how is it
possible to build an autonomous civil society in a country where associational life or any
other form of group representation on the basis of ethnic identity or minority group is
prohibited? Again, this is another example of the type of difficulties that the work of
democratization faces when it is done outside of contextual considerations.

Dynamics of Trust Within Balloons and Minions
Let’s examine this problem and the ways in which it became a turning point in the
development of civil society in Rwanda. And to stay at the national level, let us focus on
just Balloon and Minion CSOs in Rwanda, the two leading strata of civil society that most
international donors have continuously expected to be at the forefront of the struggles for
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democratic change. Before multiparty-ism came to Rwanda in the 1990, this class of CSOs
had nothing to do with democratization by vocation. Traditionally, they were grouped into
faith-based (FBOs) and development-oriented organizations (see Uvin 1999 and Longman
2010). Democratization or the idea of challenging the state was a foreign a concept that
they quickly embraced and learned to integrate into their business.
Political space did indeed open up and just like political parties, numerous CSOs
took off later in 1991. Those are, as their names indicate, the CSOs whose activism looked
to address the state directly. They were Balloons. Such organizations included, for
example, PROFEMMES in 1991 (to promote women), ADL in 1991 (association for
human rights defense), CLADHO in 1993 (an umbrella and a league of associations
defending human rights), LIPRODHOR in 1991 (a league that built notoriety on promotion
of human rights in Rwanda), CCOAIB (a concertation council of organizations supporting
local initiatives), ARDO in 1991 (yet another organization to promote defense of human
rights), AVP in 1991 (to promote peace), Kanyarwanda in 1991 (to promote coexistence),
and more.94 For an extensive list of CSOs that emerged at the dawn of the democratization
era, see the work of Peter and Kibalama (2006, 58-67).
At the start, these organizations exuded hope and a vibrant vocal spirit that was
going to challenge the highly personalized tradition in Rwanda’s politics. But unique to
their rise and the way they conducted themselves shortly after they formed mirrored the
fragility of the very political climate out of which they surged. They rose practically at the
same time as the RPF attack from Uganda, on October 1, 1990. Human rights-oriented
CSOs and a civil war were two competing and incompatible forces that emerged
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French abbreviations to these acronyms are provided in the list of acronyms.
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contemporaneously. Numerous arbitrary arrests took place throughout the country; it was
sufficient for one to be suspected of sympathizing with the principal enemy, RPF, to evoke
arrest. The arbitrary was commonplace. The most used term in the public discourse at the
time was ibyitso, the interior enemies. That pervasive notion, combined with repetitive
massacres on Tutsi, including seminal ones in the communes of Kibilira, in the North, and
Bugesera, in the East, defined the identity of the new CSOs and the trajectory they took
together.95 At the pick of this conflict, media spread day and night that Rwanda was on
the verge of collapsing because of, as Kangura, a prominent regime’s mouthpiece
newspaper put it, RPF was planning “genocide, extermination of the majority Hutu.”96
While these events represented one of the core problems that civil society was
theoretically going to help moderate, they ended up shaping that very civil society. The
environment between 1990 and 1994 was so tense that democratization struggles conflated
with the height of an ethnic conflict that shaped every fiber of the emergent CSOs.
Relationships between any of these newly formed CSOs and the government were defined
based on whether they supported or criticized it. Opposing the government denoted that
CSOs had rejected its effort to halt the danger that the nation faced, meaning the collapse
instigated by Tutsi invaders who had attacked it from Uganda. CSOs that opposed the
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On the arbitrary massacres in the communes of Kibilira and Bugesera, see Desforges’s Leave none to tell
the story, 1999, Pp. 106-111 by Human Rights Watch; see also Human Rights Watch report of “Rwanda
Genocide, How it was prepared, 2006, Pp. 7-8.
96

See Association des Femmes Parlementaires pour la Défense des Droits de la Mere et de l’Enfant en
collaboration avec Dr. Mugesera Léon, “Toute la Verité sur la Guerre d’Octobre 1990 au Rwanda,” Kigali:
February 1991, p. 5.
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regime and that had a different reading of the political events of that time were conveniently
cast as enemies of Rwanda or ‘inyangarwanda.’97
Those constraints made the environment such that CSOs lined up according to that
political divide. Even in the absence of the civil war, however, would not political culture
have asserted itself, and prevented civil society from engaging in a pro-citizen dialogue
with the state. Two opposing camps were formed among those CSOs, just as the political
parties were. One set was pro-government, and the others were anti-government, meaning
the enemies of the state. Ethnicity and messages of terror became a unifying factor on the
side of the government, while fear, distrust, and uncertainties shaped those who opposed
it.98 In addition, CSOs were trapped in between, leaving them with almost no other choice
than to pick one of the two. Freedom of ideas and of choice was far from the guiding
principle in the ways that multi-party politics was taking shape. Because of the social
polarization of society, it was impossible for CSOs to fight objectively for human rights
for all victims and objectively. In general, supporting the government denoted being proHutu and fervently defending the Hutu cause. Similarly, opposing the state meant that they
were pro-Tutsi, supporting the invaders and the war which aimed to obliterate the existing
political order. That wide political environment is that which begun and then shaped in the
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The term Inyangarwanda, initially used by the regime of Habyarimana to label RPF rebel forces, soon
became an ethnically coded word for Tutsi or the enemies of the country and the regime that represented it.
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That dual fragmentation (nationalist majority versus minority opposition) permeated every sphere of
influence in Rwanda, including academia, media, the military, political parties, the public itself. The height
of an ethnic conflict The pro-government elites and other leading voices owned up that strategy and redefined
priorities in their own sub-environments. For example, the vice-rector and professor at the National
University of Rwanda was first to propose that all men train and use traditional arms to defend the interior
frontiers while the professional army was busy driving the enemy outside of the country; see for example
Association des Femmes Parlementaires pour la Défense des Droits de la Mere et de l’Enfant en collaboration
avec Dr. Mugesera Léon, “Toute la Verité sur la Guerre d’Octobre 1990 au Rwanda,” Kigali: February 1991,
p. 5. See also, Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH),
“Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), p. 66.).
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public conscience and so went CSOs. Their identity and the ways they calculate risks, and
the ways in which they strategize and set priorities are rooted in the political climate of that
begun in 1990. To the extent that organizations are not idealist institutions that shape
outside the influence of ideas, human sentiments, and interests, that was a natural outcome
in the life of Rwandan CSOs. There is no evidence that membership in the CSOs correlated
with the ethnic divide of the time, meaning Hutu and Tutsi never coexisted in a CSO, but
it is clear that the ethnic dynamic of that time became an important driving force for
mobilization within CSOs. It hence makes it even unclear whether Rwanda would have
democratized in the absence of the war. In responding to the ideological constraints and
the political forces of the time, CSOs fast lost their battle. To the extent that inter-personal
and inter-CSO trust, all necessary for mobilizing, was built on jingoist sentiments and
ethnic affinities, there is a case to be made that both Balloons and Minions hurt more than
helped the prospects of true democratization in the near future. The ethnicization of the
war context by the regime nurtured ethnic “bonding” in lieu of ethnic “bridging” social
capital during that time. In so far as ethnic identity was such a seminal element in ways
CSOs emerged and fragmented, it meant that a competitive multiparty politics necessarily
exacerbated ethnic animosity in Rwanda. Distrust and mutual suspicion, across individuals
and groups, replaced the norms that would have been the sources for cooperation and
initiatives. The norms of alliances were absorbed by conditions created by the ethnic
conflict and the way the state securitized the conflict. Allying with a CSO whose leader
(and consequently the whole CSO) was labeled icyitso or wrongly accused of supporting
the enemy meant that there was no such thing as “general trust” or “depersonalized trust,”
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such as that described by Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994, 139) and that Yuki et al. (2005,
50) define as the product of collaborating CSOs in vibrant societies.
After the Genocide, ethnic plagued the environment in which CSOs functioned
more than ever. The new political environment was equally if not more constraining than
that of the previous era. A new government emerged, led by RPF, the ex-rebels who were,
shortly before, the enemy of the country. Yesterday’s “good guys” became the new villains
and vice versa, depending on which ethnic side you were. The tables had turned, but the
context remained contentious. It was a contentious context. In the processes of dealing
with Genocidal criminals and other remnants of this human tragedy and of instituting a
new order, the new regime arrested numerous Hutu alleged of committing the Genocide,
some of which were arbitrary. There were also numerous cases of disappearances of Hutu
citizens who, mostly, held some influence where they lived previously. Arbitrary became
the rule in town once again (Amnesty International 1998; Front Line Rwanda 2005, 40).99
The environment was even more complicated because there were no state institutions to
regulate this chaos. It was estimated that by 1998, over 140,000 Genocide suspects still
filled the prisons of Rwanda awaiting trial to be performed by only fewer than 50 members
of the Bar (see Kamatali 2014; see also Peter and Kibalama 2006, 43). Judges had been
assassinated in the Genocide or fled the country. Retribution by armed members of RPF,
some of whom were teenagers who had lost family members to the Genocide, were
sometimes beyond control. At the village level, both true and false accusations of Hutu
members took place based on Genocide driven sentiments of anger or retaliations by the
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See Amnesty International. 1998. Rwanda: UN Human Rights Field Operations must keep investigative
role, Al Index: AFR 47/28/98. See also Front Line Rwanda, Disappearances, Arrests, Threats, Intimidation
and Co-optation of Human Rights Defenders 2001 – 2004, p. 40.
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survivals. Simultaneously, RPF, the new master of public order, faced insurgent chaos
caused by former Interahamwe militiamen and ex-Forces Armés Rwandaises (FAR) who
infiltrated from Zaire across the Western borders of Rwanda, and the general proliferation
of arms in the region (see Bizimana (1999, 98ff). Old CSOs were confronted with this new
reality. LIPRODHOR is one of the few CSOs that confronted the new regime amidst this
judiciary chaos, arbitrary arrests and disappearances of prominent Hutu members who
stayed in the country.
Another effect produced by the new environment was that it attracted a set of new
CSOs (responding to the new socio-economic constraints) into the new political landscape.
Organizations such as IBUKA, which means remember took off in December 1995. It
aims to preserve the memory and honor the victims of the Genocide through extensive
documentation on the victims where possible.

As the name connotes, IBUKA’s

undergirding principle is that “the Genocide should be remembered.” It is also a body that
represents and defend interests of the survivors; that is why it has been very present and a
major witness at the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
Other reactionary CSOs include the AVEGA Agahozo (Association of Widowers of the
Genocide, solace); the association of students who survived the Genocide (AERG), the
Community of Indigenous People of Rwanda (COPORWA) was created in 1995 and is the
only organization representing the members of the third ethnic Twa minority people to ever
exist in Rwanda. As their names denotes, all these new organizations represent a new wave
of socio-political interests that the new political landscape has had to accommodate. They
came into existence primarily as a response to the environment that had been structurally
unfair to them, and hence formed as tools for surviving and ways of asserting resilience.
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For example, when I interviewed the head of AVEGA in Kigali in 2015 and asked her
about the genesis of their organization, she told me that women like herself chose to be
proactive because “ak’imuhana kaza imvura ihise,” a local dictum to denote that ‘once it
is convenient for others, then one can expect help.’ One important observation here is that
the majority in this new wave of CSOs were produced by a socio-political context that
would not have made sense if their leaders did not politically support the Kagame regime.
For such CSOs, choosing to be an outright force of opposition whose work would involve
to villainize a regime that had unquestionably saved them from the hands of murders would
have been rationally unparalleled.
Fundamental to the rise of post-Genocide CSOs—especially those made up of
members who survived the Genocide—was the pressing need to articulate constituencies’
rights that had been absent in the previous political periods. But that articulation also
became a source of disharmony among the wider CSO community. The ethnic dynamics
that had produced them in the first place did not fizzle out. Rather, they continued and
made it even more difficult for the wider CSO community to harmonize their interests
where necessary, form strategic alliances, and put aside their ethnic cleavages to view the
problems of their aggregate constituencies in some objective way. As such, pre- and postGenocide CSOs could not mobilize nor unify a voice on virtually anything insofar as they
were still entrenched in their ethnic grievances. That in return made it difficult to draw the
line that connects them to democratization. This dual cleavage had of course started before
the Genocide. The Genocide naturally amplified them, and eventually wound up creating
a new socio-political reality and, by extension, shaping the new environment that CSOs
had to conform to and work in. The cultural implication for this has become that ethnicity
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and ethnic nationalism are even more deterministic criteria for Rwandans to choose to take
part in politics or otherwise. Ethnicity and the historical references that Rwandans have
about them are now and onward an indelible marker in how they think about politics,
processes of appointing public officials, and participating in such processes.
But remarkable is the way CSOs fragmented, realigned, and reoriented after the
Genocide. Just as before, a dual typology continued to distinguish them, but this time in
an inversed order. One group of CSOs were pro-regime and another were in opposition.
On the one hand, the action of LIPRODHOR and that of the likeminded CSOs represented
anti-regime activism especially in the early years that followed the end of the Genocide,
while that of IBUKA was an overt expression of support to the regime. During that time,
the government accused opposition CSOs of harboring divisionism and the Genocide
ideology. The common phrase to describe that type of activism that LIPRODHOR was
leading and that the public was sensitive to was “kubiba amacakubiri” (sow divisionism).
People subtly were saying that LIPRODHOR was speaking for Abahutu, just as IBUKA
was speaking for Abatutsi.100 This was, and to a degree still is, a profoundly difficult
atmosphere for CSO activism because ‘speaking for Abahutu,’ in a sense, also implied that
Abahutu too were victim to a systematic massacre done by RPF akin to that done by the
previous Hutu extremist regime, supporting further that there were two Genocides, which
is incorrect.

International NGOs too fell into this dual divide.

Those supporting

LIPRODHOR and of whom actions somehow appeared as insensitive to the question of
the Genocide were foes to the government. In chapter five, section on Post-Genocide
Institutions and Civil Society Freedom, I have described the tumultuous relationship that
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From an interview with a civil society expert. I was in Rwanda during the period that my interviewee is
alluding to; I concur with his recollection because it corresponds to what I, too, heard at the time.
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characterized foreign NGOs and the government in 1995, when 38 of them were expelled
and 18 suspended. Bleak ties between the government and the group of organizations
(local and international) that challenged it heightened between 1996 and 1998 when
Rwandan officials expelled the press and the information officer of the United Nations
Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (UNHRFOR). This UN body had recently
criticized the execution in public of the five persons previously convicted and sentenced to
death by Rwanda’s courts (Bizimana 1999, 97).101 Again, this context is important to
understanding the difficulties for civil society to be autonomous in the sense that while the
government opposed it and that the international community rebuked the government, the
population was deeply divided on those questions.
There is no doubt that ethnic conflict in Rwanda is not what it used to be in the
years following the end of the Genocide, as in 1995, but these events are still fresh in the
minds of many citizens and have profoundly redesigned the social and political realities
that activism within CSOs is conditioned upon. For example, when USAID gives a
$100,000 worth grant to a local Balloon organization, logically it gets involved in the
process of hiring team members who will implement that project. When they hire, they
are looking for competent candidates as opposed to reflecting ethnic balance within CSOs.
It is a merit-based process.

That means they do not ask which ethnic background

candidates come from. In fact, outside the conscious act of the employers, they often bring
people from both sides together. Moreover, chances are that they may hire two people of

101
The UNHRFOR deployed to Rwanda in September 1994 to carry out investigation over human rights
violations, respect of human law, and help rebuild Rwanda’s judicial system and civil society institutions.
This role did not fulfill well considering the nature of relationship that this UN body had with the new
government in Rwanda. In February 1997, its employees were ambushed while on duty. The following year,
the organization withdrew from Rwanda in response to a “context of mass human rights abuses” (see
Amnesty International 1999).
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whom one may have relatives in jail over the Genocide related crimes while the other may
well be a survivor of the Genocide. Then, irrespective of such social enigma, USAID puts
them together and expects of them to reconcile interests, history, and feelings, and to form
alliance and a strategy on counterbalancing the state. For those two locals to coalesce,
unify views, and decry the misdeeds of the government is a more onerous task than one
could reasonably expect to be performed. While representation based on ethnic identity is
prohibited in Rwanda, interpersonal trust is still challenged by recent events in Rwanda’s
history. It has certainly gotten better than in the past, but it is still forming across
individuals of the Rwandan society. Therefore, to task CSOs composed of two groups
(individuals and CSOs) to decry the state over human rights abuses will accomplish nothing
other than exacerbating a confrontational environment. Again, this new social reality and
the ways in which it continues to play among members of civil society is a reinforcing
factor to a political culture that is notoriously deferential to the state. The complicated
nature of ethnic relations in the post-Genocide Rwanda has added to the rationale of why
people—in the public realm and in civil society alike—yield to the will of politicians; it
has not undermined it.

Dynamics of Trust Within Mushrooms and Their Utilitarian Function at the
Community Level
While ethnic anxieties still plague intra- and inter-CSO relationships at the national
level, the dynamics of trust plays out differently within the Mushroom associations that I
visited. Contrary to the state oriented CSOs, grassroots-centered associations reflect a
pragmatic convergence of interest among members, which can be a good recipe for
building and democratizing communities. Like Balloons and Minions, Mushrooms include
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members from both ethnic stripes but unlike in the former, ethnicity is not a barrier to
networking, working, and achieving common goals together. Of the eight Mushrooms that
I visited, all of them had at least one member from the opposite ethnic group and that did
not appear to affect the group dynamics as within the CSOs I inquired about. Two of those
groups had Twa ethnic members. In three Mushrooms, members included former prisoners
of the Genocide who had been released from jail in exchange for confessing their crimes,
and had completed the ‘general interest duties,’ referred to as TIG, then voluntarily
integrated that Mushroom whose members were survivors.102 In other instances, the
Mushroom CSOs that I met gathered both widowers of the Genocide and wives of husbands
who were still in prison. “[...] One member in our association is a Hutu who married a
Tutsi husband.

She was two-month pregnant when her husband died.

We bought

everything that that child needed to go to school because the mother was poor. The child
has always been a good student and recently got a scholarship to go to ‘Amerika’ [USA],”
said the president of one association in the Southern province. “[...] I am a godmother to
three Hutu children. They spend overnights at my house whenever they want; I also spend
overnights at their parents’ homes. When I was hospitalized for three months, they did not
leave me. My children are in secondary school far away from me. On my way from town,
I sometimes stay at their house because it is too dark at night. [...] My hopes are in God,
my children, in the people of this association, and in my neighbors,” said one Genocide
victim in another mushroom association.

102
In 2003, one the ways to deal with the consequences of the Genocide included President Kagame’s decree
to release prisoners came forward, confessed, asked for forgiveness, and helped with identifying the locations
of the remains of the victims. Estimated 60,000 detainees had been released by early 2007 (Asiimwe 2007).
Further articles on this topic, see Vasagar (2005); and The Telegraph (2005).
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Just as the groups I have described above, this set of Mushrooms too rose after the
Genocide in response to socio-economic conditions that individuals lived in.

The

associations that I visited formed between 1998 and 2005. They also tend to be fairly large
with a membership ranging from 59 to 101. Table 6.3 illustrates the dynamics of origins
and how that shaped trust among members. Table 6.4 synthesizes their focus in terms of
activity and commitment.

Table 6.3 Processes that lead to the creation of Mushrooms and trust at the intragroup level
North South
West
East Total
ORIGINS AND INCLUSION
Ethnically diverse membership:
Y
Y
Y
Y n=59
members are not bothered to talk about
(n=15) (n=14) (n=16) (n=14) N=59
uncomfortable issues such Genocide
N=15
N=14
N=16
N=14
survivors and prisoners living together
Independence of birth of association: at
Y
Y
Y
Y n=59
members’ own volition, individuals
(n=15) (n=14) (n=16) (n=14) N=59
with similar concerns (economic,
N=15
N=14
N=16
N=14
psychosocial, social) launched the
association
Membership
*How many total members does your
77 and 59 and 71 and 78 and n=612
group have?
82
52
92
101
TRUST
Do “weak ties” exist within the
Y
Y
Y
Y n=59
Mushroom?103
(n=15) (n=14) (n=16) (n=14) N=59
N=15
N=14
N=16
N=14
Members have, in the previous year,
Y
Y
Y
Y n=57
offered a day to work in the farm/field
(n=13) (n=15) (n=15) (n=15) N=59
of another member without pay
N=15
N=15
N=15
N=15
Children of members play (and do other
Y
Y
Y
Y n=57
activities) together
(n=15) (n=15) (n=15) (n=15) N=59
103

Gipson (2001, 52) defines “weak ties” as those criteria that aim to pull together heterogeneous segments
of the society in a group. They are healthy criteria, a social capital, for building society in the sense that they
serve the purpose of bridging disconnected members of that society. In contract, “atomizing ties” (idem) are
those restrictive criteria of grouping that are based on clan, family, kinship, and other segregating (“bonding”)
affinities, which isolate rather than unify diverse alterities. Putnam (1993, Pp. 90, 175-176) also describes
trust from the lenses of social capital. He contends that out of a culture of associational institutions, which
are governed by norms and trust, develops cooperation, a condition for members to preserve and protect both
“private goods” and “public goods” simultaneously.
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Parents help each other to watch over
children (including sleep overs)
Other indications of “bridging” ties
within the Mushroom:
• Member is a Genocide survivor
who married a member a Hutu
and they have children together
•

North
N=15
n/a
N=15
n/a
N=15

South
N=15
Y
(n=4)
N=15
n/a
N=15

West
N=15
Y
(n=3)
N=15
n/a
N=15

East
N=15
Y
(n=3)
N=15
Yes
(n=1)
N=15

n/a

n/a

n/a

Yes
(n=6)

Member lives in a home whose
next door is a member from
different ethnic group.
Members share rainwater
catchment system

Total
n=10
N=59
n=1
N=59

N=6
N=59

Source: Compiled from the eight FGDs I conducted with members of Mushroom
associations in all the four provinces of Rwanda (North, South, West, and East). N signifies
the cumulative number of FGD participants in the province. Members openly discussed
individual testimony, subtly clarifying whether they were Tutsi or Hutu and hence whether
the demographics of the group were both-sided or not, but because ethnic statistics and
such form of representation is prohibited in Rwanda, I did not include proportion of ethnic
representation of my sampled groups in this table. The asterisk (*) encapsulates only the
sum of members composing each of the two groups that I met in each province.
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Mutual support
initiatives for members

Farm (with hoes) for one another
periodically and benevolently
Support one another to raise children
Home visits to support the sick
Support one another to run other
household chores
Regularly visit one another and give
comfort to one another
Share food with fellow group
members occasionally

Self-reliance
activities
(economic

Commercial farming activities?
Rotating loans and saving schemes
Livestock projects
Sell vocational and technical services
(e.g., construction, stove making,
electricity, ..)
Mill
Others

Building society

Participation in
local
governance

Table 6.4 Activities promoted by Mushrooms and their Engagement in Community
North South West East Total
Member to any counsel or committee
2
2
1
2
7
at sector level?
Attended some executive meetings at
2
2
1
2
7
sector level last year?
Attend JADF meetings at district?
2
1
1
2
6
Member to a local teacher-parent
2
2
2
2
8
association?

Give messages on reconciliation in
various settings by using personal
testimonies
Conduct other social activities
(traditional dance and singing) aimed
to promote coexistence
Promote social justice by pleading and
caring for the vulnerable (e.g.,
orphans, other vulnerable ones)
Participate in umuganda every
month104

104

Y

Y

Y

Y

8

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

8
8

Y

Y

Y

Y

8

Y

Y

Y

Y

8

Y

Y

Y

Y

8

2
2
2

2
2
2

2
2
2

2
2
2

8
8
8

n/a

n/a

n/a

1

1

1
2

1
2

n/a
2

n/a
2

2
8

1

1

n/a

2

4

1

1

n/a

2

4

2

2

2

2

8

2

2

2

2

8

Umuganda is a local term describing the community work consisting in cleaning up the environment and
neighborhoods by all adult members of the society. It consists in draining trenches, cutting down excessive
tree branches and bushes, reconnecting a destroyed bridge, or ridding streets off limbs and debris. It is done
morning to noon on every last Saturday of the month and is government mandated.
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North South West East Total

Horizontal
networking

Conduct other activities aimed to
educate and promote solidarity of
community members (e.g., student
competition games, girls education,
diseases prevention, …)
Conduct inter-association coaching
visits in the same district
Conduct inter-association coaching
visits in other districts?
Have signed agreement of partnership
with other groups?

2

2

2

2

8

2

2

2

2

8

n/a

1

1

2

4

n/a

n/a

n/a

1

1

Cooptability and
vulnerability

Have received some aid from the
2
2
2
2
8
GoR?
Have traveled elsewhere to teach
coexistence under auspices of the
n/a
1
1
2
4
GoR
Have received visitors from GoR for
2
2
2
2
8
follow-up?
Have received aid from foreign
n/a
1
1
2
4
donors?
Source: Compiled from the eight Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) I conducted with
members of Mushroom associations in all the four provinces of Rwanda (North, South,
West, and East). GoR stands for Government of Rwanda. Umuganda
There was no indication that the government had forced them to be together from
the start. It is after they were functional that the state begun to take interest in them and in
how their social values matched political ends. Precarious circumstances stemming from
poverty, low health conditions, and general need for survival brought Mushroom members
together. Their stated goals and mission is a wide spectrum of activities ranging from
rotating home visit to console one another or taking care of the sick one to teaching
reconciliation and building a bridge between two villages. They promote education and
leaders are active members of school associations as both parents and community resources
for such schools.

They also all run economic activities, dominated by farming
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commercialized foods and livestock. Benefits are equitably shared even though for the
most members choose to transfer surplus into different investments such as buying land or
cows. All too often, Mushrooms conduct activities with other associations from the same
community and sometimes those of other districts. Children of Mushroom members have
clubs in which they meet and conduct social activities, sometimes with alongside their
parents.
One of the successes of Mushrooms is reflected in the ways in which their members
have overcome the problem of ethnic conflict that is still plaguing CSOs at the national
level.

While it is difficult to break through ethnic differences that separate two

professionals who meet in Balloons and Minions, it is a different experience for members
of Mushroom associations. One of my FGDs took place in a village in the Eastern province
of Rwanda. Most participants lived in community houses akin to that of twin-houses.
Every two homes were separated by a rainfall water catchment system that they both
shared. In one side lived a survivor and in the other a formerly Genocide prisoner released
from jail upon confessing to killing. They shared water from the rain tank and other
household living experiences. The leader of another Mushroom was a Genocide survivor
who married in the family of his culprits; both have children together and are involved in
teaching about coexistence. Much to my surprise about the participants from these
Mushrooms was not the very fact that these two previous enemies had been together (either
a façade or a true reality), but the degree to which their social lives had intimately and
practically interlinked as a function of proximity and the desire of individuals to continue
to be relevant in their communities. They spoke to me about each other without detectable
pretense. They are sensitive to one another. They clearly are all broken individuals, which
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may belie their actual degree of individual healing, yet exude a remarkable resolve to work
together as a way of improving themselves and theirs, because, as they repeated to me,
“ntawigira,” a dictum to the crucial importance for ‘interdependence’ in their life.
For such Mushrooms as the ones I interviewed, teaching reconciliation was not the
core of what they looked to promote at the start. But later after their activities had proven
appealing to the interest of many, then the government began to recruit them. The
government has sometimes called them to participate in national events and other programs
geared for domestic or international audience on both policy and political fronts. Some of
the Mushrooms have subsequently received benefits from such exposure from international
donors. In the end, such groups are not going to extend their activities and initiatives
beyond immediate interests of the members and the group. They do not carry a propensity
to challenge the government beyond its parochial structures. Actually, the government
gains political credit out of the work that Mushrooms do in the sense that they are seen, in
the eyes of the wider society and that of the external audience, as reflective of the state’s
effort to promote peace and reconciliation. But essential to the traits of such grassroots
groups is that basic democratic principles exist in their internal governance and regulations.
They all have written and transparent mechanisms of appointing members. Members are
elected on the basic criteria of competence such as education level, past experience, and
other individual skills, not of their ethnic background. Proper financial management
systems exist and all of them keep books.
To wrap-up this section, we have seen that the link between trust and the effort of
civil society to democratize the state presents problems at three levels. One, the general
environment, out of which Balloons and Minions developed and still work in, is
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problematic. Elites and rank and files alike are pulled into these groups primarily as
professionals trying to meet their economic needs as all ordinary Rwandan citizens. In that
sense, a CSO for them is first and foremost a place for personal advancement in an
economic sense.

It does not represent an opportunity to change the state into an

organization freely open to rivalry and aggressive criticism. As members make their way
into this kind of organized channels, they come in with a baggage of history that is both
helpful and unhelpful at once. It is helpful in the sense that interests are dispersed and
hence views can be richly utilized if well and strategically vocalized together. But it is also
unhelpful because, in Rwanda, there is not yet a social contract among all representations
of CSOs (Balloons and Minions) with regard to both the question and ways of challenging
the state. Such CSOs are composed of members who have families and most instance with
additional members of the extended family financially depending on them. Therefore, that
puts their financial obligations above the necessity for the CSO to make Rwandan leaders
democratic ones.
Second, the environment is still dominated by interpersonal distrust, with remnants
of a collective trauma in the Rwandan society as a whole. Members of CSOs have
contentious backgrounds; they are products of an ethnically cleaving environment. There
are constraints deriving from various uncertainties individuals may have.

One may

wonder why it would be worth throwing their trust at anyone and speak up on very sensitive
issues in the nation based on the simple fact that they are members of one organization.
That makes a CSO an unideal place to open up, to form alliances, and to build inter- and
intra-group trust. The binding duty for CSO members is not a result of an organically
cultivated social capital; rather, it is contingent upon historically constraining conditions
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that affect members dispersedly. All that challenges the potential for inter-CSO activism
vis-à-vis the state. It splits members over what should be the priorities for their CSO. As
a result, it becomes even illusive to attempt to connect Balloon and Minion CSOs to state
democratization processes in Rwanda. By pushing CSOs towards challenging the state,
certain international NGOs have not been helping mitigate that challenge that is
fundamentally tricky within Balloons and Minions. They remain constrained and hence
stuck by lack of trust to mobilize members so as to achieve any (political) objectives.
Distrusts chokes off their ability to converge interests, decreases the zeal of members,
erodes the potential for building a social capital within and across groups, and ultimately
keeps individual effort from prioritizing the larger interest of the society.
However, when one looks at the question of trust within and across Mushrooms at
the community level, it appears as less problematic than how it is within Balloon and
Minion CSOs. While all groups share the same broken wider social environment (of low
trust), Mushroom members have built a social clout that is needed for mobilizing that their
Balloon and Minion counterparts lack. The degree of intra- and inter-Mushroom trust that
exists at the community level has enabled them to build the society in the way that upper
regional and national CSOs have failed to achieve. At the grassroots level, because groups
are built on the “weak” as opposed to “atomizing” ties, it has become possible for them, as
Putnam (1999) would put it, to “unite the energies of divergent minds and vigorously direct
them toward a clearly indicated goal” (p. 190). Because of “group interaction and crosspressures,” (idem) members are moderating their attitudes towards achieving common
goals. Moreover, another study funded by the EU in 2004, one year after the first postGenocide Constitution and presidential and parliamentary elections, asked 10,831 people
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in Rwanda whether “associations of a cultural nature such as choir and prayer groups
strengthened trust among members and whether they encouraged participation in the local
community’s activities?” (NURC 2004, 34) and 86% of them agreed. The fact that there
is a wide popular belief in such potentiality, Mushrooms can indeed be a focal point for
building consensus, trust, resolve dilemmas of collection action, become laboratories of
local democracy, and organically develop the society.

Yet, even though they are

incomparably numerous and do more to build the society compared to Balloons and
Minions, grassroots Mushrooms receive less attention from the aid community. Most
attention from the development and democratization community has been directed to the
wrong components of CSOs. It should be reversed and redirected to the grassroots
organizations.

Risk Aversion: How Events of the Past Have Prepared Subsequent Political
Adventures
In the section titled “Why Did the Political Opening of 1990 Not Help Civil Society”
in chapter three, I gave a historical account on why the then contemporary civil society
failed. In the section titled “Civil Society and Democratization in the 1990s: What
Happened to Institutions After Opening the Political Space?” in chapter five, I discussed
the implications of the political freedom of the early 1990s on the institutions of the state
in the years that followed. In this section, let us focus on the conditions that political
liberalization of 1990 and its outcome have created for individuals seeking to be politically
active through civil society. As a reminder, 1990 produced mixed results in the world of
activism. On the one hand, allowing freedom (in which civil society became a vibrant
force in Rwanda) did not result in a change of the state’s elite behavior. Rather than
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liberalizing the state, freeing all kinds of political forces resulted in violence. But other
implications have also been that anyone seeking to change the ways Rwanda’s future
political elites behave would have to learn and adapt from that episode. The wave of
political liberalization that Rwanda experienced in 1990 and the results that it produced
have meant that civil society would have to factor caution into their subsequent political
calculus.
When I asked CSO persons and academic specialists and other civil society experts
in Rwanda, most of my interlocutors did not believe that a post-Genocide civil society has
a chance to reverse the order of things because “ntawe utinya ishyamba, atinya icyo
bahuriyemo,” or ‘it is not the jungle that is dangerous, it is what one has encountered in
the jungle in the past that is dangerous.’ In this dictum, we see three separate and yet
conjoined subjects. There is first an imaginary person, a trekker, an adventurer, or a
wildlife activist. Then there is the jungle itself, a social space, a locus where the first object
searches for life, or some form of peace. Last and most intriguing, the “what” denotes an
unidentified ‘thing.’ Unique to this third icyo is its unpredictable characteristic and its
assuredly menacing nature. It is impersonal and gender neutral, but there is also the
possibility that it could be an event, a happening, or a circumstance that is a worrisome
one. At the same time, the dictum is also a warning over the eventuality that something
bad from the past might occur again and that the risk for that is still there, in the same old
locus, the jungle. While it is difficult to label that icyo (“what”) and who or what it exactly
represents for political activists seeking to challenge the political order as it now is, the
usage of that phrase also expresses a capitulation on the part of CSOs to the diktats of the
state. I should mention that the Kinyarwanda lingo is replete with proverbial maxims. One
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of the ways to understand how Rwandans think is through their axiomatic usage of the
language to respond to a question. That is one of the answers my interviewees gave me as
we spent time exchanging on the question of why civil society is extra cautious in its
political activism. More maxims my interlocutors used to qualify and justify the attitude
of civil society, of political parties, and of all opposition forces in general include:
“utaranigwa agaramye agirango ijuru riri hafi” or “the one who has not yet been choked
off (by another person) while laid on their back believes that heaven is closer to them” to
denote that the one who has not yet faced hardship may think that others get it the easy
way; or “ubuze uko agira agwa neza” or “you give in when there are no other options left.
It is the sentiments expressed through that axiom about ‘the jungle’ that many civil
society experts must think about concerning how the political order in Rwanda can be
challenged. However, what is also remarkable is that it is also consonant with the wider
opinion in Rwanda. In 2007, a study by the Unity and Reconciliation Commission, funded
by USAID and implemented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), asked the
population (n=9,980) to agree or disagree with the statement that “it is necessary to limit
the right of association and the right to form political parties since we have to fight
divisionism tendencies” and 92% of them agreed (NURC 2007, 37). Twice previously,
they had asked the same question and the intensity of this opinion had even increased overs
years because it had been 84% in 2005 and 90 in 2006.105
Aversion to the risk that too much freedom might attract another mid-1990s has not
only stopped civil society from acting with aggression, it has even lengthened the state’s
reach and control over the society. The state officials know well that citizens are averse to
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See, NURC. 2007. Social Cohesion in Rwanda – An Opinion Survey, Results 2005-2007. 38.
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an eventuality of violence as the one that political freedom of 1990 attracted. President
Kagame and RPF understand well that power struggles could easily unravel, and that
recapturing power after opening the political space and losing power would mean another
quagmire akin to that which shipped the Tutsi population in regional countries in 1959 in
the first place. Therefore, they hold a tight grip on it and do the best to expand and
legitimize it through practical development programs. President Kagame has for the last
two decades taken supreme control and crafted the new Rwanda in staunchly Leviathan
lines. Again, for Rwandan citizens, there is no difference between the President and the
State; the two are tantamount to the same thing. The alternative to Kagame, should there
be forces seeking to displace him, is anarchy. That is what many Rwandans see or have
been made to see by the state in considering their overwhelming support to policies that
restrict and control freedom. And when they vote, they are confronted with the choice
between ‘stability’ or ‘regression’. That is why slogans go as, “gutora Paul Kagame, ni
ukwiteganyiriza ejo hazaza,” ‘to vote Paul Kagame, is to secure your tomorrow.’
Memories are still sharp, minds are always alerted, and behaviors are conditioned
whenever violent conflict is a possibility. That has legitimized actions done by the
government and its institutions. The state is widely accepted as the guarantor of the
security as the elemental necessity of the population. The reconciliation barometer, a
scientific opinion survey periodically conducted by NURC with a sample of over 10,000
respondents each, funded by USAID and implemented by the International Rescue
Committee (IRC), revealed that 97 percent (in 2005), 96 percent (in 2006), and 98%
percent in (2007) of the population trust the ability of the government to protect them.106
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Taken from NURC, DROS 2004; NURC, LAROS 2005; NURC, Social Cohesion-Opinion Survey. 2008.
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The same study also revealed that 96% (in 2005), 98% (in 2006), and 97% (in 2007) of the
population agreed that “the government is doing its best to improve the standards of living
in Rwanda” (NURC 2007, 34) respectively. These numbers can, in appearance, gloss one’s
eyes over and they may not carry a scientific impression, but for one thing, they correspond
to general voting behavior (participation and outcomes) in Rwanda. There is clearly a force
driving collectively Rwandans’ responses and anticipation to their state officials in an
unvarying way. There is no evidence that such force is caused by people’s fear of the
government—because there is no indication that the government of Rwanda terrorizes its
people—but what appears plausible is that that force may be deriving from a collective
anticipation of how the government would react should another “1990” emerge to disrupt
the current political order and the political status quo it has erected.
And civil society is not acting outside that collective sensor. There is sufficient
awareness among members of civil society to the risks, and the historical and political
sensibilities whose past experience still daunts in Rwanda. Democracy activist CSOs are
concerned that their action might be portrayed by the government as “oppositionist”
(Mukamunana and Brynard 2005, 12). Hence, many organizations have surrendered to the
government line and chosen to do development work, leaving advocacy, lobbying, and
other human rights issues secondary to the mission of other members of civil society (see
USAID 2001; Kelly 1999; Nizeyimana 2013, 71). This aversion to risk loomed neat
throughout my interviews among key informants. “The problem is that the birth of civil
society and the birth of a military rebellion [RPF] happened at the same time. From the
start, those two things have been equated. Criticizing the government means starting a
rebellion against it. Also, this regime was once a rebellion and a civil society before that
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[…]. It is not because people don’t want to talk, it is because they don’t want to be dealt
with as a rebellion,” (interview with a key informant in Kigali in July 2015).
When I asked another key informant about the future of Rwanda’s civil society, he
responded “it is difficult […] because many issues do not come from civil society. It is to
do with the overall context of Rwanda. We do not have a culture of debating the ‘Shefu’
[chief]. Whenever one evokes something that is wrong, new terms are born.. ‘igipinga’
[renegade, connoting an extremist denier of such events as the Genocide], ‘ikigarasha’ [the
useless of the society], and many of that sort. Who would like to carry such label? Even
Kagame himself, we do really not know whether he sees that as a danger or not” (informant
in Kigali, July 2015). In addition, “[…], you see when we go to the government, we ask
them to listen to us but they say we too must learn how to address them in the right manner.
Protesting means you don’t like what the government is doing. It also means that you are
going to war against the government on the street. [...] It is only logical in the mind of a
foolish that defeating the government is a goal that is achievable,” (from an informant in
Kigali, July 2015). Furthermore, “...the opposition in diaspora makes some noise and some
of the questions they evoke make sense because they reflect real concerns of people here
in the country. But civil society does not say anything...[...], ...because members fear being
conflated with that opposition.

Individual behavior cannot be dissociated from the

organizational behavior,” (from another informant in Kigali, July 2015). What we see in
this political environment of Rwanda in which civil society lives is that absence of a culture
that debates the chief has been detrimental to the democratization struggles that civil
society has attempted to carry in Rwanda since the 1990s. And the government has not
enabled the “internal controls” that oblige it “to control itself” that Madison (1969, 326)
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deemed necessary in the processes of framing a political system. Rather, the government
of Rwanda has successfully structured its powers in such a way that it remains a beneficiary
of popular support in exchange for stability in the country. Previous governments were
also successful at wheeling power to that end; that which is led by Paul Kagame has
outperformed its predecessors.

Deference to the State: Upright Naïveté or a Utilitarian Recipe for Public Ordering?
Rwandans have been described as manipulable, obedient, and “easy to mobilize”
(Straus 2006, 14) people. Kamatali (2014) has even pointed to how indifference to a
culture that prefers obedience over choice is partly an answer to the aching question of why
Rwanda descended into its own destruction in 1994. But before I engage in a discussion
on why Rwandans choose to defer to supreme authority in everyday life rather than relying
on confrontational options for popular expression and channeling their demands, I wish to
make a theoretical connection to this paradigm. Why citizens choose to defer to state
officials is an unsettled debate. First, it is unclear whether they do so as a conscious
benevolent boon to leaders that corresponds to cultural mores of a people, or whether it is
a rationally calculated choice to achieve collective goals in the collective imaginary, or
even more confusing, whether the unquestioning obedience is a phenomenon that comes
and goes and that when it comes at a particular time, it is a response to perceived threats
that leave one with no other choice than to bend to the will of the authorities. We will not
be able to answer all these questions, but what I want to tease out here is a descriptive
account on behavioral patterns on how Rwandans receive and respond to superiors and
how such responses have created habits and engrained in daily behavioral norms.
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Again, there is no unified theory on this phenomenon but the work of Migdal (2001)
helps us look into it reflectively, albeit in a limiting fashion. He posits that, in the ongoing
processes of interaction between the state and the society, meaning is created and people
become consumers of such meaning. In return, that meaning “naturalizes” (p. 137) people
to the idea of the state. That is, it becomes almost impossible for them to imagine their
lives without the state. State and state officials become as natural as the natural landscape
around them. Hence, officials become synonymous with the political Leviathan that the
state embodies. Deferring to the state in Rwanda carries a multitude of truths, but here I
examine this anticipatory obedience to authority as an expression of primarily rationally
calculated exchange for personal stability (be it socio-economic, security, and even
justice).
In Rwanda, the word “Leta” (state) implies the same meaning as “President.” There
is nearly no cognitive dissonance between the amount of power vested in the state as a
conglomerate of institutions and the individual at the apex of it. In the “Umukuru
w’igihugu” (head of the state) lies the unassailable authority, the reverence that is
considered “kirazira” (sacrosanct) to dare defy. That is why, when a “Shefu” (chief)
speaks, others are expected to listen, ask question to better understand, suggest to improve,
mobilize to unify, but never to decry, dissent, or revolt.107 Kinyarwanda is a hard-coded
culture with respect to how people view leaders. Most respondents throughout my
interviews used proverbial maxims as we continuously bounced exchanges off one another

107
The title “Shefu” is a rwandanized derivative of the French word “chef” (chief) which comes from the old
(Belgian) colonial administrative structure of ‘chefferie” (chieftancy) that was headed by a ‘chef.’ The term
is ubiquitously, and loosely, employed to denote those who are superior to you. The term is also utilized
interchangeably with ‘umukuru’ (superior) ‘umuyobozi’ (leader), ‘umutware’ (commanding one), ‘intore
nkuru’ (the head of the initiated,’ ‘kizigenza,’ (commander), and more, are all codes that are linguistically
power charged expressions of the attachment people have towards the president.
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over the reasons why Rwandans are lenient to the will of leaders. Answers, which these
analysts knew I understood and was able to decode, included for example: “ntawe
uvuguruza umukuru” (no one can contradict umushefu); “uko ingoma zivuze niko
zitambirwa” (as the drum bits go, so goes the dance), “intero nyir’urugo ateye niyo
wikiriza,” (the tune that the head of the household launches is that which everyone in the
house follows), “umwera uturutse ibukuru bucya wakwiriye hose,” (the vibe which comes
from ‘above’ spreads all over overnight).
People are expected to obey because in the words of the leader, just as in those of
the father of every home, is the permanent belief that the “umukuru” is always well
intentioned towards his people. The Shefu’s primary concern is the wellbeing of all his
people. That is why Rwandans say “Umwami ntiyica, hica rubanda,” “the King does not
harm, the rank and files do.” As such, people naturally and positively almost unreflectively
link the power of the leader to their destiny. Each time I asked members of Mushroom
organizations in the four provinces of Rwanda to tell me what they ascribed their
achievements to, effortlessly and instantaneously, the response was uniform: umubyeyi
wacu, Kagame Paul.

I should acknowledge that the term “our parent” is such an

impoverished equivalency in English because it does not carry the versatility that the
original language imbues. “Umubyeyi” is such a semantically versatile moniker. Primarily
it denotes a ‘mother,’ usually a breastfeeding one. But in this context, Umubyeyi conveys
endearing maternal and fatherly sentiments both simultaneously. It also denotes the august
and imminent, majestic at the same time protective, dignified and impressive at once, and
grand and noble and imposing qualities resting in the leader altogether. In Paul Kagame is
the rendition that it is right that there is no one else “uzatugeza ku majyambere arambye,”
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(the one who will deliver us enduring development). Such is a powerful force deep seated
in the psyche of the most average people, and which is perhaps more openly expressed in
rural than urban areas. That is why, people often travel from far regions of the country to
speak to the president and bring questions directly to him when they feel that judicial
institutions or lower leaders at the village and district levels have improperly treated them.
It is also true that often the questions that the population brings to the president are
legitimate ones and reflect the need for proper responses. But CSOs are unable to channel
them through standard mechanisms of arbitration, which partly stems from the fact people
do not generally believe in the ability of CSOs to deliver them finite advocacy. Bypassing
intermediary structures seems to be important in the ways in which the Rwandan society
and the state have always connected to one another. The term umubyeyi that is today used
to describe President Kagame was similarly used during the time of President
Habyarimana.

People used it to praise and enchant him during the animations

populaires—forms of popular adulation of the leader—that members of the MRND had
imported from the neighbor Mobutu’s Zaïre and introduced them into Rwanda.
The 2003 Constitution granted that Kagame would run for only one additional
seven-year term in office, or only until 2017. He once said that if no alternative to him
existed by 2017, then “it means that I have not created capacity for a post-me Rwanda. I
see this as a personal failure” (quoted from Economist 2017).108

Just as Rwanda

approached the expiration of Kagame’s second term, the parliament had received four
million signed petitions to amend the constitution and to allow Kagame to run after 2017
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The Economist. July 15, 2017. “Many Africans see Kagame’s Rwanda as a model. They are wrong”
available and retrieved from online at https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21725000-its-recoveryafter-genocide-has-been-impressive-land-ruled-fear-can-never-be-happy on March 8, 2018.
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(idem).109 Parenthetically, that number represents nearly 60% of the Rwandan electorate
(see Table 6.1). All the 75 parliamentary members voted in favor of the constitutional
amendment. The referendum proposal for that change was approved by 98% of the popular
vote thereafter.
I witnessed this development in person during my summer 2015 fieldtrip. When I
attended a parliamentary session, open to the public in July 2015, the petitions thus far
received at the floor had reached three million. Towards the end of the session, the Speaker
of the house called on “Honorable Bamporiki Edouard,” of RPF, to address the session. It
was unexpected, and visibly unscheduled, that yet another person would speak at that
juncture while the session neared closure. Before him several other members had one-byone made a case on why constitutional change was necessary. They all referenced
testimonies gathered from previous interactions with rural people while on fieldtrips. But
as Bamporiki was about to speak, the atmosphere in the assembly quickly changed. I could
see all cameras turned to him and that all the attention converged towards where he sat.
“Kindi was a certain man from the Eastern region of Rwanda,” he began his tale. He went
on to recite that Kindi was admired for his strength, courage, values of integrity, and many
other virtues that he earned enough trust and favors from the King, including that of
stewarding the royal army. The story ends when Kindi is removed by the king as a result
of jealousy from his peers and intrigues that they concocted against him, which then caused
the royal warriors’ health and morale to shrink. Later the king would probe into the causes
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From another article of the Economist of July 15, 2017, “Paul Kagame, feted and feared. Rwanda is a
more prosperous country than ever before. It is also a repressed one.” Retrieved from web at
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21724982-rwanda-more-prosperous-country-ever-it-alsorepressed-one-paul-kagame on March 8, 2018.
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of unhappiness of his troops when he was told that they had suffered because of
“amaburaKindi,” now a popular dictum to denote a regret expressed over lacking the right
option. It is commonly used in an instance where, for example, children would be forced
to drink water because there is no milk, or eating unsalted meal because the money that
would have been used to buy salt was paid against a pill to treat a sick family member.
Bamporiki ended his tale cautioning that someday Rwanda might experience famine, that
would cause a syndrome he called “amaburaKagame,” or a self-brought drought era on the
nation by ridding it of Kagame.110 In the few minutes that followed, the MP received a
sander
Bamporiki’s metaphoric plea was, in effect, a reminder that Rwanda’s moods,
survival, and wellbeing were always linked to an admiration of the steward. He also meant
to remind that altering the steward was not tantamount to betterment of living conditions
in local context. By cautioning about the uncertainties that might arise with changing the
routine, the tale is also a suggestion that satisfaction, in Rwanda’s history, always came
from the status quo or restoration of the status quo but that change always led to
uncertainties. It was an implicit suggestion that the choice for everyone ought to be clear.
The economic element to the metaphor is also an important one in this political
ramification. It is a reminder that the association that exists between the shefu and events
such as drought, hunger migration, barrenness of the cattle, unfilled granaries, deaths,
diminishment of progeny, and other calamities is deep and central to human conditions in
Rwanda.
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One morning of summer 2015 during my field research, I hopped down to a local
village in the East to meet members of a local Mushroom association. I had spoken over
the phone to the leader of the association days before the meeting. He knew about my
research, who I was, and the kind of atmosphere in which the interaction would occur. My
contact person at a mother-organization in Kigali, whom they interacted on a regular basis,
too, had spoken to the leader of this association that he knew me and about my research
and that they could meet me. We agreed that we would meet at a local public market before
taking me to meet his peers. When he showed up, he told me that plans had changed and
that the meeting had to be cancelled for ‘I’ had not informed the leadership of the Sector,
the next administrative structure after District in Rwanda. He added that he and his peers
would meet me only if the “officials” cleared me for it. He then took me to the head office
of the Sector to speak with the Executive Secretary. In the office, I presented every piece
of paper on me, including my Rwanda, Florida, and student ID cards, to her to prove that I
was innocuous and no stranger in the area up to no good intention. She did not fall for my
effort not to have to reschedule my interviews. “I am conducting these interviews as a
Rwandan citizen,” I implored. “This is just what His Excellence [President Kagame]
ceases not to repeat,” she retorted, “’umucengezi’ will not come from some country from
afar.”111
While I was upset at the stern Executive Secretary for intuiting that my advent was
comparable to that of an insurgent, she was justified in her action to avert my interviews.
She wanted to remind my key informants, their peers, and to me, that deferring to authority
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describe the insurgency led by Interahamwe militiamen who entered and committed murders from Zaïre in
the aftermath of the Genocide.
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has no alternative in the ways Rwanda, across structures, is ordered. And by connecting
her action to the views of the President of Rwanda, she meant to remind us that there is no
matter, however trivial in appearance, that should be severed from the central authority of
the state.

Is Rwanda’s Political Culture Inimical to Liberal Democracy?
How Nefarious to Democratic Culture Rwanda’s Political Culture is?
Imagining Rwanda’s political culture and the place it has always occupied in the
processes of state building as well as in the efforts to democratize the state leads to conclude
that this culture is a double edged sword. On the one hand, evidence shows that it has
consistently tolerated the unchecked power of the President over time. Over time, there
has seemed to be virtually no distinction between what the President wants and the daily
behavior of state’s institutions or of other branches of the government. Kayibanda, the first
leader of Rwanda as a constitutional Republic, run alone even though there were eight
contemporary political parties. He viewed and ruled Rwanda as an exclusively singular
Bahutu nation. After him, the Constitution of 1978 granted that Habyarimana and his
MRND party be the only channel through which every political idea be expressed. Today,
there is no other political alternative practically imaginable in Rwanda than Kagame and
his RPF party. The recent constitutional amendments yielded to his third term reelection,
clearing a path to him for two additional terms thereafter. These three regimes have of
course been fundamentally different in both origins and power structures, but the one thing
that parallels them is the optimal degree of political latitude along with the overwhelming
popular legitimacy that each has enjoyed. The popular support has always been legitimate
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because it is not coerced.112 Whoever is the President of Rwanda always enjoys the latitude
and freedom to shape the meaning, spearhead the action, and behavior of political
institutions without significant opposition to it. That means that the power of the President
is constantly maximal and, in all practical purposes, unassailable. No other organized
power structure has successfully transcended that of the President in the country. That has
always been the case. Of course no President is there forever, but such has always been
the trend in Rwanda’s political arena.
The implication is that there is no threshold on when the President (along with all
the institutional power he wields around him) ceases to be utilized to the best interest of
the citizens or otherwise. Some presidents in Africa started off as promising good
reformists (e.g., Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe or Yoweri Museveni of Uganda) who
attracted wide international support but later morphed into systems dominated by human
rights abuse, self-aggrandizement, corruption, and personal and regime security.113 One
other challenge in the ways we gauge the trajectory of leaders who begin as good and
pragmatist reformists is that their popular support tends to remain significant regardless of
the direction they pull their states into. A significant proportion of the population is likely
to muster a strong support around them; and that is important in the sense that there is a
risk to descend into acute ethnic division in certain countries. Not just that, they also are
likely to go to great strength to support and justify even the most abysmal culmination of
their government. Habyarimana was virtually unanimously portrayed as a role model in
the developing world.

He was seen as a “good manager” (Foka 2015) who used
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development aid to advance his people and promote good governance, stability, fight
against corruption, with a serious vision for the country (Schürings 1995, 495; Renard and
Reyntjens 1993, 11, 18; Reyntjens 1994, 35; Guichaoua 1995a, 33; Willame 1995b, 436,
445; Brusten and Bindariye 1997, 12; Voyame et al. 1996, 61, 64). But along with this
development success of Habyarimana also was the unwavering popular support in the
months that followed his death trying to save the central authority that he represented in
Rwanda. Kamatali (2014) explains, from the interviews he held in the Northern province
of Rwanda, how several convicted Genocide criminals connected their motive to kill to the
principle of “following orders” that is prevalent in Rwanda’s culture. Those inmates would
say “bari badutegetse kwica abatutsi,” ‘they had given us the law to kill abaTutsi’
(Kamatali 2014, 2). “Bari badutegetse” also translates as ‘they had ordered us.’ He further
explains the confusion that Kinyarwanda carries on informal and formal ways of following
orders. For example, the word “order” and “law” means the same: “itegeko.” And the
words “law-giver,” and “order giver,” denote the same thing as “authority” or “official”
(idem). The most important of risks stemming from that cultural attitude towards the shefu
is that it leaves no boundaries between the presidential leeway and independence of other
institutions of the state. It gives credence and hence legitimizes the belief that the President
is ipso facto the superior judge who transcends every sphere of governance, who has the
ability to do, undo, and hence shape the character of institutions, and ultimately thinks and
sees better what is in the best interest of the nation than all others in the land. That
unquestioning trait (towards superiors) is, therefore, a key factor in the forces that drove
the country into the abyss in the 1990s.
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What’s Good About Rwanda’s Political Culture?
On the other side, however, Rwanda’s political culture begs for a different look
than that just castigating it as purely nefarious. In the next few paragraphs, I will analyze
factors that precluded it from supporting democratization in the 1990s in the first place.
Second, I will assess the evolution of that political culture and make new arguments on
how it—as it stands today—could be utilized to advance democratization efforts in a
manner that avoids another 1994 from reoccurring. But before I do that, let us remember
that by Rwanda’s ‘political culture,’ we understand a mode of acting and behaving—
politically—that is a confluence of historical events and cultural beliefs. Throughout this
dissertation, I have treated it as the dominant variable in the outlook of Rwanda’s political
development today.
First of all, in this political culture is the benevolent boon that every President has
always enjoyed in the republican history of Rwanda. Deference to the central authority
has always been an element central to how the state functioned. And as I showed in chapter
two and three, various changes—be they political reforms, external pressures, or within
civil society entities—have never truly succeeded at diminishing the centrality of the
President and his invulnerable leeway in shaping. We have also see, in chapter three, that
when efforts to reduce the power of the state reached the peak in the early 1990s, horror
replaced the democratic outcome that had been hoped. A pluralist democratic rule was in
sight but instead of it the worst happened even before the first election happened. In late
1950s, transitioning from monarchy to a Republic had yielded practically the same results.
Multiparty-ism took off as the colonial rule ended but one party rule, ethnocracy, and
violence dominated the lifetime of that first government. After the Genocide, the foremost
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priority for the incoming regime was to resuscitate the central authority of the state then
lost. In so doing, human rights were violated, political competition shrunk, opposition was
and is still muted, the freedom of media and of civil society restrained and at times
repressed, and the same centralized and personalized power configuration as in the past
returned. At the same time, there is a return to normalcy in the republic today. I have
extensively described the positive reforms and socio-economic gains that the postGenocide state has accomplished in chapter four (see section on civil society and the
macro-economic environment of Rwanda). Which takes us to our next reflection issue
about Rwanda’s political culture today.
Is it possible to preserve democratic principles in Rwanda’s political order
alongside with that culture? And most importantly, what does the future of democracy and
civil society look like in Rwanda? To answer these question, let us focus not on how to
change this political culture because it is pervasive and has been deeply engrained in the
political routine since ages. Rather, let us focus on the elements that it carries that are good
in an ideal democratic order. The assumption is that such elements could potentially be
redemptive of democracy in the future.

We know from past experiences that

confrontational attacks to the state in the hope that its behavior will change leads to nothing
but an absolute uncertainty. Efforts to perturb the central authority are not a guarantee that
civil society will successfully engrain democratic norms in Rwanda’s polity. The power
relations between civil society and the state do just not measure up. I have identified three
ways in which Rwanda’s political culture is not incompatible to democratization effort.
That is, the synthesis between a liberal democracy and Rwanda’s political culture
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corresponds to the principles of “responsibility-accountability,” “consultation,” and
“stability.”
The current regime has learned lessons from the history of exclusion and division
that previous regimes harbored. The new government has been addressing some of the
pressures stemming from that past.

For example, education under Habyarimana

systematically excluded thousands of Tutsi using the ethnic quota policy; today, ‘education
for all’ is the norm (Obura 2005, 1). Education is one of the counter argument brought
forth by the government of Kagame to argue that it does not practice exclusion as its
predecessors. RPF dominates the economy and possesses a large bulk of the domestic
private equity, but most of the wealth it accumulates is reinvested and stays in the country
(Cheeseman 2018). Diversity of media is repressed but at the same time, the government
has availed and made Internet accessible to all (GoR 2010, 54-66). In addition, rules are
strictly applied to the extent that ministers have gone to jail over corruption (Bachorz 2009;
Economist 2012; East-African 2016).114 Universal education (22% of the national budget)
combined with governmental investment in other sectors of economy (technology,
agriculture, health, etc.) will all lead to development of entrepreneurial skills.115 New
conditions will form to give financial opportunities to many young Rwandans in the future.
That, in return, will create new possibilities for social mobility for many and a cultural shift
will occur in favor of liberal values. The new working class will expand and strengthen.
The rule of law, fight against corruption, and other measures conducive to economic
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growth, mixed with pro-gender policies, will support such progress and work as a synergy
that future governments will need to pay attention to. Consequently, a middle class will
become an important group to arbiter the polity in future.
In addition to the above referenced sectors that the state has heavily invested into,
because they are Rwanda’s “foundation issues” (MINECOFIN 2017, 29) worth 47% of the
national budget, the state has continuously showed that it takes interest in the needs of
citizens and it commits to addressing their demands. The ministry of local administration
(MINALOC) recently launched a toll-free number for citizens to file complaints from their
telephone devices (Niyonzima 2018). The online platform is meant to channel and
expedite complaints of individuals who are victim to negligence or injustices by their local
officials. The complainant dials a number and directly prompted to instructions. Once
filed, they receive a receipt notice. The complaint is then forwarded to all appropriate
officials, including those in charge of following-up and accountability.
The system was introduced following the citizen outreach tour in February 2018,
when president Kagame scolded his ministers for not ending issues that people keep
bringing to him. He asked his Ministers to go out of their office and spend more time
solving citizens’ concerns given that “it looked like people do not trust their grassroots
leaders” (idem 1). To the extent that cellphone permeation rate is over 77.8% in Rwanda
and that 99.1% of national territory has cellphone network coverage (NISR 2016, 84), this
mechanism has the potential to be successful and to execute an important bulk of the work
that civil society has challenges accomplishing.
In this political culture, the Head of State serves as the ultimate recourse and
guarantor for major change within the country. It is at the top of the realm that the tone is
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set, which would suggest that interactions are always vertically unidirectional. But there
is also an element of reciprocity to this political culture and the ways in which state-society
relations play. While the president enjoys unreserved obedience from the people, he is also
expected of them to serve as the buffer and to shield them against perilous doings, including
when they come from his subordinates.116 We see this through the ways in which president
Kagame has interacted with his subordinates across structures of the government. During
the recent leadership retreat, an annual event gathering the political elites to evaluate
governmental programs, president Kagame reincarnated in his Leviathan position not just
to admonish his subalterns but also to show the country that he is watching for it and that
his action suited the wellbeing of citizens.
“The cost of [adoring] protocol on us is steep,” he said alluding to leaders obsessed
with attention and the honors the positions they occupy bequeath them. He implied that
his ministers and other leaders within his administration repeatedly show lust and desire
for attention rather than being characterized by a sense of duty (Girinema 2018, 1). “Your
love for protocol is a bad habit...you would, for example, find five people racing to find
one chair for one person, or a Permanent Secretary fighting others to secure one specific
seat […] for [their] Minister. […] or many officials including high ranking police offers
and managers of an airline abandoning their duties to salute and run behind a minister at
the airport after landing from a foreign mission,” (idem) he continued. “I took a phone
and called one of such ministers and told him that ‘the next time I see you allowing it,’ I
will have fired you the following morning” (idem). “[…], when they go out in the
community, it is as if the heaven has descended. …, they don’t spend time on the primary
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The usage of the subject “he” for a general statement is only meant to describe past presidents of Rwanda
(all men), not to masculinize the presidential function.
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reason for the trip, rather on the protocol. Other tasks must stop because people have to
abandon their office to put attention on welcoming him. He then sees just that, not what is
behind the wall of protocol [..], he only sees what they have prepared him to see. […] This
culture must stop. It is too expensive; it accomplishes nothing, and it means absolutely
nothing. Your personal importance should be gotten rid of from this. If you are truly
professional, you don’t get lost in these useless things,” (idem) he ended his lecture.
Again, in this political culture there is a contrast that separates the strong-man
syndrome from conventional norms for channeling and responding to people’s demands.
But insofar as Rwanda’s cultural context dictates it as such, my analysis here has
subsequently stayed on the outcomes. The presidential function remains central in the
ways in which society interacts with the state. The president is symbolic of the political
Leviathan for channeling grassroots’ aspirations for change. He rationalizes political
action and events along the binding Leviathan – strong expectations relationship that the
state maintains with the society. Rwanda’s polity is therefore defined, in theory and
practice, by the degree to which the president lives up to his role as the Leviathan in
executing what is considered good for the people.
When he attended a panel at the Wall Street Journal – Investment in Africa Summit
in London in March 2017, President Kagame was asked by the panel discussant to contrast
his development success and the change of the Constitution (that later allowed him to win
a third term in office). “We have at no occasion been involved in doing anything wrong
against our people,” he responded.117 In a sense, he meant that “being bad to the people”
was the metric by which all events and behavior ought to be gauged.
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Cited from YouTube video on the panel that President Kagame held in London on March 7, 2017 retrieved
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TjZQisyGSWA (28:25mins) on March 8, 2018.
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His response suggests that, by virtue of the contract that binds his Leviathan role
and the Rwandan people, recent constitutional change is not tantamount to “bad,” and that
it is rather a ‘good’ political routine insofar as it enabled him to continue to ‘develop’ them.
Or differently put, out of this state-society relationship comes the pressure on the Leviathan
to act they ways they do.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

“…The vision of Rwanda as a country—its challenges, its priorities, its people, its
politics—is remarkably similar across agencies and people […]. There is almost no
information on what people think, feel, hope for, believe in, dislike, or dream of; their
social relations and conflicts; their perceptions of development, the state, or the aid
system; or their resources, networks, capacities, or aspirations. [documents available]
offer only indirect, occasional glimpse into the realities of Rwandans as people. This is
the case for all African countries and the people living in them.”
(Uvin 1999, 9).
Throughout this dissertation, I have sought to spur a new discussion on ways in
which we think about the project of the democratization of African states. Since the 1990s,
the debate on the attributes of civil society and on why it has not enabled states to
democratize has come to a dead end. The arguments I have made herein aim to illustrate
the contextual complications that applying ideas and policies of democracy (in Africa)
encounter in societies as challenged and challenging as Rwanda. Conceptually, my
arguments have shown that domestic cultural realities are too important a factor to ignore
in the analysis. That is, understanding the outcomes of democratization in Africa requires
us to pay attention to the interior logics of why the project of democratization—civil
society being the medium—has faced longstanding resistance. There is a need to take an
inward look at the workings of politics and at the organic ingredients that have shaped it,
not simply at the outer forms of democracy or the structures of the state.
Theoretically, I wanted to show that de Tocqueville (2001) and Putnam (1993) were
correct to connect sociocultural traditions to political practices.

In a way, what de

Tocqueville meant was that democracy in America had been a function of a hard,
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conscious, and inward work which, in the sense that civic associations reinforced the
“habits of the heart,” became foundational to stable and effective institutions (Tocqueville
1969, pp. 525-528).

In return, civil associations produced a “culture congenial to

democracy” (Tocqueville 2000, 190).118 Yet, the ways in which African civil society has
been theorized and connected to democracy follows a different logic. That it, the focus has
been the numerical, economic, and institutional aspects of groups. We continue to treat
CSOs in Africa as if they have similar evolution and maturation as those of their Western
counterparts. The evolutionary logic of civil society in Africa differs profoundly from that
it had in the West. Therefore, my arguments here have been to highlight that the civil
society – democracy model (in Africa) is one that is built on inadequately predicated
theory. That is to stay, the ontological conditions for what truly make civil society –
democracy relationship work do not yet exist and that has not received proper consideration
in academia. That state and society in many societies, as it is the case in Rwanda, are
produced by a different cultural logic than that which produced democracy in the West.
Previous scholarship on civil society and its incidence on democracy in Rwanda
has not produced ideas that can truly help advance political development in Rwanda. The
discourse on political development in Rwanda has led to a divided and divisive impasse.
It leaves the reader stuck between the ‘villain’ and ‘hero,’ or a pro- versus anti- choice,
which is harmful in a society whose ethnic dynamics align well with that duality. My
arguments are centrist and realistic. I recognize the fundamentality of liberal democratic
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It is true that then America was riddled with controversies associated with its treatment of Black people
and other minorities and women, but the singularity of its political system is that its original design carried
neutral principles of communal republicanism deriving from parochially driven civic virtues that the
founders successfully turned into institutions. It was made to evolve and be correctible while preserving
the sacrosanct individual liberties and rights (see Needleman 2003).
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values, but take a different view of how they can be realized, and the pace at which they
can be applied. Rwanda experienced an externally enforced transition in the 1990s, but the
outcome was disastrous, particularly because the socio-cultural and historical context was
not ripe for it. The challenge presented by previous scholarship and various projects of
democratization stem from the fact that they examine the problem from only one point of
view. Democratization (and all its sustaining forces) need to be re-conceptualized beyond
universalizing standards; it needs to take into account socio-political and cultural realities
of the context as well.
The civil society and state relationship does not have to be binary, ranging (as
Migdal has argued) between “disinterest” and “outright hostility” (Migdal 2003, 133). As
he observes, when the state and society interact, it is a more complex process than it
appears, and hence, it cannot be reduced to duality. The two morph with one another in a
continuous way. Therefore, “states do not succeed in establishing their own domination
by default. In fact, they may end up as much the transformed as the transformative state”
(idem). For that reason, scholarship on democratization needs to treat both the state and
the society as two equal sides of the phenomenon. That is what I have attempted to do in
this dissertation: to analyze the democratization work of civil society from within
Rwanda’s political cultural framework.

In the next paragraphs I offer a summarized

account of my arguments and of what challenges building civil society and democratization
in Rwanda have been. At the end, I also offer a reflection on what should be done as far
as the future of civil society and democratization is concerned.
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History
Going as back as far as pre-colonial times, we do not find ingredients of
autonomous forces whose primary goal was to counter or undermine the state’s action.
Strong social capital always existed in Rwanda, but it was always in support of the central
authority. That is as true in pre-colonial order as well as throughout the systems that
followed it. Before colonialism, Rwandans were religiously deferential to authorities; that
cultural trait is still pervasive in contemporary politics. Colonialism did not alter that
structure of social order. Instead, it reinforced it and did not institute recipes for a liberal
constitutional democracy by allowing veritable independent organizational movements.
More than anything, the colonial order complicated the chance for a democratizing civil
society when it first reinforced the existing order, and then switched sides, perpetuating
risks of unstable institutions while perturbing the stability of existing social order. That
instability is still an important ingredient in the ways Rwanda’s political culture has
historically adapted and changed in response to democratic pressures.

President

Kayibanda, propelled to prominence by the colonial power, governed as an ‘ethnocrat.’ He
failed to lay the first foundational corner stone that would have disrupted old political
traditions. He was the chance for Rwanda to cultivate new civic virtues that he would turn
into institutions, but he did not. Habyarimana, taking inspiration from previous political
orders, followed the same governing logic. His MRND party and regionalist rule excluded
a segment of the population, exacerbating ethnic tensions that eventually plunged the
country into chaos. Kagame, a product of the previous political anxieties that eventuated
into the Genocide, was not expected to adopt a political behavior different than that of his
predecessors with respect to handling oppositional forces. Historical patterns that continue
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to characterize state and society relations in Rwanda come from the fact that the elites never
truly had organically grown constraints, nor the desire, or the incentive to create a
competitive liberal order in which civil society has a significant voice.
The first rise of organized groups in Rwanda—in 1943—did not come out of
popular desire to contest the power of the colonial state. It was a creation of the colonial
state to channel economic needs of the colonial elite. Subsequent associational movements
were always viewed and treated as such.

This pattern took root and during the

democratization era the Genocide exposed the weaknesses and the danger of enforcing
democratization through archetypes that are not organically grounded in the contextual
cultural realities. Before and after the outbreak of the Genocide, civil society split into
both “constructive” and “destructive” forces, and in remarkable number of instances turned
against the very population it claimed as its own constituencies.

Economic Arguments About the Failures of Civil Society in Democratization
There are three levels at which civil society intersects with political development
in Rwanda, individual, group, and the macro national economic environment. On the
individual level, people join Mushroom or grassroots associations primarily to meet their
material and emotional needs.

Participating in associational movements bestows

opportunities to socialize and help resolve economic needs of an individual. Like in most
societies, members feel a natural urge to enjoy freedom, and also have the state serve their
needs. Associations are an alternative to achieving those needs or those that the state
cannot meet for them. Rwandan associations are not joined primarily to serve members’
intention to challenge the political order. Individuals are generally poor and even povertystricken at the grassroots associational level. Therefore, associations are meant to address
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basic local problems that are outside the processes of countering the state. But in their
endeavors, individuals within grassroots groups wind up, consciously or otherwise,
building communities and constituting empowered structures that are useful in state
building and eventually local strands of democracy. Yet, associations at the grassroots are
vital forces of democratization that receive little to no attention in the ways in which we
connect civil society to democratization.
On the group level, CSOs that are financially viable are not likely to conduct
themselves any differently. Some (relative) financial independence does not necessarily
make them change behavior or mission and hence make them assertive vis-à-vis the state.
Quite similarly, financially destitute groups and those with a financial vitality both behave
in a similar fashion in the ways they approach the state and its authority. Because of the
leeway that cultural and other contextual realities have given to the state, CSOs have no
other choices than to be a labor force that the government has utilized to implement its
development vision. And as long as members of such CSOs continue to benefit from it,
they have, by and large, remained content with that arrangement. That puts even more at
odd the idea that CSOs are a force that can truly challenge the state when they are
financially vibrant.

Institutional Accounts
Putnam was right to assert that “institutions are devices for achieving purposes, not
agreement” (1993, 8). He observed that developing institutionalism was important for
democratic performance, but most important that engraining a type of institutionalism in
system of order that is already established was the most difficult thing to achieve. Just as
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Arturo Israel has argued, it is a one thing to build a road, building the organization that
manages it is another (Israel 1987, 112).
In Rwanda’s colonial era, institutions served to reinforce the power of the
colonizers by closely regulating the role of non-state associations and channeling them to
the purposes of the colonial state. This established in the political culture the role that
CSOs should play vis-à-vis the state. The same role was re-produced during the one-party
era of Kayibanda and Habyarimana, with institutions reinforcing the idea that CSOs
organizations should serve state purposes. In the 1990-94 era, new institutions were
adopted and adapted to the pressures of history—especially seeking to resonate with a
traumatized, fearful, and angry population. However, just as in the past, new institutions
were crafted to reflect the traditional precedence of the state over other social structures.
That reordering of institutions and of the society as a collective has systematically
structured the role of CSOs, subsuming them under a state directed development agenda.

A Political Culture to Be Embraced
As we have seen, there are several challenges to analyzing the relationship between
civil society and democratization through the lenses of institutionalism and the economics
in Rwanda. As we have equally seen, the variable that is more important in this analysis
is political culture. That is, Rwanda’s state-non state actors relations cannot be understood
without understanding the workings of its political culture. But if Rwanda’s political
culture dominates explanations for its democratic trajectory, that too poses a dual dilemma.
On the one hand, it leads us to imagine it as purely exclusive of and antagonistic to liberal
democratic principles. On the other hand, that political culture is and remains the social
foundation that has held the state up, keeping it from crumbling and enabling it to redevelop
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across various tumultuous episodes. Without it, Rwanda might have been reduced to the
collapsed-state condition of contemporary Somalia. There is also the fact that the hope and
the hard work done to liberalize politics in Rwanda in the 1990s has not altered that political
culture; it has survived and barely changed. As a matter of fact, Rwanda’s political culture
has even been strengthened after the Genocide. There is then a case to be made that such
political culture should be recognized in the future processes of democratizing Rwanda via
the medium of civil society. Putting civil society at the service of democracy in Rwanda
is going to have to take an integrative approach with respect to Rwanda’s political culture.
But before I develop this theme in the next section, let us look at the place that Rwanda’s
political culture has given to civil society in the overall political order.
First off, in Rwanda, civil society as a concept and an important element in
democratic order is rarely seen as a policy field. And here I am referring to balloon and
minion organizations, which for the most part are based in the capital city, whereas
Mushrooms are remote, grassroots entities. There seems to be no sense of urgency or
pressure within either the ruling class or the public conscious that civil society is a public
issue needing national attention and mobilization. My research suggests that public
officials do not imagine it as an element of state advancement if it contradicts them. Rather,
state elites have always seen and managed to keep CSOs as convenient partners for
executing developmental agenda.

That constricts its significance in setting national

priorities and in the general processes of ordering the society. Similarly, advocacy—
usually political and sensitive of issues—weighs less than the issue of development.
Professionals within civil society conceive of it the same way.

There is a general

recognition that civil society is too weak to influence national issues that are political in
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nature. Consequently, there is no impetus to engage on issues that carry such sensitivity,
and hence people do not commit beyond the intention to fulfill personal interest. On the
other hand, the government is aware of civil society’s vulnerabilities but also knows that
the best profit of their relationship lies in their ability to execute development programs, as
suggested by a part of the former Minister of Local Government in Chapter 4, section on
“civil society within Rwanda’s macro-economic environment.” That is, members of civil
society are so attracted by the economic incentives that the development agenda offers
them that the mission to challenge the state stays secondary. For that reason, CSOs have
become the most reliable development labor force which, besides executing the state
directed programs such as health, education and agriculture, poses no real threat to the state
imposed political order.
NGOs in Rwanda are overwhelmingly service delivery oriented. The primary force
behind this tendency is that they are still building their economic capacity.

The

demographic makeup of this civil society reflects the needs of an average Rwandan,
seeking to better his or her life every day. In a democratic sense, there is too little that civil
society is accomplishing, but in an economic sense, most CSOs have found comfort in the
development agenda set by the state.

In the future, meaning after they have built

themselves, civil society NGOs will need to play a bigger role of bridging the state and the
society. They will do so by embracing and increasing work on all means of the society
through a bigger, peaceful, and enduring discourse. They will, for example, need to make
the mayor explain about the budget to the people. They will have to mobilize forces and
advocates to work on questions related to water, transportation, equitable access to
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resources and energy and other environmental protection issues by building bridges across
interests, and not just in their usual capacity as service delivery vehicles.
But that also means that CSOs will have to work within the dispersed strands of
democratization. That is, civil society will need to tackle democratization issues by starting
at the bottom structures of government, which do not threaten the regime. It is a problem
when they vilify the President, but it is ironically encouraged by the President when they
denounce a Minister, a Mayor of a District or an Executive Secretary of a Sector for
embezzling public funds or for misbehaving in any way that would be inacceptable if done
by the President. This is demonstrated each time President Kagame effectuates one of his
“popular outreaches,” at which citizens bring to him various complaints that local leaders
often have failed to resolve. In many instances, such complaints are directed against those
leaders. People are eager and fearless to denounce the vices of a local leader whenever the
President visits their community. There is also the fact that civil society often fails to
denounce them before citizens bring them to the attention of the President. But such is a
contextual reality that has always linked the state and the society. Civil society has not
truly ever embodied the channel through which ordinary citizens’ demands are taken to the
upper echelons of the state, notably the President, in Rwanda. The state appears to have a
greater sensor of where the needs of the people are going (and the appropriate instruments
for that) than civil society does. That is a challenge that Rwanda’s civil society still faces
and needs to learn to work through in its democratization struggles. As of present, CSOs’
greater strength lies in executing development programs and it is likely to remain so for a
long future. And until it has the organizational and financial grit that is commensurate to
the might of the state, then this civil society will first have to stay and work strategically
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within the decentralized arenas of democratization and team up with all the Mushroom
organizations. That is where the hope and the impetus to counter and balance the state by
CSOs seems to lie. After all, the fact remains that 80 percent of Balloons and Minions
NGOs are based in Kigali, but 80 percent of the population is rural.

Therefore,

concentrating in the capital city because it is where the financial capital is will not help
civil society to achieve significant change. They have a tough road ahead because, for a
CSO to be strong, they need constituencies and communities and organic mechanisms of
raising resources and hence the financial autonomy. International NGOs will need to
recognize the challenges weighing on local CSOs and therefore support them to function
within Rwanda’s socio-cultural realities. Power is centralized and personalized, and
deference to the central authority is still a culture potently engrained in Rwandans’ routine.
And the Genocide has re-legitimized it. As a result, civil society is differently organized
in Rwanda than it is in Uganda, Burundi, or DRC.
By giving less attention to rights to food, education, education, clean water, safety
of mining laborers, and other parochial components of rights, organizations such as Human
Rights Watch (HRW) take a very narrow view of human rights. The context is important
in Rwanda. Let us take an example of such agencies as USAID, DFID, SIDA. In their
mission to develop civil society in Rwanda, put priority to the “independence” aspect of it.
But power, throughout different regimes that have followed one another in postindependence Rwanda, has always been ruled in such a way that freedom of non-state
actors means to be anti-state. Therefore, other than creating jobs for members, there is not
truly a whole set of change one can hope and expect USAID to accomplish in terms of
using democratic strategies to alter the political order. When USAID gives a $100,000

240

grant to a local Balloon organization, it naturally gets involved in the process of hiring
team members who will implement that project.119 When they hire, it is always a meritbased and competitive process, which means they do not ask whether the candidate is a
Hutu or Tutsi. They recruit individuals on the basis of their competence. But such
individuals may have different ethnic backgrounds. In fact, they may put in one office two
people, one of whom may have relatives in jail over Genocide related crimes and the other
of whom is Genocide survivor. Next, irrespective of such social conundrums, USAID puts
them together and task them to reconcile interests, history, feelings, and views, and hence
form alliance and a strategy on countering the state. For those two locals to coalesce, unify
views, and decry the government is the onerous of demands one can be asked to execute in
Rwanda. Interpersonal trust is still challenged by recent events in Rwanda’s history. It is
still forming across individuals of the Rwandan society. Therefore, to demand the two
individuals such a task accomplishes nothing other than setting up a confrontational
environment. Especially so because the government is not impressed or amused by such
approach. Another challenge stemming from that is also that international organizations—
who have more power, instruments, qualifications, and protection to voice anything
improper that the government of Rwanda engages into—do not say anything. Yet, they
are the first to demand such a task from the weak CSOs that are bereft of some kind of
solid protection that are not equipped or prepared should their action backfire.
One other recurrent complaint about Rwanda’s political system is that there is no
space for dissenting opinions about the government allowed in the public square. It is true:
Rwanda’s political arena is tightly controlled by the state. And such has been a pattern
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A though formulated based upon an interview I held with a U.S. government officer in Kigali in spring
2012.
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since before Rwanda became a Republic and after it obtained independence in 1962.
However, it is also true that CSOs have not accomplished anything using current strategies
for countering the state. In the past (1990-1994 and shortly after the end of the Genocide),
confronting the state head-on has produced nefarious results.120 Considering the fluidity
and risks of these mobilization tactics, CSOs should adopt a less confrontational approach
in attempt to accomplish something different than it has been the case in the past.
Rwanda’s public has consistently showed that it is tolerant towards dominance of the
state’s authority and civil society is has never truly been able to reverse that social order.
And because the environment remains constraining for liberalizing that order, then new
strategies are essential. CSOs will need to re-conceptualize their role and seek to effect
political traditions from within the system, not through outright hostility towards it. They
need to do so by acting as part of the society (and thus the system), not separate from it.
The opposite has not led to change.
On the other side, it is unlikely that the state will change or give them a leeway that
could cause a perturbation to the public order. For example, when I interviewed the head
of RGB on his view of CSOs and the place they should occupy, his answer would not have
been any blunter. The envisaged relation with CSOs is that of both “business partners”
that are “citizen centered,” and “not as opponents.” He specified that the government wants
CSOs to be “good clients.” He also indicated that the government was not against CSOs’
“talking, speaking, and criticizing” as long as [all that] was in conjunction with “doing,”
which means doing what is in correspondence with the government’s vision. The head of
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I have discussed this topic in Chapter 5, section titled “Civil Society and democratization in the 1990s:
what happened to institutions after opening the political space?” and also in Chapter 6, section titled
“Rwanda’s civil society and democratization through the logic of trust and social capital.”
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RGB added that one of the reasons why local governments (districts) were successful in
bettering lives of their citizens was in part because CSOs were actively involved in the
monthly Joint Action Development Forum (JADF), to plan and budget development
activities. He explained that JADFs had traditionally been presided over by the ViceMayor in charge of economic affairs, but that between 2012 and 2015 (my interview time),
only 8 out the 30 districts were still led by district officials, others by volunteers stemming
from international NGOs. What that means is that aspiring to total autonomy of CSOs
outside of the state’s control is practically unforeseeable. Clearly, the state does not
envisage to free them from its grand development architecture. It wants them to be a party
to the state development plan, not autonomous actors upon it. Therefore, if there is a
change that must come from CSOs, it is going to come from community-centered
approaches by such organizations. CSOs are going to utilize the community space to
convey messages to the state and they are going to need to do so strategically, creatively,
intelligently, but non-confrontationally. My interviews suggested that the government is
receptive somewhat only when complaints are courteously delivered, hard evidence
supported, credibly built, and thus compellingly presented.
But as CSOs operate within those parochial and dispersed strands of democracy,
challenges for them will remain insofar as they are still heavily dependent on external
funding. Absence of financial independence affects the quality of skills and hence the
personnel they wind up with. They are unable to run effectively their offices. There are
no unions or other systematic mechanisms through to raise resources. CSOs are always
looking for resources. Most of them are concentrated in the capital city or want to work at
the national level. Many of them are “briefcase CSOs,” meaning their opportunistic start
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creates ephemeral results, and that is in no way a recipe to advance the liberalization of
society and culture.
Trust also still poses a challenge in ways in which civil society would like to
mobilize and assert its independence from the state. At the central level (district and
national)—where international NGOs support is concentrated—interpersonal trust is still
problematic.

Individuals involved in civil society are mostly professionals that

circumstances have randomly brought together. That creates a reality whereby individuals,
not knowing very well the person they are called to engage with, are reluctant to open up
to one another on all political matters. That is, people say one thing in public (media,
academia, community meeting) but say another in a private setting. The only level where
trust is not an impediment to the workings of civil society is within the Mushrooms. Some
interpersonal trust at the grassroots level—what one could call intra-associational
Mushroom trust—exists. At least enough trust among members of Mushrooms to work
together exists. But on aggregate level, the question of what does it mean to mobilize civil
society constituencies (as a united front) and coalesce them around issues of communal
interest when there is no trust still lingers. Elites at the CSO (national) level are motivated
more by the desire to meet personal interests (material goal) than communal vocation
(collective goals). And, when collective and altruistic values are outweighed by selfserving interests, in addition to other challenges arising from domestic context such as
ethnic, regional, and political conflicts, then it becomes an impossibility for such civil
society to reverse the democratic trajectory Rwanda has been on.
I do not think that the term ‘political culture’ has done semantic justice to this
phenomenon (the inability of civil society to alter state behavior regarding democracy).
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Nor do I believe that describing it as such conveys enough features of knowledge that this
culture embodies. But in it, I wanted to convey that there might be a sacred and sacralizing
element in the conscience of Rwandans about ‘authority.’ The origins of this culture may
be traced back in precolonial times, but most puzzling is why Rwanda’s critical junctures
(colonialism, the revolution of 1959, independence, the coup d’état of 1973,
democratization in 1990, the Arusha Peace Accords of 1993; and the Genocide) were
unable to alter its patterns. I do not believe that it is because Rwandans are gullible or
servile and incapable of standing up to totalitarian behavior, but it appears hardly deniable
that many Rwandans are comfortable abiding by the leaders’ way. They have always
believed leaders to be generally just and right. This is not unique to Paul Kagame, the
latest leader. Each of his predecessors has enjoyed the same level of cultural legitimacy.
For that, he is a perpetuator of traits of statecraft that predate his advent into Rwanda’s
political arena. The ‘you don’t challenge authorities’ seems to be deeply planted in the
imagination as a cultural norm in Rwanda. Kayibanda was described as “an ethnic
autocrat” (Scherrer 2002, 77), Habyarimana as “an educational totalitarian” (Guichaoua
2010, 44), and recently Kagame as “a transformative authoritarian” (Straus and Waldorf
2011, 5). Whatever their goals or their methods of achieving them, however, all have
reflected, in the eyes of many analysts, the authoritarian norms and expectations of the
wide Rwandan population.
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Can African Civil Society Be Made to “Work” for a Liberal Constitutional
Democracy?
Three decades ago, enforcing civil society in Africa was an idea that gave hope to
the world. Throughout this dissertation, I showed and described factors hindering and
dissipating that hope in Rwanda. At the fall of USSR, both insiders and outsiders made
copious efforts towards making democracy work in African states. But rather than closing
the debate, the ubiquity of instruments of democratization has added even more
questions. Out of the 54 states in the continent, fewer than the number of fingers on a hand
are recognized as true democracies by international agencies rating democratic
progress. In spite of an increase in democratic norms and reforms, modes of governing
and ordering African societies have rarely moved away from the status quo. Going
forward, there is no assurance that developing civil society in the same ways as it has been
the case will produce a different outcome.
Yet, the old ways are still the dominant approach to promoting democracy in Africa,
i.e., through development of a strong civil society. The development community has not
absorbed many lessons from the past. For example, just between 2007 and 2013, the
European Union (EU) channeled nearly U.S. $6 billion (€5B) of its development aid
through civil society in Africa (Piebalgs 2013, 2). Prior to that, several summits gathering
the EU and the ACP countries (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) resulted in creation of the
“Cotonou Agreements” (European Commission 2014).121

The EU, through this

partnership, mandated that African states receiving its aid (to national budget) allocate a

121

This series of summits established and then modified the Cotonou Agreements over the years. There
was first the Lomé Convention (Togo) in 1975, which was then updated in 2000 in Cotonou (Benin), and
again in Luxembourg in 2005, and again in 2010 in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) (see European
Commission 2014).
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certain percentage to local CSOs, so as to allow participatory policy-making domestically
(idem Pp. 21-40). Most states of sub-Saharan Africa (48) are parties to the Cotonou
Agreement (idem Pp. 8-10). In addition, At the Lisbon Summit in 2007, the EU and 54
African countries adopted the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) with, among others, the
goal of “moving ‘beyond institutions’ by working towards a people-centered partnership,
ensuring the participation of civil society and the private sector and delivering direct
benefits for African and European citizens” (EU-AU 2014, 31).
These efforts are the same old methods that viewed civil society as a phenomenon
capable of developing in a linear progression. Implicitly, the Cotonou Agreements and the
JAES assumed that because it worked well in one place, therefore it must work the same
way elsewhere, regardless of individual contextual conditions. That approach has seldom
changed or adapted even though the social, cultural, and political contexts in many African
states have clearly changed. Associational movements are still a route to democratic
change in the Western imagination.

As Andris Piebalgs, the EU Commission for

Development, put it, “civil society organizations form a vital part of any truly democratic
system” (Piebalgs 2013, 1). The West clearly believes that the stronger civil society is in
Africa, the stronger and more democratic the African states. In turn, strong and democratic
states make better economic partners for the developed West. But, given the Rwanda
experiment in previous decades, we have seen the limitations of this philosophy of
democratization. Each context is equally essential in the analysis, and hence worthy
examining. At glance, one may naturally think that civil society was vital to events such
as ‘the Arab Spring,’ whose only real success story is Tunisia (Feuer 2017). Likewise, ‘the
Citizens' Broom’ in Burkina Faso which brought an end to the 27 year-long rule of Blaise

247

Compaoré, as well the ‘Enough is Enough’ movement in Senegal that averted Abdoulaye
Wade from instituting lifetime and nepotism-based rule fit the Western view of civil
society’s potential for political transformation. But the sui generis nature of each of these
countries’ social, historical, political, ethnic, and economic context is equally important in
the analysis.
Therefore, amidst these efforts still lingers the question of how the development
community’s approach to civil society can learn how to circumvent the serious challenges
posed by rigid social norms and politico-cultural realities in some African states. After all,
the EU’s model for civil society is, a priori, and feeds into the quintessential liberal
argument premised on Huntington’s faith in the “global democratic revolution”
(Huntington 1991, 33) proffered since the 1990s. And if democracy, be it on local or global
levels, is a system that many states are struggling to integrate and to which civil society’s
vibrancy appears as a good remedy, then the questions of a) why has it not yet happened,
and b) why has this three-decade old debate not closed yet remain legitimate and
unanswered.
But that too, leads to another question: why does civil society behave differently in
Africa and West? To me, understanding the causal relationship between civil society and
democracy in Africa calls for a shift in approach. It requires a transposition of normativity
on traditionalism. The examination of civil society and its role in political reform needs to
take an inside-out approach. That is, because of the ways in which complexities
surrounding civil society in Africa unfolds, there is a need to move beyond the simplicity
that connects CSOs to democratic rule. There is a need to gauge civil society not just
against the international and normative standards, but against domestic environment too.
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That is what I have attempted to do throughout this dissertation and that is how we can
truly understand the factors of acceptance and resistance to democratization in Africa.
Understanding the workings of civil society in Africa, as in this specific case of
Rwanda, cannot be decoupled from the local cultural context and how that context has
historically conditioned the political orientations of citizens. There are strong cultural
artifacts historically embedded in political practices at both the state and non-state actor
levels that a normative civil society cannot hope to change in a swift fashion. Obedience
to authority in Africa is more cultural than misusage of rationality in most African
societies. Following orders and submission to the supreme authority of the nation is a
powerful social characteristic that pervades all spheres of influence. It is thus dubious that
one dominant model for civil society can prevail in such settings. In addition, in Africa,
the state-society relations are, by and large, conceived as an expansion of family ruling
system, in which the father is the ultimate guarantor of the ontological security, i.e., a
provider and a protector (Schatzberg 2001). In return, this father figure—whom I have
referred to as the political Leviathan—receives loyalty from members of that family
institution. In Rwanda, even the shock created by the Genocide has not altered this mode
of living and relating to those in power.
Consequently, in a way, to the extent that the African political culture remains a
powerful social force in fashioning these state-society relations, and to a degree, remains a
fundamental instrument of ordering the society. Therefore, there is a need not to subjugate,
squash, or exclude that cultural context from our knowledge of democratization and its
variations across the globe. Effective support of civil society in Africa needs to find a good
balance between services and advocacy, between traditionalism and global normative
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standards, and between societal and political aspirations. Advocates for making civil
society ever more vibrant must make it work from the bottom towards the middle of the
spectrum before seeking to effect an overall transformation of state-society relations.
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